



NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE FOUNDATION

# AFGHANISTAN TO 2014 AND BEYOND

ASK AND TASK

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**Afghanistan to 2014**

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# AFGHANISTAN TO 2014 AND BEYOND

**ASK AND TASK**

*Conference organised by*  
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*in cooperation with*  
NATO DEFENSE COLLEGE  
ISTITUTO AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI



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# FOREWORD

AMBASSADOR ALESSANDRO MINUTO-RIZZO  
*NDCF President*

International security is a problem concerning everybody, in the same category of climate, energy or the environment. This is why we are all concerned with the events taking place in Central Asia. It is a difficult issue as we know too well and obviously it is not a colonial war, nor one fought for hegemony or over territory as we were accustomed to see in the past.

The issue is to rebuild a state that had tragically collapsed, doing in a few years what normally takes a much longer time. Afghanistan was aggressed by the Soviet Union, experienced a savage civil war and harboured a very bad brand of international terrorism. We are trying to help the Afghans to achieve a decent government, a more advanced social organization, an acceptable economic development.

Every chapter in history has its own challenges. The Afghan chapter is still being written and we do not know yet how it is going to end because there are many variables. Today, as it is the case when events are in full flow, it is difficult to understand the problems “all together”, but the Alliance and the international community have to cope with the problem and fulfil a pledge.

As it happens in democratic countries and at international level the “why NATO?” keeps frequently coming up at every crucial point of this issue. The answer is surprisingly simple: “Well, because up to this day it is the only serious tool at the disposal of the international community when crisis management becomes difficult”. Only this and nothing more.

We have to remember that Afghanistan is much more than a NATO operation. As a matter of fact it is a concern of the entire international community, being the subject of several UN Security Council Resolutions since 2001, all of them going in the same direction, namely supporting the engagement in the country all along

the way. The Atlantic Alliance is only a part of a much more complex overall picture.

Thus Afghanistan is emerging from the mountains of Central Asia, acquiring a wider dimension as an important precedent. It follows that international security requires greater attention and new instruments to be used.

I think that it is fair to acknowledge that, despite the difficult situation and its structural problems, the country is today very different from that under the Taliban's rule. Internal security is far better than in 2003, public education and health services have greatly improved. A normal political dialectic is somehow emerging and Parliament is elected through national elections. They may not be perfect, they are however a rather unique case in Central Asia.

We, in the young NATO DC Foundation, think that our primary task is to give light and discuss in depth the core strategic issues of our time. It goes with the principle, stated in our Charter, of promoting "the culture of stability".

In this moment of rapid change in the international environment, as well as in social behaviour, it is becoming essential to give an intelligent reading and an attentive interpretation of events.

This was the reason for convening, in February 2013, a very ambitious international conference focused entirely on the complexity of the Afghan case. We have asked the very best people that we could find to give their informed view, each of them from a different angle. The result of this intense effort is the present volume. Our hope is that it may be a contribution to the understanding of issues and a guide for future works on Afghanistan.

# 1.

## LOOKING A MORE THAN HALF FULL GLASS

AMBASSADOR MAURITS R. JOCHEMS

*NATO Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) in Afghanistan*

### **Introductory remarks:**

- Many other international organizations are involved; it is not only NATO that makes a contribution.
- I do have only 15 minutes
- Now 4 months again in Afghanistan as NATO's SCR. However, 5 years ago I was also half a year in Afghanistan in the same position. So, I will make a few comparisons with the situation in 2008, when it was also about one year before Presidential elections (2009 and 2014 respectively).

### 1.1 DIFFERENCES (POSITIVE) WITH 5 YEARS AGO:

In 2008 there was not as yet an end date for the ISAF operation. At the 2010 NATO Summit in Lisbon, it was decided that the Transition period for the hand-over of full security responsibility in Afghanistan by NATO/ISAF to the Afghan government will come to an end on 31 December 2014.

This end date has focused very much the minds of everyone involved, not least those in the Afghan government who were too much focused on an end state and did not seem to have a sufficient sense of urgency to get things done.

The Afghan political leaders – not necessarily all in government- are now seeking a dialogue with each other in the lead-up to the Presidential elections. This was not the case, not to this extent, in 2008.

Reconciliation efforts with the Taliban. Developments such as the establishment of the Afghan High Peace Council and the Doha office are positive.

Pakistan is much more open, all in all, for reconciliation and peace in Afghanistan than 5 years ago. The countries in the region are much more positively engaged than 5 years ago, as visible inter alia in the Heart of Asia process.

The long term commitment of the International Community has been made

explicit, i.e. the 2012 Tokyo and Chicago commitments, the Decade of transformation, etc.

Urbanization, literacy and other modernization trends (cell phones, TV, computers) have created perhaps irreversible effects in terms of non-traditional youth, improvement in the position of women, etc.

Last but not least, the ceiling as foreseen in the NATO 2010 Lisbon decision with regard to capable Afghan National Security Forces, in total 352.000, has now almost been reached.

## 1.2 DIFFERENCES, ENDURING ISSUES (NEGATIVE)

The hybrid of a still strong tribal patronage system in combination with the construct of a modern and strong central government is causing problems.

Warlords still play a major role and do not shy away from intimidation and corruption.

Opium- and, to a lesser extent, hashish production and related crimes have not decreased.

The position of women is still an issue, aggravated by concerns about the possible consequences of reconciliation.

Delivery of basic services by the government is still problematic; the closure of PRT's will test even more the ability of the Afghan government to provide these services from Kabul to the provinces and districts.

The closure of bases and PRT's is one of the reasons behind the concerns about unemployment, about jobs post 2014.

The "leaking border" with Pakistan is one of the reasons that the insurgency is still resilient.

**A second approach to analyze the state of play is to make use of the well-known triad: security, governance and development:**

## 2.1 SECURITY

The security transition is going well. The ANSF are already in the lead of 80 percent of the training and almost 90 percent of the operations, with ISAF in a support role. And the ANSF will have almost two more years to go before they will have the full security responsibility in Afghanistan.

The Afghan National Army and Police are not always up to NATO standards, but they are already very effective.

The international community has committed itself to pay for the salaries of the ANSF well after 2014, so in this respect 2014 will not be 1993, when the Soviet Union stopped financing the ANA.

Meanwhile ISAF has to redeploy still some 125.000 containers and 70.000

vehicles (one every 7 minutes). So, COMISAF General Dunford has to fight, to hand-over to ANSF and to redeploy all at the same time.

ISAF, the ANSF and the International Community have been creating the conditions for better governance and development by the Afghan government.

## 2.2 GOVERNANCE

Some positive developments as set out above: reconciliation and reintegration initiatives, greater interest by countries in the region to cooperate with Afghanistan (e.g. Heart of Asia process), and last but not least the greater drive by Afghan political leaders to consult each other and discuss with a view to the April 2014 Presidential elections.

The “dead line” of 31 December 2014 has certainly contributed to this enhanced engagement by the Afghan government and by Afghan political leaders who are not in government.

The non-security authorities in Afghanistan are now also more focused on the delivery of basic services to the provinces, although the results are not yet satisfactory. Different from the security transition, the development of good governance and the process of economic development will need more time. The International Community’s decision in Bonn, 2011, to establish a Decade of Transformation post 2014, is meant to help meet this requirement.

A peaceful political transition in Afghanistan is key. The 2014 Presidential elections will be a litmus test for this peaceful transition. The outcome may well have a decisive impact on the cohesion of the ANSF.

## 2.3 DEVELOPMENT

PRT – and base closures will only have a limited effect on economic growth in Afghanistan. According to a World Bank study the average economic growth in Afghanistan over the past years was on average about 9 percent, and post 2014 there will still be about 4 percent economic growth.

The ex-minister of Finance and ex-World Bank employee Ashraf Ghani, currently the Chairman of the Transition Coordination Commission, states that the people in the regions where PRT’s and ISAF bases are closing will survive. They lived, worked and survived there before there were PRT’s and bases.

The IMF has resumed its credits to the Afghan government.

The development cooperation relationship between Afghanistan and many bilateral donors will normalize after 2014. Development cooperation will be dealt with by embassies instead of PRT’s, which did have a military function and were specially developed for Afghanistan also to help bring governance and development assistance to areas outside of Kabul.

The financial and economic commitments to Afghanistan by the international

community have been consolidated by the 2012 Tokyo commitments of about 16 bln US dlr. However, these Tokyo commitments by the International Community are **conditional** in view of good performance by the Afghan government in areas of good governance ( 2014 elections !, corruption!), human rights (position of women!) and delivery of basic services to the regions.

### 3. CONCLUSION

As set out above, there is certainly progress in Afghanistan over the last 5 years, there is a definitely potential for progress also after 2014, but – admittedly - some important challenges remain.

For me the glass is more than half full!

However, progress after 2014 really will depend very much on the Afghans. Will they agree amongst themselves to have a peaceful outcome of the elections? Will they be more measured in their criticism of certain neighbours and/or the International Community at large and instead focuses on their own responsibilities, for example with regard to delivering basic services to the Afghan people?

**Sovereignty** is a precious good. However, the other side of the same coin is taking up **responsibilities** and acting in a responsible way, not least in relation to international partners and neighbours.

Thank you very much.

# 2.

## MEETING THE REAL WORLD

### *Challenges of transition*

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The more one looks at Afghanistan today, the more likely it seems that Transition will at best produce a weak and divided state and at worst a state that either continues its civil war or comes under Taliban and extremist control. More than a decade of Western intervention has not produced a strong and viable central government, an economy that can function without massive outside aid, or effective Afghan forces.

There are no signs that insurgents are being pushed towards defeat or will lose their sanctuaries in Pakistan, and outside aid efforts have generally produced limited benefits – many of which will not be sustainable once Transition occurs and aid levels are cut. There has also been a steady erosion of outside support for the war – first in Europe and increasingly in the US, where some 60% of Americans no longer see a prospect of victory or reason to stay. While governments talk about enduring efforts, each time the US and its allies have reviewed their Afghan policy since 2010, their future level of commitment has seemed to shrink, and more uncertainties have arisen. The meeting between President Obama and President Karzai in early January 2013 had some reassuring aspects. President Karzai moderated his initial demands and criticisms. President Obama seems to have committed the US to keeping relatively high US force levels through the 2013 campaign season, to requesting the kind of economic aid from Congress that could help Afghanistan get through the economic shock of ISAF force withdrawals and cuts in outside spending, and to helping the Afghan Army stay at levels near 200,000 through FY2017 – if necessary.

Both sides moved away from the tensions that led the US to talk about a “zero option” for US forces in Afghanistan after the end of 2014 and seemed to agree on the need for a realistic strategic agreement that would give the US a presence in, and access to, several bases after 2014, with suitable immunity for US troops.

At the same time, no clear plans emerged for annual aid spending or for the size and basing of future troop and aid efforts, and new tensions quickly emerged over

issues like US special force trainers for the Afghan Local Police. Plans for any new offensive campaign in the East were abandoned, and the political climate in the US moved towards a sharper downsizing of the probable US commitment after 2014 and more rapid cuts in US troop levels and spending between the end of the campaign season in 2013 and the end of 2014.

Moreover, a realistic appraisal of the current situation in Afghanistan shows that it will presents serious – and potentially fatal – challenges to even a fully-resourced Transition effort. These challenges include major problems in Afghan leadership, governance, the economy, and forces.

A detailed analysis of recent US government, ISAF, and World Bank reporting on the current level of progress in Afghanistan makes it all too clear that too clear that Afghans must do far more to assume responsibility for their own future and make things work on Afghan terms. As a result, the hardest choices have to be made by Afghans. They have to make changes in leadership, governance, economics, and the ANSF that show there is a real incentive for the US and its allies to support and fund a real Transition strategy. Cordesman, Afghanistan 23/1/2013

At the same time, there is an equal need for far more US and allied realism about what can be accomplished, the need for serious aid well beyond 2014, and working with the Afghan government to develop meaningful plans. Without major efforts on both sides, Afghanistan may muddle through in spite of this mix of Afghan, ISAF, and donor problems. The more Transition is treated as an “Egress strategy,” the more likely “Afghan good enough” is to turn into “Afghan failed.” Cordesman, Afghanistan 23/1/2013.

## INTRODUCTION

The more one looks at the current situation in Afghanistan today, the more likely it seems that Transition will at best produce a weak and divided state and at worst a state that either continues its civil war or comes under Taliban and extremist control. More than a decade of Western intervention has not produced a strong and viable central government, an economy that can function without massive outside aid, or effective Afghan forces. There is no sign that insurgents are being pushed towards defeat or will lose their sanctuaries in Pakistan. This has made every aspect of Transition is a high-risk effort.

At the same time there is steady erosion in outside support for the war – first in Europe and increasingly in the US, where some 60% of Americans no longer see a prospect of victory or reason to stay. While governments talk about enduring efforts, each time the US and its allies have reviewed their Afghan policy since 2010, their future level of commitment has seemed to shrink, and more uncertainties have arisen.

This erosion in outside does not mean the US and its allies will abandon Afghanistan at the end of 2014, but it is less and less clear that they will stay on



through 2020 or will provide the resources necessary to make Transition successful in the interim. "Transition" can become a post-2014 "exit strategy": today's reassuring official rhetoric may become the Afghan equivalent of P.T. Barnum's famous sign that fooled paying customers into leaving his museum by saying, "This way to the egress". The question is just how serious the risks involved are. On the one hand, the combination of Afghan problems and uncertain outside support does not mean that the Taliban and other insurgents will win. The insurgents too have many weaknesses, divisions, and problems in winning public support. The end result of the present Transition effort may be a fractured Afghanistan that divides along ethnic, sectarian, and tribal lines.

This may severely weaken the authority of the central government, but still be composed of a mix of national and local power blocs that are able to contain the Taliban and other insurgents. It may be some mixture of a new form of Northern Alliance; the remnants of "Kabulstan," other Pashtun elements, and outside aid may be able to replace the current regime without ceding power to the insurgents.

It is all too clear, however, that is not a desirable outcome. The following analysis also indicates that more realistic assessments of the challenges involved do indicate that there are practical steps that could improve the prospects for Transition. Many require action by the Afghans, while others require clearer and longer commitments by the US and other ISAF countries. It is far from certain that such steps can be taken in time, but there are real possibilities for success. Moreover, one thing does seem clear: the more "Transition" becomes an "Egress strategy," the more likely "Afghan good enough" is to turn into "Afghan failed."

#### CURRENT AND FUTURE PROBLEMS WITH LEADERSHIP, GOVERNANCE, AND THE RULE OF LAW

It is time to take a hard look at the current situation, the problems that remain, and what level of progress is readily credible. Given current real-world trends, Afghanistan now seems likely to become a weak and divided failed state, and outside military and civil aid is more likely phase down to the point where it ends with a whimper rather than a bang.

It is also time to focus on what Afghanistan is and not on what it could be, or might have been. Most of Afghanistan's most critical problems in becoming "Afghan good enough" are a function of its politics, history, ethnic and sectarian divisions, tribal infighting, and endemic corruption. With these problems, it is pointless to talk about aid efforts and reform plans that will somehow change the situation in spite of the fact that the country has made remarkably little progress to date, constant media reports that corruption and failed governance are as much the rule as the exception, and detailed official reports that make the same points. The real-world issue is whether a combination of self-directed Afghan actions and credible levels of outside aid can still make enough difference to matter.

## The Problem of Leadership

The most serious single problem Afghanistan faces is leadership – both now and after the new election in April 2014. It is whether President Karzai will actually move towards enough of the political, economic, and governance reforms the Afghan government promised at Tokyo in the summer of 2014 to offer hope for Transition. It is whether he and Afghan politics will allow an election that Afghans trust; above all, it is whether an effective leader will emerge that can bring together Afghanistan's key factions in some form of national government and consensus.

Today, no one can predict whether President Karzai will make some final effort to stay in office, whether the Taliban will try to use peace negotiations to gain power, who the next leader of Afghanistan will be if real elections do take place in the spring of 2014, or how Tajik-led Afghan national security forces will react if the ANSF feel their survival is threatened. What is clear is that no one has yet identified a strong, popular replacement for Karzai, a clear path towards forging as much of a national consensus as possible, or a proven leader who can quickly take control of Transition during the most critical period in the withdrawal of outside forces and cuts in aid workers and funds.

What is all too likely is that the next "leader" of Afghanistan will be at least as dependent as Karzai on the weaker aspects of Afghanistan's real-world power structure. Rather than having some form of broad mandate and mix of support that cuts across ethnic, regional, sectarian, and tribal lines, he will depend on his ability to win the support of a faction of power brokers and warlords, likely becoming steadily more dependent on them as outside forces leave. He will have to try to govern in an Afghanistan where criminal networks and narcotics traffickers assume an increasingly more important economic role.

The end result will be that some new form of regional, ethnic, and sectarian splits create a new Northern Alliance and new local and regional Pashtun factions. The wild cards could become a form of takeover by the ANSF outside Kabul or a political implosion so serious that insurgents threaten to take over the whole country rather than the small areas they currently dominate.

No future government can avoid a significant degree of dependence on Afghanistan's current power structure. While outsiders call it "corruption," Karzai's focus on balancing power brokers – some with ties to insurgents and others to criminal elements -- is a balancing act that any future leader must also undertake when dealing with the political realities of power. "Kabulstan" does not control or significantly influence the rest of the country because of elections. The Afghan legislature is too weak and corrupt and there is little real representative government at the provincial and local levels. The President must use his extraordinary level of control over national and aid funds as well as the ability to appoint governors and direct leaders in order to balance one faction against another while trying to increase the power of the central government.

Elections do matter, but largely to the extent they show the Afghan people that

there is a new leader who is at least willing to try to moderate and change the current system, that he will break up the current factional structure of power, and that he has the support of a broad range of Afghan factions. In fact, it is the willingness of these factions to come together before or after the election that will probably be far more important than the election itself. Real-world political legitimacy is always a function of how well and how popular governance is, not how or whether it is elected.

Leadership and unity will become steadily more important as aid funds are cut, patronage decreases, and the President becomes more dependent on local and regional leaders while having less money to spend. Moreover, the quality of regional leadership and the willingness of regional leaders to work together and meet popular needs and expectations will become equally critical. The key political question that will determine the success of Transition after 2014 will not simply be the leader in “Kabulstan,” it will be who remains in actual power in the rest of the country, how well they can actually counter the Taliban and other insurgents, and how well they cooperate with other power brokers.

Unless a very strong new leader emerges as President and can lead with something approaching a national consensus, the country may well be better off if the end result is much stronger local leaders who are popular and effective, complimented by a President willing to deal with them. This may mean ceding some areas to the insurgents, but it may also mean keeping control of most population centers and balancing the different sectarian, ethnic, regional, and tribal factions in ways the formal structure of the Afghan government cannot accomplish.

A Najibullah-like success in “Kabulstan” and the following power struggles and competition for limited funds may well be the fastest route to repeating the Soviet form of failed Transition. To put it bluntly, the case for both continuing outside aid and a continuing US presence should depend on how successful Afghans are in creating a consensus and stronger pattern of leadership. If they fail, neither the US nor its allies have any obligation or strategic rationale to stay.

### **The Problem of Governance**

Leadership, however, is meaningless without governance. Part of the problem in dealing with Transition is that so much attention is given to the quality of elections and the structure of the central government, and so little to the actual quality of governance, how well it functions and meets popular demands in any given area, and how well it competes with the Taliban.

It is scarcely reassuring in this regard that unclassified official reporting has gradually eliminated all of the detailed maps and progress reports that gave some hint of the quality of governance by district, that reporting on the progress of the campaign in critical districts and districts of interest has stopped, and that the transfers of power to date have not been related to any meaningful public assessment of the capacity of local governments and forces to deal with them.

A more realistic official discussion of the current situation in Afghanistan comes from sources like the US Department of Defense's semi-annual report to Congress. These assessments at least qualify the positive generalizations – and promises that the next aid and reform program will actually work – that come out of far too many high level meetings:<sup>1</sup>

...the long-term sustainability of the Afghan Government is challenged by corruption, ineffective program monitoring, sub-national government budget funding shortfalls, an inability to generate revenues sufficient to cover the cost of government operations, and limited public financial management capacity. Furthermore, poor linkages between the national and sub-national levels of governance and an imbalance in the distribution of power between the three branches of government, with power concentrated in the executive branch, continue to limit effectiveness and legitimacy. Limited human capacity and a lack of appropriate formal training and education within the civil service and Afghan populace also impede the development of stable and sustainable government across Afghanistan.

On June 21, 2012, Karzai called a special session of Parliament to solicit legislative support for carrying out measures to fight corruption and reform civil governance and law enforcement. In July, he issued a 23-page presidential decree, detailing a list of government reforms. The decree has been met with skepticism, since demands and timelines were not combined with a comprehensive financial implementation plan or enforcement mechanisms.

...Additionally, in a shakeup of provincial governors, President Karzai announced on September 20 that he would change the heads of 10 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, purportedly as a result of a review carried out by the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG). These changes involved a few prominent officials that had worked closely with the Coalition, such as Helmand Governor Mangal.

...The judicial branch, with the assistance of the international community, has made increasing progress with regard to training and staffing sub-national judicial positions, and held more public trials this reporting period than during the previous reporting period. Improvements in the reach and function of sub-national governance are being made as the Afghan government develops opportunities for both traditional and formal modes of conflict resolution.

...However, constrained freedom of movement due to security concerns impedes the expansion of rule of law, especially at the district level. The time required to resolve disputes through the formal system exacerbates the separation between the formal and traditional rule of law systems, and contributes to the perception that the Afghan government is ineffective and inaccessible to many rural Afghans.

...The Afghan government remains highly centralized, with budgeting and spending authority held primarily by the Ministry of Finance and other central ministries in Kabul. Service delivery is Cordesman, Afghanistan 23/1/2013 5 implemented by central ministries. Sub-national administrations do, however, continue to engage in limited coordination, planning, and service-monitoring roles, and there are multiple institutional and operational programs in place aimed at improving sub-national governance, including the Afghanistan

Sub-National Governance Program (ASGP II), and the Performance-Based Governor's Fund (PBGF II).

...Sub-national governance structures currently operate to varying degrees of effectiveness at provincial, district, and village levels, and are overseen by the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG), and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). Coordination and cooperation between these two organizations has historically been poor, but recent developments on District Representation (see below) has improved this situation. IDLG... faces a number of challenges as it takes this work forward, including insufficient operations and maintenance (O&M) funds for sub-national structures, lack of authority over line ministries on recruitment issues, accusations of politicization in the appointment process, and extensive dependency on donor funding and parallel structures. The total governance budget is very low, at just five percent (i.e., \$720M) of the overall Afghan budget.

Budget execution rates also remain low for two reasons: first, delays in budget approval and disbursements from Kabul ministries, and second, the lack of human capacity at the provincial and district levels to execute the funds. Provincial councils are elected bodies with oversight but no legislative authority. Provincial Governors are appointed by the President in coordination with the IDLG... There is, however, generally poor coordination between councils, governors, and the provincial line departments of central line ministries, with the latter still determining for the most part how resources are allocated at the provincial level with little regard for local priorities.

This problem is compounded by poor coordination and communications between the Afghan provinces and Kabul. The Provincial Budget Pilot Program (PBPP), introduced last year by the Afghan Ministry of Finance (MoF), sought to improve budgetary planning and communication between the provincial and national levels, by including provincial authorities to a limited degree in the budget planning process for Solar Year SY1392. After a promising start, the program stalled due to funding difficulties, but efforts are underway to address these difficulties and include some PBPP projects in the SY 1392 budget. The World Bank has been helpful to this end. Budgets aside, civil service capabilities continue to be a concern across the country.

The World Bank provided similar warnings in its May 2012 study of Transition:<sup>2</sup>

Technocratic approaches to state building in Afghanistan have historically had to contend with the nature of politics in the country, where formal office and position are used as resources to balance competing elite interests.

The Afghan state – while having a highly centralized, unitary character as embodied in successive Constitutions – has always had weak central control and has needed to build coalitions of common interest with a strong periphery.

The use of state position and office as bargaining tools in the wider political process has a long history, ensuring that attempts to introduce modern, merit-based public sector reforms face an uphill struggle ... In the future, the importance of capturing formal office and position as

a tool for accumulating wealth, and hence more political power, may intensify in the face of reduced western patronage and a shrinking war and aid economy (Surhkeand Hakimi 2011). The tensions between a highly centralized de jure state and a strong de facto periphery, and between patronage and merit-based models, lie at the heart of public administration reform in Afghanistan.

Progress in building at least the outward signs of a modern bureaucracy has been striking, but these reforms have failed to closely link nascent institutional developments to improvements in state capability and legitimacy.

A critical aspect of building this capability in the future will be, i) to delegate greater budget authority and accountability to sub-national units of government, and ii) to develop core civil service capacity both at the centre and at sub-national levels to achieve better service delivery and budget execution outcomes in an increasingly tight fiscal environment.

... The policy and programmatic decisions that have sought to strengthen the link between the central Government and the provinces have created an increasingly uncoordinated and complex web of formal government structures, locally elected bodies, donor-conceived and funded initiatives, and formal and informal local institutions of service delivery and accountability... This has often meant competing institutional agendas and lack of an overall strategic framework for addressing accountability and planning issues at local level.

The sub-national administrative bureaucracy (especially the provincial departments of line ministries but also the Governors' offices) remains poorly resourced and under-skilled to fulfill many of the planning, monitoring and reporting functions being suggested for it.

Most significantly, there remains minimal linkage between local planning systems, budgetary resources and decision-making processes, rendering largely theoretical much of the exercise to extend the state down to the local level.

Current efforts to increase provincial participation in budgeting and to adopt a more equitable basis for allocations to provincial line departments are taking place without a wider debate about what is a fiscally sustainable model for sub-national governance in Afghanistan. With some 364 districts in the country the ability of government to maintain and fully staff its districts as well as resource thousands of future village councils is heavily constrained.

Currently, most financial flows to provinces and districts are outside the budget and have been heavily skewed toward conflict affected provinces that have received the bulk of donor aid flows.

In 2010/11, for example, Helmand Province received over three times the resources "off budget" that it received through the government's core budget.

This is all set to change.

Transition will reduce the flow of these "off budget" resources, which is likely in turn to reduce the levels of current service delivery in these provinces... This may well undermine the gains to state legitimacy that have been made in recent years in some of these areas, as well as the patronage of local Governors that has been built up on the basis of direct access to donor and PRT, resources.

...The challenge for government will be to try, within a much more constrained resource

environment, to ensure a more participatory and accountable budget process that does not raise unnecessary expectations, while at the same time improving the efficiency of service delivery.

A decade of promises of change and reform have left the structure of the central government weak and unable to function when the President and/or strong provincial governors interfere, with almost all funds under the direct control of the President. While some Ministries are still effective, corruption is a problem at every level and the overall structure of governance becomes dependent on given provincial and district leaders.

In far too many areas, the actual level of governance does not apply to much of a given district and the Taliban and other insurgents compete against weak government officials in the field. In those cases where governance does exist in the field, much is dependent on the use of aid funds and support from ANSF forces that are equally dependent on aid. Once again, however, this is an area where Afghans will have to solve their own problems. President Karzai and his successor must be willing to choose governance over power broker support where provincial and local leaders push self-interest and corruption beyond the limits acceptable to the local population. There need to be more fundamental reforms that give the national, provincial, and district legislature control over significant amounts of national funds and make them truly representative.

The grossly over-centralized control of funds needs to end, along with the inability to spend money when and where it is needed.

This progress will have to be erratic and evolutionary, but without such progress, both leadership and containing insurgents as well as the more extreme ethnic and sectarian power brokers may become impossible.

### **The Problem of the Rule of Law**

Governance is equally dependent on the rule of law – especially in areas where tribal, sectarian, and ethnic tensions require the rapid resolution of civil and criminal cases. Once again, there are no unclassified maps showing the trends in actually enforcing a meaningful rule of law and partnering it with effective security and governance. The end result is simply too embarrassing to make public.

Moreover, because the various elements of the police are lumped together with the Afghan Army, virtually all reporting on the police force ignores the massive problems in their civil effectiveness, corruption, and lack of ties to the rest of the justice system. The US Department of Defense summarized these problems as follows as of the end of 2012:<sup>3</sup>

Widespread corruption and insufficient transparency remain the main challenges with respect to establishing a self-sustaining rule-of-law system in Afghanistan. The country's principal anticorruption institutions, the High Office of Oversight and Anti-Corruption

(HOOAC) and the Attorney General's Office (AGO), have minimal political support in encouraging and enforcing transparency and accountability measures within the Afghan government. Weaknesses within both the formal and traditional Afghan justice systems, and the link between the two, ensure the Taliban system of dispute resolution remains a viable option for segments of the Afghan population because the Taliban process is rapid, enforced, and often considered less corrupt than that of the formal Afghan justice system. Although traditional dispute resolution is often touted as more developed in parts of Afghanistan not under central control, some dispute resolution processes, such as the practice of *baad*, are inconsistent with international human rights principals.

Overall, progress in rule of law promotion and implementation continue to be mixed. The main challenges include access to the formal justice system, poor enforcement of human rights protections guaranteed by the Afghan constitution, corruption, insufficient transparency, and inadequate security for justice facilities and personnel. The shortage of human capital and the Afghan government's insufficient political will to operate and maintain justice programs and facilities are key impediments.

To fulfill the requirements of security and sustainability, security transition must include the transition of rule of law activities and assistance from military to civilian support, with an end state of full ownership of all aspects of the justice sector – police, courts, and prisons – by local, provincial, and national Afghan stakeholders.

...Successful rule of law efforts are more likely to be found in transitional areas where Afghan governance followed ISAF-supported stability.

Expanding the reach of the rule of law into remaining areas, where the transition from an ISAF security lead to an Afghan lead has not yet occurred, poses a greater challenge as the Afghan government works to stabilize areas simultaneously with building capacity, effective governance processes, and personnel.

At best, it seems likely that most of the real-world rule of law after the end of 2014 will revert to something close to Afghan standards before Western intervention, and many areas will have "prompt justice" on traditional terms, through power brokers and warlords or through insurgents like the Taliban.

If Afghanistan follows the pattern of past cases like the US withdrawal from Iraq, the rule of law that outside advisors have sought over the last decade will at best extend to a few urban areas, and even then be both corrupt and tied to local power brokers. This will not be a bad thing if it is carried out in ways that meet popular needs and expectations, although much of the image of progress in human rights will revert to the grim existing realities in the process. It does, however, mean a steady shift towards meeting the actual needs and expectations of the people. It means limiting graft and corruption to Afghan norms and removing the most egregious figures in the justice system. Again, progress will be erratic and evolutionary and will have to be internally driven on Afghan terms and in the Afghan way, but without such progress both Transition and the rationale for continuing outside support will be gravely weakened.



## DEMOGRAPHIC DIVISIONS AND PRESSURES

There is no reliable way to describe the demographic pressures that currently affect Afghanistan or that will help shape Transition, but it is vital that both Afghans and outside aid efforts become more realistic about taking such pressure into account.

Afghanistan is a country under extreme demographic pressure. It has been for decades and it will be for decades more. It is also a country with no meaningful census, statistics that come out of international agencies and sources like the Central Statistics Office that are little more than guesstimates, an unknown number of refugees in neighboring countries, and serious problems with displaced persons and flight to urban areas because of security and economic problems.

### **Uncertain Estimates of Total Population and Ethnic, Sectarian, Linguistic and Tribal Divisions**

While the CIA estimates the total population at 30.4 million as of mid-2012, it also notes that the partial census conducted in 1979 estimated the population then at 33.6 million. It seems likely that any current estimate could have a 15-20% error.

The Afghan Central Statistics Office may provide a wide range of over-precise estimates, but it estimates the total population at very different 26.5 million in 2011-2012, and also acknowledges a high degree of uncertainty – something that far too many aid and international agencies fail to do in providing estimates of progress in education and per capita income that are really little more than analytic rubbish.<sup>4</sup> The World Bank for example, estimates Afghanistan's total population at 35.32 million in 2011.<sup>5</sup> The UN estimate is dated, but still higher and was 28.15 million as early as 2008.<sup>6</sup> The IMF estimated the population at 32 million in 2012.<sup>7</sup>

The same is true of estimates of the ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and linguistic divisions that further complicate the impact of demographic pressures at every level from the farm and village to the national. There is, however, no doubt that sources like the CIA are broadly valid in estimating the levels of division that Afghan leadership, governance, and economics must deal with:<sup>8</sup>

- Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%.
- Sunni Muslim 80%, Shia Muslim 19%, other 1%
- Afghan Persian or Dari (official) 50%, Pashto (official) 35%, Turkic languages (primarily Uzbek and Turkmen) 11%, 30 minor languages (primarily Balochi and Pashai) 4%, much bilingualism, but Dari functions as the lingua franca

What is clear is that the divisions – and further regional and tribal divisions – shape and divide much of Afghanistan and that Karzai's political juggling act has won him temporary support – much of it financed with foreign aid – that will only last as long as the central government can both threaten and bribe.

### **Short-Term Demographic Pressures**

Short-term pressures will have an immediate impact on Transition.

Uncertain as the numbers are, virtually all sources agree that over 40% of Afghanistan's population is 14 years of age or younger.

Even if one only looks at the period from 2002 to 2015, the population will rise from 26.6 million in 2002, when the present major external aid effort began, to nearly 32 million at the time of Transition – a greater than 20% increase.<sup>9</sup>

Moreover, looking at development and employment, an agricultural society with critical water and land density problems faces the significant challenge of making increases in the Afghan labor force that the CIA estimated totaled 392,000 men and 370,000 women in 2010.<sup>10</sup>

In some studies of Afghan development, the job creation impact of “success” in development falls far below this rate of increase in the labor force creating major increases in the problems of direct and disguised unemployment in spite of the projected benefit from development projects.

### **Broader Demographic Pressures**

It is also time to take a hard look at how ethnic, sectarian, tribal and regional problems interact with broader demographic stresses. Again, it is important to stress there are no reliable estimates in a country whose population is estimated to range from 26.5 to 35.32 million, but the US Census Bureau almost certainly is correct in reporting and projecting trends that indicate just how much stress the current population of Afghanistan has been under.

The Census Bureau estimate tracks broadly with the CIA estimate, and the Census Bureau estimates that Afghanistan had a population of only 8.2 million in 1950, 9.9 million in 1960, 12.4 million in 1970, 15.0 million in 1980, and dropped to 13.6 in 1990 as a result of the Soviet Invasion. Since that time, the population rose to 22.5 million in 2000 and 29.1 million in 2010.<sup>11</sup>

Barring radical changes in social values, the Census Bureau is also probably correct in estimating the degree to which these pressures will affect Transition through 2020 and beyond. The Census Bureau estimates that the population will rise to 36.6 million in 2020, 45.7 million in 2040, and 63.8 million in 2050 – in spite of the fact it also estimates a drop in the fertility rate from 8.0 in 2000 to 5.9 in 2020 and 2.8 in 2050.<sup>12</sup> It is striking that that World Bank and other leading agencies looking at Transition do not address these issues even through 2020.

## **THE CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION AND THE CHALLENGES FOR TRANSITION**

A Successful Transition will require both Afghans and donors to take a realistic look at the economic impact of cuts in military and aid spending, Afghanistan's real-world level of per capita income, gross inequities in economic distribution, and need for internal economic reform as a substitute for high levels of aid and

outside investment. Far too much official reporting on the economic situation and Afghanistan's prospects for the future is based on grossly uncertain data; favorable trends in macro-economic growth data are often decoupled from the real-world living conditions of most of Afghanistan's people. Development reporting stresses the success of projects as measured by the total cost in aid money, without analyzing how well the money is spent, the success of the end result, or the resulting impact on overall economic success.

There is a systematic lack of professionalism and integrity in the economic reporting and claims of progress by agencies like USAID and international bodies like the World Bank. They do not explain and justify their sources, explain their credibility, or provide an estimate of uncertainty. Instead, they "cherry pick" figures to justify their funding and plans.

They do seem to agree more on economic data than population data in some respects. The CIA for example, estimated the Afghan GDP at \$18.01 billion in market terms in 2011, and \$29.74 billion in PPP (purchasing power parity) terms. The World Bank estimated it at \$19.18 billion in 2011-2012.<sup>13</sup> The Afghan Central Statistic Office estimated it at \$18.95 billion in 2011-2012 in market prices and at \$20.1 billion if measured in terms of total gross domestic consumption.<sup>14</sup> The IMF estimated the nominal GDP at \$17.0 billion in 2010-2011.<sup>15</sup> The UN estimated it at \$18.9 billion in 2011-2012 in market prices and at \$20.6 billion if measured in terms of total gross domestic consumption.<sup>16</sup> The IMF estimated it at \$19.8 billion in what seem to be market prices in 2012.<sup>17</sup>

The problem is that such estimates all seem to be using roughly the same model for estimating market value without considering the uncertainty in the data, or explaining how the data are gathered, the differences between market and PPP estimates, and how dependent GDP is on outside aid and military spending, and on income from narcotics.

More broadly, outside and Afghan estimates use such data to claim progress in GDP growth and income per capita without analyzing income distribution or the success of given efforts in improving the life of given segments of the Afghan population. They also seem to draw uncritically on Afghan claims for other key data, and quote education statistics that are impossibly precise – that disguise major uncertainties about the credibility and conflicts between data on students, teacher numbers and increases, and school numbers and increase – and that are little more than unvalidated claims.<sup>18</sup>

Transition planning – and aid planning – require realistic data or at least a parametric estimate of how uncertainty will affect Afghanistan's problems as outside aid and military spending decline and it becomes more dependent on internal income from sources like narcotics. In practice, no improvement has been made in such estimates since a previous analysis of these problems in the reporting on even the most basic statistical data on Afghanistan that was issued in September 2012:<sup>19</sup>

The underlying GDP data suffer due to a lack of government capacity and access, which prevents accurate economic measurements from being taken, especially in the countryside. The data suffer from the exclusion of narcotics, re-export smuggling, and other black market activity that contribute significantly to the overall size of the national economy. The data further excludes informal household-level economic activity, which is also quite significant. The data suffers, finally, from the inherent biases introduced by the massive infusion of development and military aid spent in the country, which makes its way into the national economy through both licit and illicit channels.

Unfortunately neither the Afghan Central Statistics Organization nor any other source provides a credible breakdown of GDP by sector, district, or province; or shows it has a credible basis for estimating the GDP in either market or PPP terms. They do not explain how the standard methodologies for calculating GDP provided in the 2008 System of National Accounts recommended by the UN and World Bank could possibly be applied towards an economy distorted by external spending, corruption, and the black market.

They do not explain how figures could be collected from those districts controlled not by the government but by insurgents, an area including large parts of Paktika, Zabul, Kunar, Nuristan, and other provinces. Given these difficulties, it is noteworthy that such precise GDP numbers are provided without any indication of the percentage of uncertainty involved. The Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) adjusted GDP figures stand 64-72% higher than the figures for GDP calculated at market exchange rates. These estimates suggest that future decreases in aid reaching the Afghan people will have a disproportionate effect, given that a dollar spent – or not spent – in Afghanistan could have purchased roughly 1.7 times the amount of goods that same dollar could purchase in the US.

Furthermore, problems with even less reliable economic data from the years of Taliban rule and civil war prior to 2001 make it difficult to make meaningful economic growth estimates or comparisons to those time periods. The trend data on economics are particularly suspect because it is unclear if there is any valid base point to be used in calculating such trends. In fact, many estimates are actively dishonest exercises in “spin,” that use the worst Taliban year as their base point, often measuring in market GDP terms, and then acting as if steadily rising wartime and aid spending was somehow a sign of valid progress in the domestic economy and investment. There has been very real progress in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban, but much of the “improvement” in every measure – not just GDP – can be traced to unsustainable levels of external military and aid spending or using 2002 – the worst case year after the Taliban’s fall as the baseline.

These indicators also use the worst data point in a wartime environment for the most negative methods of measurement, which compounds the fundamental dishonesty in such reporting and ignores the possible scale of the challenge posed by transition.

There are severe limits in the ability of the Afghan government to even spend money, much less spend it wisely. The incredible overhead costs of contractors, security, corruption, and power brokers are disguised or avoided. Dependence on criminal networks and a narco-economy, rising capital flight, extraordinarily poor

equality in income distribution, dependence on the World Food Program to deal with serious malnutrition, and large-scale disguised and direct unemployment are understated or ignored.

UNAMA – the UN Agency that is supporting and coordinating the aid effort – has never issued any meaningful report on the overall aid effort. The US, Obama Administration, State Department, and USAID talk about the economic aspects of Transition in Afghanistan in broadly favorable terms as if it was quickly moving towards development.

The positive reporting on the economy and governance that comes out of the UN, ISAF, IMF, and most member countries has shown a similar focus on broad estimates of GDP growth, while the Tokyo Conference largely ignored the sheer scale of scale of the challenges the Afghan government and donors face.

The reality is that Transition may be threatened more by Afghanistan's near and midterm economic prospects than by its leadership and governance problems and the insurgent threat. Afghanistan must radically restructure the way it uses aid between 2013 and 2015 as many outside aid workers disappear and funds are cut off for the Afghans they employed. It must convince donors that they can work through the central, provincial, and local governments in ways where aid money is actually used to benefit the people and bring economic stability. It must have outside support in focusing on reforming its own economy and reducing government barriers to development.

It also will need significant economic aid well beyond 2016 to help it through the recession that is almost certain to come with cuts in outside military spending and aid. The focus will be on stability, on meeting urgent Afghan needs, and only later on development. It is also clear that no miracles are coming in terms of some new Silk Road, near-term Chinese investments in minerals, or pipelines. Recovery from cuts in outside spending and any real growth in the economy will have to focus on Afghan agriculture, the service sector, and light manufacturing.

This means aid will have to be carefully targeted and tailored to the levels Afghanistan can actually absorb, but it still means spending billions of dollars a year at a time when the US and Europe both face serious fiscal pressures and have other, and greater, strategic priorities. It also means quickly rethinking the role of foreign aid workers. The US, for example, is already reported to be preparing to move many of its PRTs out of the field during 2013 and to cut its forward positions from roughly 90 in mid-2012 to only five by the end of 2014. It is far from certain that outside states will provide the level of economic support and aid the Afghan government needs for Transition.

### **An Economy Based on Dependence**

To understand the forces at work, it is necessary to understand that a combination of outside aid and military spending has driven the growth of the Afghan economy and has totaled at least 7-11 times the revenue earning power of the Af-

ghan government. The kind of “positive” reporting that has focused on uncertain estimates of GDP growth has been decoupled from reality to the point it ignores the real-world risks in Afghanistan’s prospects for Transition, ignoring both what will happen as this spending is cut and the human factors involved.

For example, the CIA estimated in early 2013 that the Afghan GDP per capita was only \$1,000 in 2011, which ranked a dismal 217th in the world.

The CIA also warned that,<sup>20</sup>

Afghanistan’s economy is recovering from decades of conflict. The economy has improved significantly since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 largely because of the infusion of international assistance, the recovery of the agricultural sector, and service sector growth. Despite the progress of the past few years, Afghanistan is extremely poor, landlocked, and highly dependent on foreign aid. Much of the population continues to suffer from shortages of housing, clean water, electricity, medical care, and jobs.

Criminality, insecurity, weak governance, and the Afghan Government’s difficulty in extending rule of law to all parts of the country pose challenges to future economic growth.

Afghanistan’s living standards are among the lowest in the world. While the international community remains committed to Afghanistan’s development, pledging over \$67 billion at nine donors’ conferences between 2003-10, the Government of Afghanistan will need to overcome a number of challenges, including low revenue collection, anemic job creation, high levels of corruption, weak government capacity, and poor public infrastructure.

Once again, such estimates are extremely uncertain, and this time sources again sharply disagree. For example, the Afghan government’s Central Statistics Organization calculated GDP per capita of \$629 in 2010-2011, which suddenly leaped to \$715 in 2011-2012 – evidently because of higher disbursements in aid and military spending and a low estimate of population growth.<sup>21</sup> The UN put GDP per capita at \$586 in 2011.<sup>22</sup> The IMF estimated the GDP per capita in current prices at \$620 in 2012, and the per capita income in PPP terms at \$99.3.<sup>23</sup> The World Bank estimated GNI per capita at only \$470 in 2011, using the Atlas method.<sup>24</sup> This made the CIA estimate of Afghan per capita income roughly 2.1 times the World Bank estimate – which may be a result of different methods and definitions but highlights the need for any reputable reporting on progress in Afghanistan to explicitly explain and validate the use of statistical data and show the range of uncertainty in other sources.<sup>25</sup>

It also again highlights the failure of international organizations and US agencies like USAID to examine the validity of any of the progress numbers they use – include data on education, medical care, and numbers of Afghan affected – make it impossible to trust any aspect of their statistics. Nevertheless, most outside agencies do agree that the CIA is correct in drawing its broad conclusions. For example, the World Bank warned in its May 2012 evaluations of Afghan prospects for Transition that,<sup>26</sup>

Afghanistan remains one of the world's least developed countries, with a per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of only \$528 in 2010-11. More than a third of the population live below the poverty line, more than half are vulnerable and at serious risk of falling into poverty, and threequarters are illiterate. Additionally, political uncertainty and insecurity could undermine Afghanistan's transition and development prospects.

The large aid inflows that have benefited Afghanistan have also brought problems. Aid has underpinned much of the progress since 2001 – including that in key services, infrastructure, and government administration – but it has also been linked to corruption, poor aid effectiveness, and weakened governance. Aid is estimated to be \$15.7 billion – about the same as the size of the GDP in fiscal year 2011.

Despite the large volume of aid, most international spending “on” Afghanistan is not spent “in” Afghanistan, as it leaves the economy through imports, expatriated profits of contractors, and outward remittances. Other countries' experience shows that the impact of large aid reductions on economic growth may be less than expected. The main issue is how to manage this change, mitigate impacts, and put aid and spending on a more sustainable path. Key questions about Afghanistan's growth relate to its sources and sustainability. Even taking into account the stagnation of real GDP during the previous 25 years of conflict and the subsequent post-conflict economic rebound, growth – especially in the latter part of the past decade – appears to have been stimulated by enormous inflows of aid and international military spending .... Afghanistan has become an extreme outlier in its dependence on aid. Trends in aid dependence are downward for all three groups of comparator countries. Strong performers on average have initially higher aid dependency ratios, but steeper declines than the other two groups, partly reflecting more rapid economic growth.

.... Political uncertainty and insecurity could undermine Afghanistan's transition and development. International experience demonstrates that violence and especially protracted internal insurgency are extremely damaging to development, and that political stability and consolidation are key ingredients of transitions to peaceful development. This underlines the importance of reaching a peaceful solution to the Taliban insurgency, and the need for political consolidation particularly in the run-up to the next election cycle. (The presidential election is to be held in 2014, and parliamentary elections in 2015). But if there is worsening insecurity and increasing uncertainty about longer-term stability, Afghanistan's development prospects will be harmed.

Political consolidation is not the only pressing issue that needs to be tackled. Afghanistan's political economy over the past 10 years has been shaped by large inflows of aid, which provided benefits to various groups from the associated rents and contracts. Given these distortions, returning to a more “normal” economy with much lower aid inflows will not be easy and will require continued and concerted international support.

Afghanistan's political elite will need to rise above short-termism, factionalized politics, widespread patronage, and corruption and more consistently pursue a medium- to longer term national agenda. This will require political consolidation and a broad-based coalition for peace and reconciliation. And the international community will need to move beyond viewing transition just in security terms, as a way to exit, and start seeing it as an opportunity

to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of its assistance and pursue realistic developmental objectives over the longer term. There is much that both partners can do to make transition more likely to succeed from the broader and longer-term perspective taken here. While challenging, the fiscal, government capacity, service delivery, economic, and poverty dimensions of transition can be managed, provided that the overall security and political context of transition (including the regional environment faced by Afghanistan) is conducive. ...A gradual fall in aid might be beneficial in the long term as it would reduce distortions in the economy caused by the extraordinarily high levels of aid in the past. A rapid decline could, however, lead to major macroeconomic instability and serious socioeconomic consequences. Future aid flows need to be carefully programmed to allow the economy to adjust to new opportunities for growth from mining (especially), agriculture, and services. Making aid more effective can mitigate some of the negative impact of the fall in aid. Raising the local content of aid could do this, through shifting more aid on budget and increasing opportunities for local vendors to participate in aid contracts. Rather than declining aid, however, deteriorating security and governance are likely the largest risks to the economic outlook. Efforts to sustain or improve security – as well as to bolster the legitimacy of the state – will remain of utmost importance.

The Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank warned in its 2013 evaluation of the progress in Afghanistan's economy during 2002-2011 that,<sup>27</sup>

Despite gains in building a stable central government, Afghanistan remains fragile and dependent on the international community. President Karzai won a second five-year term as president in the 2009 election, but the results were disputed and accepted somewhat reluctantly. The constitution also provides for elected provincial, district, and village councils. While provincial councils held elections in 2005 and 2009, they are still seeking to find effective roles in securing provincial development, and district and village councils have not yet been elected or established.

... The government has taken steps to lay the foundation for economic stability and growth, despite a very difficult security situation and the challenges associated with building political and economic institutions. Economic activity has been robust, with real gross domestic product (GDP) growth averaging more than 10 percent annually over the past five years. Revenue collection increased to 11 percent of GDP in 2010/11 from 8 percent in 2008/09.

However, current revenue covers only about two-thirds of central government operating expenditures and less than 20 percent of total public spending. Inflation has been rising, and confidence in the banking sector has been low since the collapse of Kabul Bank in September 2010. Security spending rose by 1.3 percent of GDP, while non-security spending dropped by 0.7 percent of GDP from 2009/10 to 2010/11, as recruitment for the Afghan National Army grew by over 30 percent. The operating budget deficit, excluding grants, remained broadly stable at 4 percent of GDP, but development spending fell by 1.7 percent of GDP, and budget execution rates remain low, due to capacity constraints, difficulties in public financial management, and a worsening security situation (IMF 2011).



It is also important to understand there is nothing “worst case” about such analyses. The World Bank made these estimates under conditions where its status as a client of the Afghan government meant it had to largely ignore key factors like the effectiveness of aid, waste and corruption, the role of narcotics in the Afghan economy, capital flight, welfare and relief costs, worst case assumptions, major uncertainties in the data, and the probable impact of continuing power struggles and conflict – omissions which meant it had to sharply understate the problems of Transition.

### **Betting Transition on Aid that May Never Come to a Government Too Ineffective and Corrupt to Use it Effectively**

Both the Afghan government and donors need to urgently address these realities and work out real-world aid plans that look at least five years into the future and ensure the Afghanistan government will receive a regular annual flow of the aid it needs and can absorb. So far, the Afghan government has responded with aid requests that are unlikely to be met on any sustained basis, as well as by making unrealistic promises of reform and projections of its ability to raise domestic revenues.

In a White Paper it circulated in November 2011 in preparation for the Tokyo conference in July 2012, there was a request of some \$120 billion in future civil and military aid during a Transition period that extended to at least 2025.<sup>28</sup>

Based on our initial analysis we must look to donors to finance approximately 47% of GDP or approximately \$10 billion in 2015. At first glance, this figure may look enormous. However, it reflects a 40% reduction from current aid levels, and it is expected to decline over time. The Government takes the challenge donors will face in maintaining this level of assistance seriously, but notes that when compared to the current spending of the International Community it is small. The current estimated cost of the international military presence in Afghanistan is \$140 billion per year; 7% of total 2011 security costs is sufficient to fund the entire gap. This cost savings can facilitate Afghanistan’s passage to a future that is not aid-dependent. A long-term funding commitment by the International Community, declining over time and ending in 2030, would provide the necessary stability in financing to allow Afghanistan to arrive at a stable and prosperous future.

.... To be successful, this financial support should be defined in two categories: security assistance and non-security assistance.

*Security assistance.* Based on current analysis the Government of Afghanistan believes it will be necessary for the donor community to fund the cost of the Afghan security forces through 2025. The Government will continue to contribute to the recurrent cost of maintaining the security forces. The Government commits to work closely with the International Community to develop strategies to reduce the number of troops, and their recurrent maintenance costs.

*Non-Security assistance.* We ask the International Community to work with Government to implement the NPPs in a manner that creates conditions where strong economic growth is

enabled and the root causes of insurgency are diminished. Donor funds will be used to achieve the commitments laid-out in this document and to achieve our shared goals of improved public financial management, reduced vulnerability to corruption, broad political and institutional reform, improved public service delivery, a strong enabling environment for growth, and direct poverty reduction.

### *Unrealistic Afghan Pledges*

The Afghan government can make some reforms, but it needs to be more realistic and promise what it can actually deliver. It made the following pledges of reform and anticorruption measures in issuing the above request for aid, but they are pledges it is no more likely to keep than the others it has made over the last decade.<sup>29</sup> Afghanistan still ranked a dismal 174th out of 176 countries in the Transparency International corruption ranking at the end of 2012.<sup>30</sup>

The Government of Afghanistan is committed to building a secure, prosperous, democratic Afghanistan based on fiscally sustainable private sector-led economic growth, well-governed and transparent government institutions, and mutually beneficial regional economic cooperation.

We will set priorities and take difficult decisions to embrace reform and make effective use of international assistance, in accordance with the following objectives:

- Increasing Government capacity and building on structural reforms to improve public service delivery;
- Strengthening public financial management systems, improving budget execution, and increasing revenue collection, including phased implementation of a value-added tax;
- Increasing transparency and accountability to prevent corruption;
- Creating a strong enabling environment for private sector investment, including public-private partnerships in social and economic development, supported by adequate regulatory and institutional reforms and a robust financial sector; and
- Working closely with the International Community to develop strategies to reduce overall security costs.

Progress towards the achievement of these objectives is vital. They will help us to reach shared goals for improved security, governance, and development. The Government believes that clear, mutually agreed targets, pursued with the International Community, are the best means for monitoring our joint performance. For these reasons, and with the support of the International Community, the Government commits to:

- Improve Afghanistan's ranking in the Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index, moving from a current rank of 176 to a rank of 150 within three years,
- Improve by 15 positions on the IFC's [International Finance Corporation] Doing Business Survey within three years, and maintain or improve our ranking on each of the ten indicators,
- Grow the ratio of revenue collection to GDP from 11% to 15% within four years, and to 20% by 2025,

- Within five years: to improve the management of public funds as measured by the PEFA [Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability] assessment by 20%, to improve transparent accountable use of public funds measured by the Open Budget Index to 40% and to improve budget execution to 75% , and
- Improve our score in the UNDP human development index by 25% in the next three years; and by 50% in the next ten years.

The Government of Afghanistan believes that with the support of the International Community these commitments are realistic and achievable.

The Kabul Process, initiated at the London Conference January 2010 and formalized at the Kabul Conference July 2010, provides the framework for partnership and mutual accountability for the Afghan Government to assume full responsibility for security, development and governance and the realization of a secure country with a sustainable economy.

The Government will continue to employ the Kabul Process including increased donor engagement to channel international support for the specific activities that can further these overarching objectives. These activities will support the Government of Afghanistan to develop policies and undertake programs aimed at: (a) achieving financial sustainability through future revenue streams by creating critical infrastructure that is sustainable and can be supported by Afghanistan's budget, (b) reforming and creating critical institutions for effective governance, (c) increasing productivity in agriculture and rural areas for growth, poverty reduction and increased food security, (d) strengthening rule of law, and continuing improvement to Afghanistan's legal framework, (e) establishing an enabling environment for private sector-led growth and private investment, including a strong financial sector, secure access to capital and transparent responsible regulatory environments, (f) building skilled human capital, (g) achieving economic and social stability through increased access to improved job opportunities, (h) strengthening regional economic integration through initiatives such the New Silk Road vision and the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) Program to promote trade, facilitate transit, expand market access and support economic growth.

### *Unrealistic US and Donor Promises*

At the same time, it is far from clear that outside countries are actually willing to sustain the aid efforts their policy statements call for.

The Tokyo Conference in July 2012 only produced broad aid pledges decoupled from any clear plan or year-by-year commitment, and no real economic plan for Transition has been issued since that time. As a result, the December 2012 semi-annual report to the US Congress by the Department of Defense – the “1230 Report” – could say little more about aid funding than repeat the content of the press releases issued during two major international conferences in the spring and summer of 2012.<sup>31</sup>

On July 8, 2012, representatives from the Afghan government, international community, and civil society met in Tokyo to discuss the future development of Afghanistan. The Tokyo

Conference was held to define the international community's commitment to a Transformation Decade and for the government of Afghanistan to establish a clear reform plan. Participants issued a communiqué announcing the intent of the international community to provide \$16B for Afghanistan's development through 2015 and included a Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF) setting specific, measurable reform goals to improve Afghan governance and development performance. The United States pledged to request from Congress assistance levels at or near the levels of the last decade. Over the long term, Afghanistan and the international community pledged to increase the country's self-reliance and gradually reduce assistance levels.

The Tokyo MAF established the mutual commitments and responsibilities for both the Afghan government and the international community (IC) to help sustain Afghanistan's development gains of the last decade, improve the effectiveness of international assistance, steadily reduce Afghanistan's reliance on international aid, and improve governance to maintain stability. Afghanistan's performance in the five following major areas will be monitored: a) Representational Democracy and Equitable Elections; b) Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights; c) Integrity of Public Finance and Commercial Banking; d) Government Revenues, Budget Execution and Sub-National Governance; and e) Inclusive and Sustained Growth and Development. For its part, the international community committed to sustain financial support for Afghanistan's economic development through the Transformation Decade, and reaffirmed its Kabul Conference Commitments to align 80 percent of aid with NPPs and channel 50 percent of 105 aid through the Afghan national budget.<sup>32</sup> In addition, the international community agreed to work with the government of Afghanistan to improve the mechanisms for assistance delivery to better align with international principles of effective development.

Later in July, the Afghan government prepared a draft Tokyo Framework implementation plan to present to the international community. The paper was a positive step towards establishing the themes, goals, indicators, milestones, and responsible agencies necessary for implementing the commitments of the Tokyo Framework. After receiving input from international donors, the government of Afghanistan approved the implementation plan in late September and plans to present the final process, including specific milestones for each framework goal, at the October meeting of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board. The participants agreed to follow-up meetings, which will take place at the ministerial level every two years and at the senior official level in alternate years. The level of progress will be monitored at more frequent intervals by the Afghan-UN-led Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB). The first ministerial review of Tokyo Commitments will take place in London in 2014.

The United States, as well as NTM-A, continues to work through diplomatic channels and international organizations to encourage Allies and partners to continue providing assistance for the sustainment of the ANSF. At the May 2012 Chicago NATO Summit, NATO and ISAF Partner Nations made a political commitment to provide funding for ANSF sustainment after ISAF's mandate ends in 2014. An enduring ANSF, as envisaged by the international community and the Afghan government, requires an estimated annual budget of

approximately \$4.1B. The Afghan government has agreed to provide roughly \$500 million annually of the total cost, progressively increasing its share of financial responsibility for maintaining its security forces over time. Given Afghanistan's current economic and fiscal constraints, the international community pledged to contribute the remaining amount for three years beginning in 2015.

The Department's analysis of the problems the Afghan government faced was, however, yet another warning that Transition might fail on economic grounds alone:<sup>32</sup>

Despite measured progress in revenue generation, Afghanistan's fiscal sustainability ratio (a measure of domestic revenues to operating expenses) is still one of the worst in the world. Projected revenue for 2012 is expected to cover about 2/3 of the central government's operating expenditures yet provide less than 20 percent of the total estimated public expenditures budget. In the first quarter of CY 2012, the fiscal sustainability ratio dropped below 60 percent, due to proportionally higher increases in operating expenses, but rebounded in the second quarter to approximately 80 percent.

Despite the improved fiscal sustainability ratio, economists remain concerned about Afghanistan's fiscal sustainability as revenues are slightly below projections and government expenditures continue to increase. As Transition continues, the necessity to absorb additional expenditures for operations and maintenance (O&M) costs – as reconstruction/infrastructure projects are transferred to the Afghan government – will further strain the ability of government revenues to cover fixed operating costs.

...In the medium term, the international community has pledged to provide assistance to help fill the fiscal gap between domestic public revenue and total public expenditures. At the July Tokyo Conference, donors promised \$16B in civil assistance through 2015; this amount is in addition to donor pledges made in the run up to the May NATO Summit, which were focused on security assistance of \$3.6B and an Afghan commitment of \$500M annually to support the Afghan police and military from 2015-2017. Together, these sums align with the World Bank's baseline scenario of the levels of foreign assistance, roughly \$8B annually, needed to fill the gap, although World Bank notes that this level of assistance will be needed well beyond 2015.

...Revenue generation will only be beneficial in so far as the Afghan government has the capacity to spend its budget in prioritized areas effectively. Budget execution, while showing improvement from SY1389 to SY1390, continues to struggle to meet donor expectations, especially with regards to the development budget.

...Under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, the Afghan government is expected to improve its development budget execution rate to 75 percent by 2017. As donors look to increase on-budget funding to at least 50 percent, in accordance with pledges, the amount of funding that must be utilized will increase substantially over a short period and require the Afghan government to significantly, and potentially unsustainably, accelerate its spend rate. Limited public financial management capacity remains one of the primary challenges hinder-

ing public sector program implementation and public service delivery. More specifically, the Afghan government cites capacity constraints at the national and sub-national levels; weak planning and budget formulation; donor earmarking of funds and funding delays; and communication challenges across ministries, donors, and sub-national entities as key challenges. An additional long-term concern is the retention and integration of the externally funded Afghan “second civil service,” a cadre of skilled civil servants funded by international donors at a higher rate than the regular service in order to expand technical assistance and capacity in line ministries and, in some cases, to help execute donor-funded projects. Although the externally funded Afghan staff represents only roughly 3.9 percent of the total workforce, they account for an estimated 31.9 percent of total payroll costs, according to 2011 World Bank survey of eight key ministries and one agency. The Afghan government has little ability to absorb the cost of these higher salaries, which may jeopardize the transfer of valuable program management and service delivery competencies into the regular service.

None of these official sources came to grips with the need to provide real-world annual aid plans – plans that require constant dialogue and revision – or aid plans that deal with challenges posed by corruption, power brokers, heavy dependence on a narco-economy, waste, or capital flight. Donors failed to address the lack of any coherent aid planning by UNAMA or by “failed” agencies like USAID on a national level. With two years to go before the end of Transition in December 2014, they did not address the lack of coordination between donors and with the Afghan central government, or failures to control contractors, develop valid requirements for spending, and develop meaningful measures of effectiveness. More broadly, the discussions involved decouple the assessment of economic and development issues from an assessment of the current security situation and the current and probable capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces.

Put simply, it is time to get real, to produce plans that can be trusted and actually implemented, and create plans that tie together both civil and security needs. It is time to develop transparent and regular reporting on Afghan and aid progress, clear statements of key requirements and measures of effectiveness. The fact that aid has good intentions is not an excuse for continued incompetence.

#### UNCERTAIN MILITARY PROGRESS: TACTICAL ENCOUNTERS DO NOT MEASURE OVERALL PROGRESS OR SUCCESS<sup>33</sup>

It is equally important to realize that unless the Taliban and other insurgents fundamentally change their behavior, their peace-negotiating efforts are likely to be tactical extensions of their current demands and struggles. They have strong incentives to continue fighting through and after Transition at the end of 2014, and the Afghan government will have to deal with military challenges for the foreseeable future.

Moreover, any realistic assessment of both the current situation in Afghanistan and the prospects for Transition must be realistic about the lack of clear progress in the overall fight against the Taliban and other insurgents as well as the problems in creating Afghan forces. ISAF and the US have tended to focus on the “positive” trends in the fight and ANSF in ways that are all too close to the “follies” in Vietnam.

### **Lack of Recent Progress in the Fighting**

One key problem is the public focus on the tactical and military dimensions of the insurgency to the exclusion of the political dimensions of the struggle coupled with the extent to which they have made EIAs – enemy initiated attacks – the new equivalent of body counts.

#### *Real-world Trends in Unclassified Metrics*

As Figures One to Six show, there is no clear pattern of military success after 2011, and there are as many metrics that show a constant or increasing level of violence as there are that show any progress.

- Figure One shows that there has been no meaningful overall improvement in combat statistics over the last year.
- Figure Two shows how a carefully rigged portrayal of the trends in EIAs can exaggerate progress – although even this chart now shows meaningful shifts during 2011.
- Figure Three reflects the trend in Significant Acts that was the focus of most reporting on combat trends during the surge in the Iraq War. The overall decline from 2010 to 2011 needs to be contrasted with the trend in 2009, showing that combat in 2011 was more intense than in 2009 when the surge began.
- Figure Four illustrates how defining IED incidents can be used to show more positive trends. In this Figure, total IED attacks increased between 2010 and 2011.
- Figure Five shows total civilian casualties, rather than a metric tied to ISAF and ANSF activity, The numbers in 2001 are higher than in both 2009 and 2010.
- Figure Six shows the insurgent’s ability to find a new political focus for military activity: green on blue attacks.


**Figure 1: OSD Assessment of Security Metrics 2011-2012, Year-over-Year (YoY) Change (April 1 – September 30)**

Metric	Total EIAs	High Profile Attacks	Dierct Fire	Total IED Events	IED and Mine Explosions	Indirect Fire
% change form 2011 to 2012	+1%	+2%	+10%	-3%	-12%	-5%

Note: Metric definitions: High-profile attacks (HPA) are currently defined by ISAF as explosive hazard events, where certain executed IED attacks are taken into account. Considered are only Person-borne IED (PBIED) attacks, suicide vehicle-borne IED attacks (SVBIED), and vehicle-borne IED attacks (VBIED). Enemy Initiated direct fire occurs when effects are delivered on a target that is visible to aimer or firing unit and uses the target itself as the point of aim. Enemy Initiated indirect fire occurs when fire is delivered on a target characterized by a relatively high trajectory and where the operator typically fires from a distance beyond line-of-sight or from a position where visual contact with the target is not possible. IED and Mine Explosions occur when an IED or a Mine (which has not been stacked, altered or used in some improvised manner, which would make it an IED) event results in the partial or complete functioning of the IED or Mine. Total IED Events comprises both executed and potential IED attacks. Executed IED attacks comprise IED explosions and mine strikes, while potential or attempted IED attacks comprise IEDs and mines that were found and cleared, premature IED detonations, and IED turn-ins.

Source: ISAF, October 2012. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) as amended, and section 1221 of the National Defense Authorizations Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), p.20.

**Figure 2: ISAF Assessment of Nationwide YoY Change for Monthly Enemy-Initiated Attacks (April 2009 – October 2012)**



**ISAF Observations**


- Enemy-initiated attacks over the last 3 months are 10% lower compared to the same quarter last year.
- After rising in May and June, EIAs continued to drop through October.

Definition: This chart shows the year-over-year change in enemy-initiated attacks (EIA). The total number of EIAs is shown in the background (light blue). The red bars represent an increase of monthly enemyinitiated attacks compared to the same month the year before; blue bars represent a decrease. The changes over three month periods are depicted at the top of the chart.

Data Source: Afghan Mission Network (AMN) Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) Database, as of 17 Nov 2012.  
[http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/MonthlyTrends/20121122\\_NIU\\_ISAF\\_Monthly\\_Data\\_Release\\_\(FINAL\).pdf](http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/stories/File/MonthlyTrends/20121122_NIU_ISAF_Monthly_Data_Release_(FINAL).pdf), p.3.




**Figure 3: OSD Assessment of Monthly Nationwide Security Incidents (April 2009 – September 2012)**



Security incidents include direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire, and IED events. IED events include IED explosions, IEDs found and cleared, mine explosions, and mines found and cleared. The figure depicts a one percent increase in total security incidents from the corresponding reporting period one year ago. Each of the first three months of this reporting period had more security incidents than the same three months one year ago. This rise is considered the result of an earlier start of the fighting season as well as a shortened poppy harvest.

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012, Report to Congress in accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) as amended, and section 1221 of the National Defense Authorizations Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), p. 151.


**Figure 4: OSD Estimate of Monthly IED and Mine Explosions (April 2009 – September 2012)**



This reporting period saw a 12 percent year-over-year decrease in IED and mine explosions, while total IED and mine activity (which includes executed and potential IED attacks) decreased three percent. Potential IED attacks include those that were found and cleared, premature IED detonations, and those turned in to the coalition by local nationals. IED turns-ins more than doubled during this period compared to one year ago.

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress in accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, December 2012, p. 160.

**Figure 5: Monthly Civilian Deaths and Injuries Caused by Insurgents and ISAF (April 2009 – September 2012)**




The ISAF CCMT (Civilian Casualties Mitigation Team) methodology is based on internal and comprehensive reports provided by ISAF troops within Afghanistan, and the activation of Joint Incident Assessment Teams comprised of Afghan government representatives as well as ISAF to review evidence and conduct interviews. The amount of available information depends on ISAF involvement in the event, and therefore it is possible that ISAF statistics under-estimate CIVCAS caused by events where ISAF was not present.

From April through September 2012, approximately 90 percent of CIVCAS were caused by insurgents. Insurgents continue to rely heavily on the use of indiscriminate tactics, such as IEDs. In the reporting period, 59 percent of insurgent-caused CIVCAS were due to IEDs. ISAF has continued its efforts to find and clear IEDs prior to detonation.


An area of great concern, however, continues to be alleged and disputed CIVCAS. Since conditions on the ground do not always permit complete battle damage assessments, insurgents have exploited opportunities to claim that those killed in ISAF-ANSF operations were innocent Afghan civilians, despite ISAF information to the contrary. The CCMT tracks alleged CIVCAS incidents as an indicator of public perception. Notably, from April-September 2012, there were a total of 187 confirmed ISAF-inflicted CIVCAS. Additionally, a total of 29 CIVCAS were alleged in the same period. ISAF investigates all alleged CIVCAS to determine responsibility and provides guidelines on consequence management.

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, December 2012, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) as amended, and section 1221 of the National Defense Authorizations Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), p.33.

**Figure 6: OSD Assessment of Insider Attacks On ISAF Personnel**



**On ANSF Personnel**



Adapted from the Long War Journal, [longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue\\_attack.php#data](http://longwarjournal.org/archives/2012/08/green-on-blue_attack.php#data); Cutoff date is December 24, 2012.

### *Real-world Trends in the Fighting in Helmand and Kandahar During the Peak of the Surge*

As Figures Seven to Twelve show, there has been much more uncertain progress than most ISAF reporting indicates, even in Helmand, Kandahar, and the rest of the south – the focus of the fighting in the surge between 2010 and 2011.

This is particularly important because plans to carry out a similar campaign in the East have had to be severely cut back or cancelled because of US and other troop cuts, and there will now be no broad effort to take back control of key areas in the East.

- Figure Seven shows what appear to be positive trends in EIAs in the Helmand area – which was the key focus of the surge; however, these trends do little more than show that the insurgents stopped making attacks they know would result in major losses during the peak of the surge in 2010. This “positive” trend largely vanishes in 2011 as the insurgent focused on attacks that would give them political visibility or which they thought will produce favorable results.
- Figure Eight shows that there were still significant acts of insurgent violence in the Helmand River Area in 2012.
- Figure Nine shows a significant insurgent presence in the Helmand valley in 2012.
- Figure Ten shows there were far fewer positive trends in Kandahar in EIAs during the 2010-2011 campaign, and Kandahar is a key population and economic center.
- Figure Eleven shows a significant insurgent presence remains in Kandahar.
- Figure Twelve shows that narcotics production increased in the South, reflecting the fact that the Taliban-controlled sharp croppers moved to the area of Taliban control in to the upper parts of the Helmand River valley as well as significant corruption in Afghan government-controlled areas.

What is even more important in terms of assessing both the current situation and the prospects for Transition, however, is that the metrics in Figures Seven to Twelve reveal a sharp a set of differences between measures of tactical clashes like EIAs and maps of the areas in which the Taliban and insurgents have a presence and control.

This is critical in a war where the insurgents do not have to engage ISAF and ANSF forces on unfavorable terms and have the ability to wait out ISAF and US withdrawals in order to win what is really a war of political attrition.

#### *What Matters in a War of Political Attrition*<sup>34</sup>

NATO/ISAF and ANSF tactical victories are scarcely irrelevant, but the reports on these victories are not a substitute for a net assessment of the relative political and military strength of the Taliban and other insurgent networks relative to the Afghan central government.

The test of victory or relative progress in the current type of insurgency is rarely which side wins the most tactical encounters or trends in the current outcome of clashes with regular regime military forces. It is rather the overall ability to take control of populations and areas over time, to defeat the ability of the regime to govern and hold a given amount of space, to deny the regime popular support and income, to exploit local tensions and internal divisions within the population, and to deprive the regime of outside funds and military support.


The Taliban and other insurgents know that history shows there is no easy way to assess progress in counterinsurgency or to distinguish victory from defeat until the outcome of a conflict is final. Time and again, “defeated” insurgent movements have emerged as the victors in spite of repeated tactical defeats. The Chinese Communist victory over the Kuomintang, the Cuban revolution, the Vietnam War, and Nepal are all cases in point. The insurgents can lose virtually every formal battle or tactical encounter and still win at the end of a struggle and emerge as the political victors. They do not have to fight tactical or conventional wars; they can fight battles of political attrition – often winning against unpopular and incompetent regimes.

They know there are cases where the insurgents do eventually have to make the transition to becoming regular forces and defeat the regime’s forces in tactical combat. They also know, however, that this is only one route to victory. They can win if the regime loses sufficient popular support or if it fails to govern properly and control space – particularly in heavily populated areas. They can win if major factions desert the regime without joining the insurgents, if the government cannot afford to sustain the conflict, or if it loses a critical source of outside support.

This makes the many weaknesses in the Karzai government and in the structure of the Afghan government critical liabilities that aid the insurgents. The same is true of the fact there is no current threat to the insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan or likelihood that Pakistan will change the ambiguous role it has played throughout the war.

Furthermore, these liabilities are reinforced by the fact the insurgents know that most US forces and almost all allied forces will be gone by the end of 2014 and that outside popular support for the war and continued aid is now negative and declining in every major ISAF country. Their prospects of a political-military victory are reinforced by ongoing cuts in US forces and those of many key allies and by the widespread corruption and abuses of many elements of the Afghan government – including most of the police.


**Figure 7: OSD Assessment of Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-Southwest (April 2009 – September 2012)**



RC-SW contributed 30 percent of all EIAs from April 2012 through September 2012, the same percentage compared to the corresponding period one year ago. From April 2012 through September 2012, EIAs in RC-SW increased by two percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago.

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, December 2012, p. 153.

Figure 8: OSD Assessment of Northern Helmand River Valley Area EIA Location Changes, YoY Change, June – September, 2011 vs. 2012




Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, December 2012, p. 163.

Figure 9: Violence in Helmand: January – September 2012


## Violence in Helmand

In Helmand Province's north, only the district centers are under government control. In the rest of the province, most areas are under government control.



Source: "Violence in Helmand," New York Times, January 9, 2013.  
<http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2013/01/09/world/asia/09HELMAND-map.html?ref=asia>.

**Figure 10: OSD Assessment of Monthly YoY Change in Enemy-Initiated Attacks for RC-South (April 2009 – September 2012)**




RC-S contributed 21 percent of all EIAs from April 2012 through September 2012, a decrease of one percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago. From April 2012 through September 2012, EIAs in RC-S decreased four percent compared to the corresponding period one year ago.

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, December 2012, p. 157.




Figure 11: OSD Assessment of Kandahar EIA Location Changes, YoY Change, June – September, 2011 vs. 2012



Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, December 2012, p. 162.

Figure 12: No Reduction in Opium Growing in the South, West, and East and Probable Levels of Taliban Influence and Control



Source: Government of Afghanistan - National monitoring system implemented by UNODC. Note: The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

PROVINCE	Cultivation 2006 (ha)	Cultivation 2007 (ha)	Cultivation 2008 (ha)	Cultivation 2009 (ha)	Cultivation 2010 (ha)	Cultivation 2011 (ha)	Cultivation 2012 (ha)	Change 2011-2012 (%)	Eradication in 2011 (ha)	Eradication in 2012 (ha)
Kapisa	282	835	436	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	181	290	+60%	5	54
Kunar	932	446	290	164	154	578	1,279	+121%	1	70
Laghman	710	561	425	135	234	624	877	+41%	21	76
Nangarhar	4,872	18,739	Poppy-free	294	719	2,700	3,151	+17%	61	784
Nuristan	1,516	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	NA	0	0
<b>Eastern Region</b>	<b>8,312</b>	<b>20,581</b>	<b>1,151</b>	<b>593</b>	<b>1,107</b>	<b>4,082</b>	<b>5,596</b>	<b>+37%</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>985</b>
Badakhshan	13,056	3,642	200	557	1,100	1,705	1,927	+13%	367	1,784
Takhar	2,178	1,211	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	NA	0	0
Kunduz	102	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	NA	0	0
<b>North-eastern Region</b>	<b>15,336</b>	<b>4,853</b>	<b>200</b>	<b>557</b>	<b>1,100</b>	<b>1,705</b>	<b>1,927</b>	<b>+13%</b>	<b>367</b>	<b>1,784</b>
Baghlan	2,742	671	475	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	161	177	+10%	31	252
Hilmand	69,324	102,770	103,590	69,833	65,045	63,307	75,176	+19%	1,940	3,637
Kandahar	12,619	16,615	14,623	19,811	25,835	27,213	24,341	-11%	287	922
Uruzgan	9,703	9,204	9,939	9,224	7,337	10,620	10,508	-1%	154	485
Zabul	3,210	1,611	2,335	1,144	483	262	424	+62%	85	88
Day Kundu	7,044	3,346	2,273	3,002	1,547	1,003	1,058	+5%	235	236
<b>Southern Region</b>	<b>101,900</b>	<b>133,546</b>	<b>132,760</b>	<b>103,014</b>	<b>100,247</b>	<b>102,405</b>	<b>111,507</b>	<b>+9%</b>	<b>2,701</b>	<b>5,368</b>
Badghis	3,205	4,219	587	5,411	2,958	1,990	2,363	+19%	36	53
Farah	7,694	14,865	15,010	12,405	14,552	17,499	27,733	+58%	212	316
Ghor	4,679	1,503	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	Poppy-free	125	NA	43	11
Hirat	2,287	1,525	266	556	360	366	1,080	+195%	227	600
Nimroz	1,955	6,507	6,203	428	2,039	2,493	3,808	+53%	20	148
<b>Western Region</b>	<b>19,820</b>	<b>28,619</b>	<b>22,066</b>	<b>18,800</b>	<b>19,909</b>	<b>22,348</b>	<b>35,109</b>	<b>+57%</b>	<b>539</b>	<b>1,130</b>
<b>Total (rounded)</b>	<b>165,000</b>	<b>193,000</b>	<b>157,000</b>	<b>123,000</b>	<b>123,000</b>	<b>131,000</b>	<b>154,000</b>	<b>18%</b>	<b>3,810</b>	<b>9,672</b>

Source: UNODC, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2012: Summary Findings, November 2012, p.3-8.

All this makes creating effective Afghan National Security Forces and giving the Afghan government the necessary aid another critical part of Transition.

It also makes planning for the transfer of power and setting realistic goals for the development of the ANSF as critical as previously discussed issues with leadership, governance, and economics.

### **Transitioning Provinces and Districts**

To begin, the current claims of success in transferring responsibility for security to the ANSF have been largely cosmetic. Afghan forces simply are not ready and there are critical questions both as to when they could become ready – if ever – and the levels of future outside aid and advisory personnel that will be needed to sustain them. There are severe weaknesses in the Afghan military forces which are being compounded by the steadily increasing effort to simultaneously expand the ANA, rush it into the field, and reduce the levels of funding, trainers and partners in the field.

Figure 13 shows a recent Transition plan for giving the ANSF responsibility for security and indirectly provides a rough summary of the relative security of given districts. As was the case in Iraq, however, the map shows transfers that do not reflect the presence of hostile elements or insurgent influence and control and effectively calls for transfers regardless of the real-world level of security that exists on the ground.

Current plans sharply understate the risks in such transfers and exaggerate the current and near term capability of the Afghan government and ANSF to accept such transfers. Transition of responsibility is being shaped by a transfer to meet an end-2014 schedule, not a transfer according to ANSF capability.

It is being driven by US and allied troop withdrawals, from a total of 91,000 US and 40,313 allied troops in early 2012 to some 68,000 US and 36,905 allied troops in October 2012.

These withdrawals have already made it impossible to sustain the US troop presence in the south and to implement the US/ISAF campaign plans in the East and for all critical districts, issued in 2010 and 2011.<sup>35</sup> Moreover, it now seems likely that most US troops will stay in Afghanistan through the campaign season in 2013; further serious withdrawals may occur well before the end of 2014. The plans to cut the number of US positions in Afghanistan from roughly 90 to 4-5 during 2013-2014 not only will steadily cut US capabilities but also are almost certain to be matched or exceeded by other ISAF forces.

### **Afghan Forces in December 2012: Closer to 192,000 than 352,000**

This makes building up the real-world capability of Afghan forces a critical part of an effective Transition, along with the need for the US and other countries to

provide the proper mix of financial aid and advisors/trainers/partners. The US seems to have made such a commitment in broad terms, at least to the point where it will aid the government in keeping the Afghan Army at levels of around 200,000 through 2017. There are many reasons both for this focus and for looking well beyond the end of 2014 – if the Afghan government can make good on meeting the other conditions for a successful transition. Figure 14 shows the deployment and unit strength of Afghan Army forces, providing a broad perspective on the relative strength of the ANSF in key areas. A close look at this map shows that many of these ANA forces are not deployed in high risk or high combat areas and can cover only part of the rest of the country. It is a warning that Transition may sharply affect combat and overall security performance as ISAF forces withdraw regardless of the current readiness ratings of the ANSF.

Figure 14 does not include the Afghan police but – with some exceptions like the ANCOPs and the best elements of the Afghan Local Police – it is a far more realistic picture of actual ANSF capability than a total or Figure showing all Afghan forces, including a largely corrupt and incapable police force that has far more limits than the Afghan army.

The real-world capability of the ANSF is likely to remain far closer to 200,000 men – which will remain partially dependent on US enablers well after 2014 – than the 352,000 man goal that includes most elements of the Afghan National Police (ANP). The latest 1230 report by the US Department of Defense notes that,<sup>36</sup>

The ANSF met its goal of recruiting a force of approximately 352,000 Soldiers and Police by October 1, 2012. The current recruited strength of the Army is 195,000. The Police force stands at more than 157,000 recruited. The Army and Police personnel not currently in training or fielded units are recruited and awaiting induction at the training centers. The ANA is scheduled to achieve its surge-level end-strength of 187,000 soldiers inducted by December 2012, and to have these personnel trained, equipped, and fielded by December 2013. The ANP is expected to reach its surge-level end-strength of 157,000 personnel inducted by February 2013, and to have these personnel trained, equipped, and fielded by December 2013. The AAF is expected to reach its goal of 8,000 airmen inducted in December 2014, and to have these personnel trained, equipped, and fielded by December 2017. As a result of the significant increase in the size of the ANSF, Afghans now constitute more than two-thirds of all those in uniform in Afghanistan.

At the same time, the 1230 report warned that,<sup>37</sup>

Despite progress, corruption remains a critical issue, especially in the MoI, Afghan Border Police, and the Afghan Air Force – a condition that threatens to undermine public perception of the security ministries and ANSF as capable and legitimate security providers for Afghanistan. The Afghan Parliament's vote of "no confidence" in the MoI and MoD ministers in mid-August 2012 and President Karzai's subsequent replacement of the head of the


National Directorate of Security (NDS) have further stressed the security ministries, slowing progress in some areas. All ministries, however, exhibited sufficient institutional cohesion to withstand these changes at the minister level. ANSF will continue to face significant challenges to its growth and development; including attrition, leadership deficits (including Non-Commissioned Officer shortages in both the ANA and ANP), and limited capabilities in staff planning, management, logistics, and procurement.

The ANSF also continues to require enabling support from Coalition resources, including air (both transport and close air support), logistics, ISR17, counter-IED, and medical evacuation support.

A realistic assessment of both the current and future ANSF needs to be based largely on the Army and exclude most of the police other than the ANCOPs.

This will be even more true if President Karzai succeeds in putting an end to the US Special Forces training of the Afghan local police – a demand he made in January 2013.

Figure 13: Plan for Transferring Security Responsibility



Note: The Transition process was jointly conceived of and developed by the Afghan government, the United States, NATO, and ISAF Coalition partners in a series of international conferences during 2010, beginning with the London Conference in January and culminating in the NATO Summit in Lisbon in November 2012.

Transition is being implemented in accordance with the Inteqal Framework across all 261 districts from Tranches 1, 2 and 3. As the ANSF demonstrates its capability, the level of ISAF support is adjusted allowing the ANSF to take more responsibility. At the end of September, 2012, the ANSF had begun to assume the lead for security in 261 of the country's 405 districts. The increasing capability of the ANSF has expanded security gains in many Transitioning areas.

Tranche 1 and 2 areas (138 districts in 20 provinces) continue to be the most secure areas in Afghanistan, both in terms of objective measures and Afghan population perceptions.

The Transition process met another major milestone this reporting period with President Karzai's May 13 announcement of Tranche 3. With the implementation of Tranche 3, approximately 76 percent of the Afghan population lives in areas where the ANSF are in the lead for security. Tranche 3 is more expansive than the first two tranches with 122 new districts entering the Transition process. It includes all remaining provincial capitals and major transportation corridors. To better manage risk in subsequent tranches, some of Afghanistan's more challenging districts were included in Tranche 3 while ISAF has sufficient combat power to address significant security challenges in support of ANSF.


Implementation of Transition in Tranche 3 areas has already begun. For Tranche 3, the Afghan government assumed responsibility for organizing Transition ceremonies, marking the start of Transition. Between July and September, Transition ceremonies were held in provinces entering Transition for the first time. With the start of Tranche 3, 11 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces are wholly in Transition, including Kabul, Balkh, Samangan, Takhar, Bamyan, Panjshayr, Daykundi and Nimroz. Planning for Tranche 4 began during the reporting period. Transition readiness improved in 36 of the remaining 143 districts waiting to enter Transition, and no districts declined in their readiness ratings.

As with Tranche 3, Tranche 4 will likely include areas with significant security challenges; however, managing the associated risk with the forces available is an important planning factor.

Source: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress In accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, December 2012, p. 28-29.

Figure 14: Afghan Army Forces in 2012

ANA: approx. 185,000 personnel trained



Source: "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures," December 3, 2012. <http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf>.

## Limits to the Afghan National Army

Even the Army does have serious limits that will require aid and enablers beyond 2014. The US Department of Defense 1230 Report of December 2012 does identify many areas of progress in the MoD and ANA, and provides a summary overview of the statistics in this progress involved on page 95. Nevertheless, such progress needs to be kept in perspective.

There are only two years left to Transition and the report identifies many areas of continuing challenges that make current transfer plans seem more cosmetic than real. It is unlikely that the ANA will be able to stand on its own before 2016 without more funding and advisory/partnering supporting than it now receives. Therefore, until the insurgency is over, it will need more outside aid than the pledges made during the Chicago Conference seem likely to provide, even if they are actually kept. The US Department of Defense report also warns that,<sup>38</sup>

The MoD and GS have made impressive progress in their ability to plan operations, which is an exceptionally difficult task even in Western defense ministries. However, the ability of these ministries to actually implement operational plans is still developing. The MoD, like many Afghan government institutions, lacks sufficient trained, educated, and professional staff in order to plan and execute operations at a requisite pace.

The MoD is capable of deploying forces, but is deficient in its ability to ensure that those fielded forces are physically issued with equipment that has been provided by NTM-A. In many cases the equipment is in depots and not in the hands of the soldiers who require it. The ability to collect, share, and act on intelligence at the ministerial level is being developed; an assessment of this ability is not possible at this time, however. As a general rule, the various departments within MoD and the GS function well internally (although some departments, such as Counter-IED operations, continue to face challenges); however, their interaction and coordination with other departments requires improvement. Reflective of a problem common to many ministries of defense, internal stovepiping of information and a lack of staff interaction between departments hampers the maturing of the MoD and GS.

Due to the high pace of ANA expansion, the MoD and GS often do not have sufficient time to examine issues and develop coordinated, cross-functional solutions. Structurally, the Afghan military is not a mirror image of Coalition militaries, and the Afghans are, with ISAF support, developing their own strategies, policies, and procedures to address these issues. Afghan solutions to these issues will not replicate NATO or other Coalition's procedures, and western standards should not used [sic] as benchmarks to gauge Afghan progress.

The total NTM-A (CJSOR 12. 0) number of required trainers is 2,612.... Although the requirement for ANP instructors by the end of the reporting period is 1,504, the ANP had only 1,126 personnel assigned to instructor positions. The ANP has consistently trained more instructors than required; however, it has been unable to assign enough of them to schools, resulting in a shortfall. Although attrition levels exceeded the monthly goal of 1. 4 percent each month during the reporting period, strong recruiting and retention efforts, which both exceeded their goals every month, contributed to the solid overall end-strength figures.



The main causes of attrition and low retention are poor leadership and accountability, separation from family, denial of leave or poor leave management, high operational tempo, and ineffective deterrence against soldiers going absent without leave (AWOL). The Attrition Working Group, made up of ANA, NTM-A, and IJC officials, continues to monitor and assess these trends in order to determine causes and potential solutions to reduce the overall attrition rate. Should the attrition rates consistently fail to meet target levels, there is a risk that training costs will compromise the Afghan government's ability to maintain the 195,000 force. Consistently high attrition may also negatively affect ANSF capabilities, as a high number of soldiers will have to be recruited and trained each year, resulting in a force composed of many inexperienced soldiers.

The MoD continued to improve and increase leadership development by focusing on increasing both the quality and capacity of officer and NCO training programs. During the reporting period 29,180 trainees graduated from Basic Warrior Training (BWT), 423 soldiers from Officer Candidates' School (OCS), and 3,765 from 1 Uniform Course (1U – an NCO direct accessions course). BWT and 1U courses have been operating at or above capacity throughout the entire reporting period. Nevertheless, growing the required number of NCOs for the ANA remains challenging. The SY 1391 Tashkil authorizes the ANA 64,132 NCO positions. In order to address current NCO shortfall, an additional 7,093 are required. The plan to address the NCO shortfall emphasizes developing an experienced NCO corps by promoting from within the ranks. The shortage of NCOs will gradually be reduced through 2014, as experienced, qualified soldiers are identified, trained, and promoted.

CSTC-A procured and delivered a high percentage of ANA-required equipment to Afghan depots during the reporting period. Of the three main categories of equipment required by the ANA (shoot, move, and communicate), [sic] CSTC-A delivered 102 percent of "shoot" equipment, 89 percent of "move" equipment, and 93 percent of "communicate" equipment. The re-opening of the Pakistan GLOC on July 4 increased delivery of equipment to Afghanistan.

However, delivering equipment to the national and regional depots does not mean that this equipment has reached personnel in the field. The ANA's main challenge in equipping its units continues to be the delivery of equipment from depots to the units deployed in the field. Each individual ANA unit is slated to receive equipment that has been released from the national depots, shipped through the ANA Central Movement Agency, and delivered to ANA Regional Logistic Support Commands (RLSC). RLSCs subsequently issue the equipment to the field units. Ensuring that the requisitioned equipment makes it through this chain to the units in the field has been challenging, however. Some RLSCs have warehoused equipment waiting to be issued, while nearby units in the field are forced to operate in an under-equipped state. CSTC-A has limited ability to track equipment once it is delivered to the depots, although the equipment levels of partnered units in the field are tracked under the Commanders Unit Assessment Tool (CUAT) system.

Despite this focus, NTM-A anticipates that the ANA will continue to require assistance with logistics and acquisition processes beyond December 2014. The ANA logistics enterprise is in the early stages of development, and capabilities are widely variable, with some hubs

functioning at a high level and others struggling to establish a basic level of self-sufficiency. Overall, the various Afghan logistical processes and organizations, regardless of proficiency level, do not operate as one national logistics system in an integrated and cohesive manner. However, many challenges remain. Although capabilities are demonstrated in some areas (local contracting for food, spare parts, and services), additional focus and attention is needed at a national/strategic level for requirements planning, budget integration, supply planning, quality assurance, contracting, distribution, material accountability, and performance measurements. In some process areas, a minimum core capability set does not yet exist, and in other more advanced processes such as contracting, a viable basic capability has been demonstrated since 2011. The lack of trained logistics staff officers throughout the ANSF is a concern, however, and is likely to become increasingly problematic as ISAF reduces its advisor and mentoring positions. The low numbers of qualified logisticians at both soldier and leader levels continue to be a concern. NTMA has addressed this challenge through application of Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) focused on maintenance, supply, distribution, and mid-level logistics management. In addition to formal, classroom-based training, ANSF logisticians are being trained through On-the-Job Training (OJT). NTM-A anticipates that the number of school-trained logisticians will increase by more than 10 percent (from 9,900 to 11,000) over the next few months, and that training executed by MTTs will produce an additional 2,500 trained logisticians.

Currently, the ANSF is dependent on CSTC-A for all bulk fuel ordering, delivery, and acquisition. The lack of technical capacity to solicit and manage contracts for logistics contributes to this problem. However, CSTC-A intends to conduct a phased transfer of all fuel funding and acquisition responsibilities for the ANA and ANP to the MoD and MoI. By January 2013, MoD will gradually begin taking over management of bulk fuel acquisition and distribution. Transition of these responsibilities will be completed by December 2014. The plan will be developed jointly with the MoD and MoI through an executive-level Fuel Committee and a Fuel Working Group. The executive Fuel Committee will also involve the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Ministry of Finance.

The Afghan Air Force's (AAF) long-term development strategy includes the creation of an air force that can support the basic needs of the ANSF and Afghan government by 2017... AAF plans, however, are ambitious, and indicative of the conflict of aspirations, affordability, and necessity within the Afghan government. At present, AAF capacity and capability remains limited, but with a clear path to meet the demand of both the AAF and SMW pilot requirements. AAF development obstacles include inadequate education and literacy levels. The pilot training program is a two-year program, inclusive of English language training. Corruption and infiltration by criminal patronage networks (CPN) also remain significant problems in the AAF.

ISAF and the Afghan government continue to work together to combat corruption in the AAF, and as of the end of the reporting period, numerous investigations into allegations of corruption and other illegal activities were ongoing. As in other areas of governance, however, the Afghan government has yet to demonstrate the political will to address corruption and remove and prosecute corrupt officials on a consistent basis.

## The Trainer and Advisor Problem

These problems will be even more critical if ISAF and NTMA-A cannot correct the shortfalls in the numbers of qualified trainers during 2013-2016.

The December 2012 Department of Defense 1230 states that,<sup>39</sup>

The United States provides the majority of required advisory teams for the ANSF. For this reporting period, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) established 466 Security Force Assistance Teams (SFAT) requirements, of which 13 percent (60 teams) were not filled as of the end of the reporting period. The SFAT requirement for the next reporting period is 460 SFATs for which SHAPE is currently generating forces. The near-term challenge for NATO is how to enlist the support of troop-contributing nations that have specific and readily usable and transferable skill sets for SFA teams, many of which will operate in the field. The number of requirements will decrease through 2013, as the ANSF improve their ability to conduct independent operations.

Rushing reductions in outside trainers/advisors is likely to make the shortfall problem worse, not better. The 1230 report on ANSF operational effectiveness ratings indicates that there still are no ANA units that are effective without advisors, and only 27 out of 267 rated units (10%) that are “independent with advisors” – a category that has no clear definition.<sup>40</sup>

The report shows that there are 295 units in the fielded ANA force. A total of 209 have advisors or partners rating the units’ effectiveness. A total of 58 are autonomous or not assessed and 28 more are not covered. This is a total of 70% of 295 ANA units. It then states – drawing heavily on the work of Franz Kafka – that,<sup>41</sup>

OCCs had an increase in top-third units with 22 (71 percent) of the 31 reported/required having achieved this milestone. This is an increase of four (18 percent) from the 18 reported as top-third units in the previous cycle, which shows improvement over a three-month period. Of those 18, (11 percent) were not reported this cycle.

In summary, out of the 267 ANA and OCC required units, 165 (62 percent) are top-third units. This is a six percent increase from the 157 units reported in the top two RDLs in Cycle 14 while 16 (10 percent) of the 157 top-third units from that cycle were not reported in Cycle 15.

At the same time, the Department of Defense Report raise serious question about the quality of the ISAF CUAT reporting on the ability of ANA units to stand on their own – reporting further made questionable by the fact the report states that the CUAT combat effectiveness rating system is being revised to cover operational performance for the first time and needs to be further revised to establish separate rating systems for the ANA and ANP at some unspecified point in the future. Worse, the report indicates that the reporting will go from having ISAF trainer/advisors rate Afghan performance to having Afghan rate their own performance

– a shift of which the negative consequences are too predictable to require further analysis.<sup>42</sup>

*The ANP is Unready, Corrupt, and Lacking in Supporting Elements to Meet Transition Needs*

Once again, however, it is important to stress that the Army is far more effective than most of the police and is likely to remain so. The analysis in the December 2012 report – and earlier in an October 30, 2012 Quarterly Report to the US Congress by the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction<sup>43</sup> – strongly suggests that much of the Afghan police force lags far behind the Army in overall development. It makes it clear that the police are far more corrupt and tied to power brokers than the ANA, and lack the mix of courts, adequate detention facilities, and civil governance necessary to be effective in many areas. <sup>44</sup> The December 2012 Department of Defense 1230 report warns that,<sup>45</sup> MoI leadership has taken on a more active role in managing end-strength, recruitment, and force balancing. Much like the MoD, the MoI already has an effective training and force generation foundation in place, and as it approaches its fielded force goals, more efforts are being applied to the professionalization of the force. The MoI will also concentrate on areas that needed improvement over the past quarter to include: fielding vehicles/equipment, recruitment, gender issues, transition from private security companies to the Afghan Police Protection Force (APPF), and building a more capable Counter Intelligence force. A notable milestone during this reporting period was the advancement of the Afghan Uniform Police (AUP) to CM-2A, marking the advancement of all four Major Deputy Ministerial Security Pillars (AUP, ABP, ANCOP, and AACP) to CM-2B and above.

Shortfalls in logistics, facilities maintenance, office space, and technical capacity to solicit and manage contracts continue to be major impediments toward progress. NTM-A and Coalition police advisors will continue to work in close coordination with their Afghan counterparts to ensure deficiencies are addressed, and that the enablers and ANP units are afforded the resources necessary for continued development and progress toward autonomy.

Although the MoI demonstrated measured progress during the reporting period, the ministry faces multiple challenges that risk impeding further development. The MoI faces persistent difficulties in creating and maintaining a sustainable force, particularly in creating a logistics capacity within the ANP pillars. Similar to the MoD, the MoI lacks sufficient trained, educated and professional staff.

Furthermore, the MoI remains significantly susceptible to penetration by Criminal Patronage Networks (CPNs) in the fielded force, far more so than the ANA. Due to the nature of its mission, the dispersed deployment of its forces, and the span of control, the Afghan Border Police (ABP) is particularly vulnerable to potential influence by CPNs. The Afghan government, in partnership with ISAF, has made only limited progress toward removing

corrupt officials. ISAF and the Afghan government are accelerating efforts to develop internal accountability systems and sustainable processes through ministerial development and reform initiatives within the MoI that will further enable prevention and detection of internal criminal activity, thereby reducing the influence of CPNs.

...some units, such as the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), are now highly effective, frequently partnering with ISAF forces in successful operations. Progress has been less rapid in other areas, such as the development of ANP logistics capabilities, and the development of the Afghan Border Police. The ANP remain significantly behind their ANA counterparts in developing the capabilities necessary to transfer to full Afghan lead by the end of 2014.... The ANP did not meet its end-strength growth targets this reporting period, finishing 8,548 below the target goal of 155,706. Earlier this year, the ANP were recruiting at a pace to achieve the October objective ahead of schedule. However, the Ministry of Interior (MoI) ceased recruiting during April 2012 to focus on rebalancing ANP assets. The ANP had more low-level recruits than necessary at the time, but was facing a shortage of officers and NCOs. They opted to pause input of new (and mostly low-level) recruits to focus on ensuring that officers and NCOs were serving in actual officer and NCO billets, as well as to effect the reassignment of personnel from overstrength units to under-strength units.

The ANP remains under-equipped as a result of fielding challenges, including battle loss replacement needs and the closure of Pakistani GLOCs earlier this year. Distribution of vehicles... The biggest logistics challenges include the recruitment of specialized policemen and the retention of trained logisticians, while ensuring fielded equipment is operational. Additionally, logistics continues to challenge the operational readiness of the ALP in particular was slowed by the GLOC closures... Development of an ANP maintenance capability is underway, as poorly maintained equipment affects unit performance in the field. Currently, the ANP is entirely reliant on contracted maintenance provided through an NTM-A-managed contract.

...much like the situation with ANA equipment, problems arise when delivering the equipment from national (and largely ISAF-run) depots to smaller regional depots and to the units themselves. When equipment is fielded to the ANP, either staged by local pickup in Kabul or a convoy, CSTCA has little oversight over the ultimate destination and unit receiving the equipment. Diversion of equipment from its intended unit as stated on the CSTC-A issuing order has occurred, although the exact rate of equipment diversion remains unknown. Often, far more equipment than necessary is delivered to one unit at the expense of others, giving rise to a situation in which some units are over-equipped while others are under equipped.

In addition to diverted equipment, damaged equipment is often not reported by the units. This causes lower "on-hand" numbers at the unit level than what is documented as the quantity fielded.

As a result of a deliberate decision to place initial focus of force generation on ANP policing units, the development of enablers – in particular logistics capabilities – was delayed, and ANP logistics capabilities are not expected to be self-sufficient until late 2014. NTM-A began to shift its efforts to logistics development in mid-2011, and this is now the main focus

of NTM-A. Logistics will remain the main focus area for the training mission throughout 2012 and 2013. NTM-A initiated a detailed planning process to review the current logistics system, and in conjunction with IJC and MoI, to develop a more sustainable system to meet ANP requirements beyond 2014.

ANP logistics nodes at the regional level and below continue to require Coalition assistance in order to effectively provide sustainment. The biggest logistics challenges include the recruitment of specialized policemen and the retention of trained logisticians, while ensuring fielded equipment is operational. Additionally, logistics continues to challenge the operational readiness of the ALP. Each District Chief of Police is authorized three AUP personnel to assist in ALP management and supply; however, the level of support varies from district to district. NTM-A is working with available ALP logisticians to establish better accountability of issued equipment, better coordination of services, and improved knowledge of the logistics system.

...Development of an ANP maintenance capability is underway, as poorly maintained equipment affects unit performance in the field. Currently, the ANP is entirely reliant on contracted maintenance provided through an NTM-A-managed contract. NTM-A and maintenance experts from the MoI are focusing on the establishment of ANP mobile response maintenance teams, with recovery capability within the current manning and equipment levels. In order to improve the ANP's maintenance capability and increase the level of confidence across the ANSF, several projects are ongoing. Expanding current NTM-A-provided maintenance training will address the necessary human capital investment to enable a basic maintenance capability within the ANP. NTM-A will pursue improvement in the ANP maintenance program and the use of recovery assets. Furthermore, NTM-A expects to refine sustainment requirements for eight MoI Supply Points (MSPs) and seven Regional Logistics Centers (RLCs). In conjunction with MoI, NTM-A plans to simplify the requirements and requisition process and develop infrastructure and contract management capabilities.

.... A number of other issues hinder ABP development. Correctly accounting for personnel remains a major issue, especially with "ghost soldiers" (soldiers who are no longer assigned but for whom the unit continues to collect pay)... Pay and promotion issues also negatively impact ABP development. The lack of banking facilities in some regions, along with the security situation along routes used for the movement of bulk funds, have prevented personnel from getting paid in a timely manner. ABP training is currently not as extensive as the training most other ANP receive. Training shortfalls include communications, driving, maintenance, counter-IED, computers, and literacy. More NCO training is needed. Many ABP outposts remain static, and rarely conduct border security missions beyond the vicinity of their outposts.

...The AUP made steady progress during this reporting period, although major challenges remain. As part of a deliberate decision made when the AUP was still in the early stages of development, initial focus was on force generation and support to the COIN campaign. As increasing areas of Afghanistan transition to ANSF lead and the ANA is better able to handle the military aspects of the security mission, increased consideration is being given to AUP reform as part of security sector reform. This includes the further professionalization of the

AUP to create a police service that can actively deal with criminality and has a sense of integrity, a code of ethics, an ability to engage with the community, and respects the rule of law. ...Currently, roughly 17,552 (20 percent) of the AUP are untrained and approximately 12,800 (15percent) are un-vetted. Full vetting for new AUP recruits occurs when they arrive at their first training center. Many instances have occurred in which Provincial Chiefs of Police (PCoPs) place newly recruited patrolmen directly into local units from the recruiting centers, bypassing the training centers.

...One major impediment to AUP development in this area is the low capabilities of the Afghan justice sector. The AUP's capabilities, both geographically and functionally, have far surpassed those of the Afghan judiciary and justice sector. The AUP have the authorization to hold suspects for up to 72 hours, but beyond that judicial intervention is required. AUP do not act as investigators of crime as police forces do in many Western nations. The Afghan judiciary is in charge of criminal investigations and prosecution. In many areas, AUP personnel may arrest a suspect but are forced to release them after 72 hours due to a lack of support from the justice sector. Increasing the capabilities of the Afghan justice sector and judiciary, as well as the coordination between them and the AUP, will be a priority through 2013.

The 1230 Report again raises serious question about the CUAT and other effectiveness reporting on the ability of ANP units to stand on their own. The report describes the readiness of police units as follows:

The ABP had 22 units (43 percent of the total required) reported as "Independent with Advisors" or "Effective with Advisors", which is down 29 percent from the 31 reported in Cycle 14. Of the 31 reported in the top two categories in Cycle 14, seven (23 percent) were not reported in Cycle 15. The ANCOPI did have a measured increase in units reported as having achieved "Independent with Advisors" or "Effective with Advisors" status. Sixteen units reported as having achieved top-third status, which is an increase of 23 percent from the 13 reported in Cycle 14. Of the 13 reported in the previous cycle, four (31 percent) did not report in Cycle 15. There has been a significant decrease in reporting on police units, and for this reason it has been difficult to make an accurate assessment of progress. Of the 408 required police units, 179 (44 percent) have achieved ratings of "Independent with Advisors" or "Effective with Advisors" this cycle.

This lack of coverage indicates that such ratings have little real meaning and these problems again are rendered even more questionable by the fact that the entire CUAT system is being revised to cover operational performance for the first time and needs to be further revised to establish separate rating systems for the ANA and ANP at some unspecified point in the future.<sup>46</sup>

The practical dilemma that requires far more detailed and transparent aid planning is that the police are unlikely to meet a meaningful level of capability at any predictable point in the future – almost regardless of the outside level of aid and training. At the same time, rushing reductions in outside trainers/advisors is likely

to be a far more serious problem for the ANP than the ANA. The 1230 Report shows elsewhere that there are 609 units in the fielded ANP force. A total of 265 have advisors or partners rating the units effectiveness. A total of 143 are autonomous or not assessed and 201 more are not covered. This is a total of 44% of 295 ANA units that are not rated by trainers or advisors.<sup>47</sup>

One answer may be to take as many of the police out of the paramilitary role as possible, focus on the ANA for key combat tasks, and strengthen the Afghan Local Police to create local forces with a vested interest in the security of the areas they protect. Also important is to focus on protecting key population areas and not try to create a transfer of responsibility that attempts to push the ANSF into truly defeating the insurgents. If the other elements of the Afghan government are successful in Transition, a war of political attrition may become a two-way street. The government may be able to wait out the insurgents as it wins the confidence of more of the people and the insurgents lose support.

It is also clear, however, that US willingness to sustain most of the cost of aid and advisors requires an unambiguous Afghan government commitment to provide bases, facilities, and a status of forces agreement. It also requires Afghan success in creating a stable and effective mix of Afghan forces at some point within a few years after 2014. There is no point in reinforcing failure – or in paying for it.

## CONCLUSIONS

The combination of Afghan problems and increasingly uncertain outside support does not mean the Taliban and other insurgents will win. It is all too clear, however, that every aspect of Transition is a high-risk effort and that many elements can fail, including leadership, governance, the economy, and Afghan forces.

The problems also raise serious doubts about some aspects of current aid planning and commitments – or the lack thereof – and the capabilities of Afghan forces. The hardest choices have to be made by Afghans. They have to make changes in leadership, governance, economics, and the ANSF that show there is a real incentive for the US and other states to have a concrete Transition strategy. At the same time, there is an equal need for far more US and allied realism about what can be accomplished, provision of serious aid well beyond 2014, and working with the Afghan government to develop meaningful plans. Without major efforts on both sides, Afghanistan may muddle through in spite of this mix of Afghan, ISAF, and donor problems. The more Transition is treated as an “Egress strategy,” the more likely “Afghan good enough” is to turn into “Afghan failed.”

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 "Corruption in Afghanistan also impacts the international community, who need to start thinking long-term. According to an article from Huguette earlier this year, as much as \$1 billion of the \$8 billion donated in the past eight years has been lost to corruption. As much US\$ 60 billion of military contracts have been lost to fraud and waste. The country receives \$70 billion in foreign military assistance and development aid annually. Afghan government revenue was \$1.3 billion in 2009.  
 "The country's future depends on tackling corruption more than almost any other. A Transparency International report last year warned: "Corruption, weak institutions and a lack of economic development pose a fatal threat to the viability of Afghanistan." The attention of media and international community are starting to turn to the 2014 elections as a key moment, but this Wednesday Afghanistan's score in the Corruption Perceptions Index will send a different message. The country's leadership must put a stop to the corruption practices in the country now, and not in 2014.  
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# 3.

## THE ELECTION IS THE MAJOR CHALLENGE

JAN KUBIŠ

Many of the analysts that are operating with fact and figures, with trends and perception, in Afghanistan, predict very negative scenarios. However, all transitions period are characterized by uncertainties and some very promising factors need to be pointed out.

First, the international military is leaving but not the international community. Afghanistan is taking its fate into its hands. In spite of all doubts and imperfections, this is a very healthy process and the international community is providing help and support.

Second, one should never forget about the resilience of the Afghan people. They are preparing their future with admirable determination. Every day, political leaders, the opposition, the administration, regional actors and the insurgency, discuss, compete and cooperate to find new solutions.

Third, there is no doubt about the commitment of the international community in terms of support to the Afghan military forces. There is willingness despite all deficiencies and problems. The US and Afghanistan agreed that there will be, after 2014, a partnership, including a military partnership. This is a first element of predictability, extremely important, for the country and for the people. But also many other commitments are confirming that the international community will be there for Afghanistan and with Afghanistan for many years, after 2014.

Fourth, when it comes to the future development of the country, angst and uncertainties, deep rooted into the society, have to be taken into account. There are many questions that need solution, sometimes different from financial commitments. Without a political transition there will be no transition at all. Afghanistan, its political leaders but also the political society is taken the issue seriously. The process is not necessarily inclusive, but true efforts have been made. Current and future political leaders will try to build consensus around the emerging elements, in order to create the opportunity for a more successful dialogue, including part of the armed opposition.

In this picture, the major challenge, is the election. A democratic transition has to be confirmed by reasonable elections. There is no guarantee in this period of unpredictability but it is much more likely that elections will be held, given the many declaration of commitment by the President. And elections will contribute for more stability for the future in Afghanistan.

Regarding Doha we heard about the Doha office. And again as loyal UN civil servant, I took note about what is the intention of setting up this office and regarding what was confirmed in London during the talks the other day: a 6 months preliminary period and then the setting up of the office in rather short times. That's the primary line. But is it completely baseless? We are reading signals as well as from the UN from different parts of the insurgency. (It seems unclear).

Another point to be made is about the armed insurgency. There is a concrete engagement with part of the administration and the legal opposition. The question is now about how to organize this engagement in order to integrate coherently the armed insurgency into the picture of this managed transition. Indeed, this is a managed transition. The different forces are not just interacting by moving things in different directions, they are all adding to stability within a constructive dialogue. Again, those are elements of predictability.

For what concerns the economic development, even if the growth bubble is disappearing, the country will not collapse. In fact, there is an important share of GDP growth which comes from agriculture, giving an element, even if slight, of stability.

In sum, there are serious problems in Afghanistan, concerning the political process, transformation, peace and human rights protection, but no gloom and doom scenario should be predicted. The Afghan people, young and elders, coming from the South and from the North, are complaining. They are extremely critical of both the government and the international community. But they say "We believe in this country. We would like to stay in this country. We would like to build it." Despite all the problems they surely know better than we do.

# 4.

## A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT AFGHAN CIVIL SOCIETY

EMANUELE GIORDANA

Certain words appear with unerring regularity in reference to the conflict in Afghanistan: the Taliban, jihadists, security, transition, exit strategy, post 2014. The words we use to describe the situation or through which we try to imagine a future often conceal illusions or hopes, but they are also frequently used to fill a theoretical void. To be perfectly honest, it seems to me that the term “civil society” (*jemaa madani* in Dari) fits into this category. Though it first started appearing in official speeches and dossiers a few years back, its use has increased sharply in recent times.

I would even say that, like the term “gender”, its presence has become de rigueur. But if we look a bit closer and ask ourselves what exactly the word means or represents, the matter gets a bit trickier. There hasn’t been a lot of study or research conducted on Afghan civil society, though some progress has been made over recent years. When we say the word “Pashtun” we know what we are referring to, and the same goes for “financial system”. When we use the term “civil society”, on the other hand, we may very well mean different things or not even know what exactly it is we’re referring to. Or, at least, so it seems to me.

Some would say that it refers to that vast galaxy of NGOs whose operations and subsistence depend on international cooperation funds. These organised groups speak a language we find appealing, with frequent references to human rights, gender issues and services. They meet our needs, and perhaps those of the Afghan government as well, and so we set aside a bit of money for them. They are our little friends that make Afghan democracy stronger and more in step with the times, starting from the very language they use.

But is *this* Afghan civil society? According to the most attentive observers and scholars - Elizabeth Winter, for example, or our very own Giuliano Battiston - whether Afghan or Italian or British, civil society is a plurality of organised groups working outside of but not necessarily against a country’s institutions.

Others would say - and the Tokyo Conference undoubtedly scored a point in

favour of this particular vision – civil society also includes businessmen. Those, that is, that have personal gain as their objective: not exactly what organised civil society should ideally aim for. And then still others say that civil society is simply society: but then are we referring to all of society? As in, all those not wearing a uniform, who belong to neither the police nor the military? The Italian election campaign, to cite an example close to home, is abusing the term left and right.

I have no intention of boring you with a theoretical debate that sparks heated discussion amongst those specialising in the subject - this subject that has only recently begun to be analysed. It is also only recently that these bottom-up initiatives have shown themselves to be a driving force highly beneficial to the countries themselves, or at least so it seems to me.

I am labouring under no illusions. I know full well that even within civil society there are unscrupulous individuals and associations that go at public and private funds as if they were bones to be gnawed at. However, in general these groups represent the desire we all have to preserve and develop our shared assets, whether they be institutions or the water we drink or the right to an education. And this holds true whether we are talking about Italy, Belgium, Canada or Afghanistan, whether New York or London, Tehran or Islamabad, or - of course - Kabul. These are by no means randomly chosen examples. Civil society can be considered a resource or a problem, a friend or an enemy. It can be helped and supported or silenced; it can be strengthened or used as a fig leaf, serving no purpose beyond that of its own existence.

What I am interested in doing here – in the company of those who have followed and continue to follow the evolution of this country we all love, and that as we all know has an uncanny ability to fascinate – is to pose a question. I would like to ask you how much time the international community has spent reflecting on the term “civil society”. How long has each one of us put into asking ourselves what the term really means, a term subjected to so much abuse in so many dossiers? Or have we accepted it grudgingly, as if it were some sort of toll to be paid? How much effort has gone into helping, sustaining, and developing Afghan civil society? To what extent do we believe it to be a pillar of civil coexistence and stimulus to do better, to remind us of our promises and commitments?

I believe very little effort has been put into it. Extremely little. I believe that despite the millions of dollars spent on surveys to see how Afghans see us, we have not spent so much as a tenth of that on studying Afghan civil society. And I wonder how much of all the money allocated to cooperation efforts has gone towards civil society. An in-depth study would reveal a great many surprising things. It would show that there are unimaginable associative forms at the village level and that we have underestimated religious networks in our dangerous equation of “mullah equals danger”. Do you have any idea of how many progressive mullahs there are in Afghanistan? Do you know how many poets associations there are?



There may even be one per village, but just try and find a publisher willing to publish their works.

This is a small, tendentious example with the sole aim of prodding into action this audience of ours. I would simply like to toss a stone into the pond, hoping that the concentric ripples reach decision-makers' consciences before 2014. Afterwards it will be too late to remember that a civil society really did exist, since these voluntary forms of association are as fragile as the roses brightening up Kabul gardens. Though their roots go deep and get them through the winter, they are by no means immortal. If watered and cared for during the summer months, however, they will not easily succumb to the ice and cold.

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**Afgana** ([www.afgana.org](http://www.afgana.org)) is an informal Network of the Italian Civil Society (Ngo's, Associations, academics, researchers and citizens). Afgana was born in March 2007 thanks to an initiative promoted by 3 Italian Association (Arci, Lunaria and Lettera22). The initiative was a response to the appeal "A journey to peace and justice in Afghanistan: reflections and proposals of the civil society". The appeal put forward suggestions and solutions for a country, Italy, where "a lot has been said about Afghanistan, but only few on Afghan population, its needs, and on how Western presence is perceived".

Afgana organized the first Afghan civil society Conference in Kabul and in Rome in 2011, who is mentioned in the Partnership Agreement between Italy and Afghanistan signed by the Italian and Afghan Parliament. Afgana is recognized by Italian Parliament and Mofl and was received with an Afghan civil society delegation by president Napolitano.

The Website [Afgana.org](http://Afgana.org) collects contributions, news, comments, and researches from and about Afghanistan. It is meant to update the reader on the progress made by the project launched during the Rome conference on the 26th of March 2007, where associations, academics, journalists, experts and members of Parliament participated.

In December 2011, Afgana launched the "30% Initiative". Afgana in Italy is asking the Parliament to reallocate to civil reconstruction and cooperation projects, 30

cents out of every euro saved from the downsizing of the Italian military force in Afghanistan. The same issue was presented by Afgana during Tokyo Conference in July 2012

# 5.

## THE JOURNEY OF AFGHANISTAN TOWARDS SELF RELIANCE

*From Transition to Transformation 2011-2014 & 2015-2025*

GENERAL ABDUL RAHIM WARDAK

### INTRODUCTION

During the 2013-2014 period, Afghanistan will enter a new critical juncture and defining period that will shape its destiny. Throughout this period, the country will undergo three Transitions: Security, Economic, and Political. With the drawdown of international forces, the economy will be hit hard. The number of jobless people will increase, and foreign donations will shrink. Therefore, rigorous planning and preparations for all three transitions is an absolute necessity. There is a detailed military strategy for Security Transition. The same may not be true for Political and Economic Transition as these involve on-going efforts. This paper presents the overall Transition process with more emphasis on Security Transition.

The public has been continually asking why we have not achieved more progress despite over 10 years of assistance from the international community. If we candidly reflect upon our past decisions and performance, we can find our answer. For many years we failed to develop sufficient Afghan National Security forces (ANSF), and the threat assessment was unrealistically low. The initial size of the ANSF was far too low by any historic or Troop-to-Task analysis, and the scale and challenges of rebuilding a devastated nation were underestimated. In 2006 when the enemies escalated their attacks, we did not respond effectively until 2009. Afghanistan remained an Economy of Force effort, and a great window of opportunity was lost. However, with the announcement of a new strategy, the way ahead to realize our common and shared objectives became clear.

This strategy was not narrowly focused on counter-terrorism, but rather on a comprehensive civil-military campaign. It provided a proper vision with all the necessary elements that we longed for since 2002. But unfortunately, the implementation for this strategy did not endure and was short lived. Although serious efforts only began in 2009, the war protracted beyond expectations. Economic austerity on a global scale and elections and local political agendas in supporting countries

constrained the international community's ability to support this growing and enduring mission. Additionally, casualty numbers became disturbing.

The enemy vividly remembered the disengagement of the international community in the 1990s. They assumed that sooner or later the international community could be waited out, that its interests would wane, or that its patience would run out. In the early years, the enemy was encouraged by this view and that the newly built ANSF were structured as a force lighter than light infantry, equipped with old weapons collected by the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) and the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) programs. The enemy also saw weakness in the half hearted effort in institution development, infrastructure building, and economic revival. As a result, it was once again convinced that the international community was not serious about the matter and could not sustain firm political will for long.

The resurgence of the Taliban in 2006 was not just an accident or an impulsive reaction. On the contrary, it was the result of years of preparations and strong conviction on the enemy's part that the international community was not coherent. If we had built on early progress in the ANSF programmes and thoroughly filled the security space with Afghan forces, the enemy would not have been able to make any progress.

Our ability to defend the nation against overwhelming odds throughout the history has been so long the source of Afghan pride. However, after 30 years of destructive war, foreign interference and proxy conflict, our ability to defend our land has been greatly affected. The fact that the soldiers of the international community have been shedding their blood to protect us is considered by the majority of the Afghans a source of shame and dishonour. We do hope that with the implementation of the Transition process, we will regain our pride.

Although the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) has faced numerous challenges and obstacles, yet it continues to deliver improvement across all sectors of the government. Despite of these successes, statements in the media and comments by some think tanks have portrayed a gloomy picture and downplayed our prospects for success. The debate in some policy circles seems to be refocused on redefining success and not the practical problem of actually succeeding. But, there should be no doubt about the Afghans' determination to succeed. It is a question of the survival of the nation with a history of 5.000 years.

Progress in governance, reconstruction, and economic development must be accelerated as people who can not feed their families, find jobs and make a living through legitimate means, will quickly fall under the influence of those who promise other solutions. Attracting inward investment and providing the conditions for economic growth and development are vital.

We face major problems and constraints in achieving our goals in security and governance. These include our porous borders, the size of our economy, and the lack of well educated people to staff ministries and provide public services. The

speed of our progress depends on the International Community's willingness to continue to commit resources and the determination of GIRoA to show leadership and make difficult decisions.

#### THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES

Our main goal is to establish a sustainable and enduring ANSF that is responsible for security and law enforcement while serving the Afghan people. By partnering, the fielded Afghan forces continue to develop enhanced capabilities to the point where the ANSF can lead operations throughout the country. The International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) has been committed to partnership by living, training, and operating with the ANSF.

Although it is extremely difficult to raise an army and fight a war simultaneously, the Afghan National Army (ANA), which is becoming increasingly disciplined and democratically accountable, has been one of the success stories of the last few years. The program of defence reform led by the United States has helped us to establish the foundation of an army that is ethnically balanced, nationally oriented, professionally skilful, morally disciplined, and operationally cohesive.

There is clearly a requirement to develop the ANA from a light infantry-centric force for counter insurgency operations to a modern force capable of defending our nation. We must build enabling capabilities currently provided by ISAF to include Counter-IED, Protected Mobility with Integrated Firepower, additional Indirect Firepower, Air Transportation, Air Reconnaissance, Air Support of the ground forces, and in the absence of ISAF forces Air Interception and Air Domain Awareness capabilities to secure our air space. Most of these capabilities, if acquired, are going to immensely enhance the effectiveness of the ANA in the present conflict and expedite an irreversible Transition.

Looking beyond security in the narrow sense, it will be threats from lawlessness, illegal armed groups, and organized crime, including the drug trade, which represent an equal if not greater threat to stability in Afghanistan. Real security will be impossible to achieve so long as drug production and trafficking flourish and the money they generate causes instability. This makes the development of a professional and competent police force and the strengthening of the rule of law and the justice system vital.

The Afghan Ministry of Interior (MoI) has endured many challenges in the reform of the Afghan National Police. Through an extensive program of reform and retraining, the Afghan National Police (ANP) is making steady progress. They are developing stronger ethos, discipline, and motivation. They are working diligently to promote professionalism and eliminate corruption. The ANP is steadily moving towards their rightful place as the guardians of the Afghan civil society.

To realize its security objectives, GIRoA acknowledges that in the near and medium terms, it will require the International Community to further develop, sup-

port, and equip the ANSF. Forecasting the full spectrum of the future security situation is almost impossible, but based on operational studies, analyses and the assumption of a gradually degrading threat, we recognize the need to develop a planning model to serve as a conceptual basis for GIRoA and the International Community to decide on future ANSF funding and the adjustment of its size and structure through the Transformation Decade (2015-2025). The size of the force and other planning assumptions will be subject to revision in accordance with conditions on the ground and mutual agreement between GIRoA and the International Community.

Based on the present concept, the ANSF will surge to a fielded force of 352,000 personnel in 2013. This ANSF size will remain in place through 2018 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization -NATO Defense Ministerial decision on February 21, 2013) to protect the people, retain key population centres, neutralize existing threats, deny terrorist safe havens, diversify its structure, secure borders, and defend vital installations.

The ANSF will assume the lead responsibility for securing all of Afghanistan by mid 2013 and then complete the Transition process by the end of 2014. Following the completion of Transition, the International Community will continue to train, advise, and assist the ANSF, which continues to become increasingly capable of independent operations.

The ANSF will consolidate security gains, stabilize the country and contain any residual and operationally significant threats. As Afghanistan continues to become more stable and secure, GIRoA in coordination with the International Community will reduce the overall size of the ANSF to a more sustainable force and refocus its efforts increasingly toward enduring security roles.

GIRoA and the International Community for planning purposes have agreed on a conceptual model for decisions on ANSF funding and force structure, which will be sustained with the International Community's support through the Transformation Decade.

Subject to the realities on the ground, the model envisions a reduction of the ANSF surge by the end of 2018, with a baseline funding level of \$4,1B. The plan includes an ANA of 123,000, an ANP of 97,500 and an AAF of 8,000 personnel. GIRoA will contribute \$500M toward the estimated \$4,1B cost and the International Community will provide the remaining \$3,6B.

## PEACE AND RECONCILIATION

The Afghan High Peace Council (AHPC) has developed a detailed road map for peace and reconciliation. By 2015, AHPC envisions that the Taliban, Hizb-e-Islami, and other militant groups would stop armed opposition, join the political process, and participate in future elections. The inclusiveness of the Afghan constitution allows for a political system that will facilitate the participation of all Tali-

ban and other armed groups in the political process to achieve their political goals and aspirations peacefully. The AHPC road map consists of five steps:

- Step 1. By end of March 2013, ensure Afghan ownership and leadership of the peace process and place emphasis on securing support from Pakistan and regional and international countries.*
- Step 2. During the first six months of 2013, initiate formal and direct negotiations through confidence building measures.*
- Step 3. During the second six months of 2013, conduct formal and direct negotiations with verifiable representatives of the Taliban and other militant groups. Here, the main focus will be to secure agreements on priority issues, including ending violence, facilitating the provision of basic public services, and ensuring security for the upcoming elections in the spring of 2014.*
- Step 4. In the first half of 2014, complete the consolidation of agreements achieved in Step 3, and secure a final end to the conflict.*
- Step 5. By 2015, further strengthen regional and international cooperation to ensure an enduring security and stability in Afghanistan and the region.*

Peace and reconciliation efforts that are ongoing, if successful, can have far reaching impact on security, political, and economic Transitions. Recent positive developments with Pakistan and the expected opening of the Taliban office in Qatar have given the peace and reconciliation process new hope.

In order to realize a stable and secure Afghanistan, we need national unity and inclusiveness of its entire people. This is only possible through the continued implementation of the Reconciliation and Reintegration Program. We are seeking a genuine peace that makes life worth living, a peace that enables man and nation to grow and to build a better life for their children.

Over recent months, there has been a visible increase in the pace of people reintegrating. As of 9 March 2013, 6442 insurgents have reintegrated since the program's inception, and 921 are under negotiation.

Peace is the highest aspiration of all Afghans. We will negotiate for it, sacrifice for it, but we will never surrender for it - Now or Ever.

#### AFGHANISTAN AND DEMOCRACY

The Afghan people have wholeheartedly embraced democracy by developing a constitution and associated political process. In the past 11 years, we have worked fast to develop a single national army, police, and institutions that promote a strong central government. Moreover, building a strong central government, with well resourced and credible institutions will facilitate the conditions for democracy to fully take root and blossom in Afghanistan, both at the local and national levels.

Some in the West fear that democracy will not take hold; however, the real

essence of democracy with some variation is deeply rooted in our tribal code of conduct and by virtue of our society and past history. Many members of the international community have participated in our Shuras or witnessed our Loya Jirgas. The process of deliberation and reasoning to a mutually agreed solution is in our DNA.

At the same time, we have sometimes struggled with aspects of Western style democracy. We have not yet developed all the proper instruments to implement it in such a short span of time. Our modern democracy is a work-in-progress, and the world should be patient with us. Similar to the history of evolution of democracy in other countries, the young Afghan democracy will need decades to fully mature. Afghanistan's social and cultural fabric will drive the evolution of its democratization process.

#### TRANSITION OVERVIEW

The main objective of Transition is to transfer full sovereignty to the Afghans across all government functions by 31 December 2014. With the completion of Transition, Afghanistan envisions to achieve the following in the Transformation Decade and beyond:

- *By 2015, full responsibility for security, foundational economic investments, and good governance.*
- *By 2025, reduction of dependence on international assistance in non-security sectors with consolidated peace and stability, improved government service, effective development, and civil and human rights.*
- *By 2030, the emergence of Afghanistan as a model of a democratic developing Islamic nation.*

The most important Transition will be political. Therefore, a fair, transparent, and accountable election in 2014 will play a decisive role in achieving stability, prosperity, and national cohesion. The timeline of the 2014 election process has been announced; however, many issues are pending. Disagreements about voter registration cards still continue. Electoral law has to be ratified by the parliament, and funding for the election has yet to be allocated.

Concerns remain that after the withdrawal of foreign forces and the disappearance of foreign spending after 2014, the Afghan economy will greatly suffer. Although in the near term this may be true to a degree, GIRoA with assistance from the International Community has set the foundation for future economic stability. If Afghanistan's economic potential is properly realized, then the country can once again become an economic and transit hub for South and Central Asia.

Indeed, for the post-2014 Afghan economy to become self-sustaining in the next decade, GIRoA will need to implement good governance, rule of law, and make fundamental investments. The Afghanistan National Development Strategy



(ANDS) with focus on National Priority Programs (NPPs), a prioritized version of ANDS, will be the basis for future economic stability.

Reduction in international spending will have adverse effects on job availability. As approximately 60% of the population is under the age of 25 years, the demand for jobs will grow significantly in the near future. Planned sustainable economic growth will promote job creation. The National Regional Resources Corridors Program will focus on hard infrastructure investments, while soft GIROA initiatives will focus on building local capacity.

Afghanistan's economic potential can be realized by exploiting its natural resources. Programs related to energy, information and communication technology, rebuilding of the agricultural sector, and general rural development can also be major contributing factors.

Although GIROA with assistance from the International Community has set the foundation for future economic growth, Afghanistan will still require assistance from the international donors in the Transformation Decade. We project a fiscal gap of approximately \$8,4 billion or 33,6% of GDP in 2015, which will reduce to 11,8% of GDP by 2025.

Any significant inadequacies in government and development can prove harmful to the Transition process. The Transition Coordination Commission and GIROA ministries have identified key governance reforms that will be mandatory. Moreover, an Afghan minister has assumed the coordinating role to ensure risks to Transition are minimized.

A technical group, created by the Ministry of Finance, has brought together cluster lead ministries, the TCC, NATO/ISAF, and the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) to examine the non-security aspects of Transition, i.e. governance and development. The group aims to identify shortcomings in governance and development that could present dangers to a sustainable and irreversible Security Transition.

In June 2011, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) nations reached an agreement to several guiding principles to drive the phasing out of PRTs throughout the country by the completion of Transition. In August 2011, they shared best practices in evolution planning and formalised their plans. The facilitator for this process was the NATO senior civilian representative, and these plans were supplemented to each province's Transition implementation plan. These plans include detailed information on how PRTs will support the Transition implementation process to completion.

## SECURITY TRANSITION


To achieve Security Transition in 2013, lead responsibilities will transfer incrementally from ISAF to the ANSF as its capabilities continue to grow. The operational readiness of the ANSF is evaluated by the ISAF Regional Command, the Af-

ghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) assessment, and validation training teams. These assessments and evaluations are presented in the Strategic Transition Security Assessments Working Group, and operational readiness is decided upon thereafter.

The ANSF and ISAF have developed the Strategic Transition Security Working Group (STSWG) in accordance with the draft document entitled *Combined Strategic Directive of the ANSF and ISAF on the Implementation of Transition* to conduct joint assessment planning and to identify issues. STSWG provides recommendations via the Senior Security Shura to the Joint Afghan-Nato Inteqal Board (JANIB) on areas that could be transitioned and those that are in-process. The STSWG now includes the Combined Intelligence Working Group, the Combined Strategic Communication Working Group, which meets on a weekly basis with the MoD, MoI, National Directorate of Security (NDS), ISAF, and the Government Media and Information Center (GMIC). The Transition Coordination Commission and the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) are also participants in these meetings. STSWG continues to refine the ANSF assessment and reporting process.

The tireless efforts and heroic sacrifices of NATO and ANSF, and the generosity of the International Community have made Transition a reality. On that momentous day in Bamyán back in July 2011, we started our joint endeavour to allow Afghans to fulfil their historic responsibility to defend and secure their nation.

#### The Afghanistan Territory and Five Tranches of Transition



Tranche 1 of Transition commenced on July 2011 (see Figure below); Tranche 2 began in November 2011. Tranche 3 started on 13 May 2012 and ended on 12 December 2012. With the completion of the Tranche 3, 76% of the population of the country consisting of 11 provinces and 260 administrative districts were transferred to ANSF.

With Tranche 4, 12% of the population and 56 districts in 13 provinces will be handed over. With the successful completion of Tranche 4, 316 districts covering 87% of the population of the country will come under the protection of the ANSF.

With Tranche 5, which is currently in the planning stage in the security sector ministries, the transfer of 10 remaining provinces, which encompass 87 districts, will complete the Transition process.

The lessons learned from Tranche 1 of Transition were instrumental in developing the complete Transition process. Transition is dependent upon a coordinated effort by the international community to include embassies, donors, multi-lateral organizations, and ISAF. Once Tranche 2 commenced, GIRoA and international community had a clear sense of their roles and responsibilities, including not just the security forces but also other GIRoA organizations such as ministries, provincial and district level governments, judicial institutions, and other representative entities.

It should be noted that the violence level has dropped considerably in the provinces that were transitioned to Afghan responsibility. So far, we can not conclude that the decrease in the level of violence is real or a part of a deliberate plan by the enemy to create a false impression of stability and launch large scale operations after ISAF withdrawal.

GIRoA recognises that consolidating security through Transition and the Transformation Decade is critical for achieving stability, improving governance, and promoting economic development. We Afghans have every earnest hope and sincere desire to relieve ISAF completely from the brunt of fighting by standing on our own feet and by developing the capability and capacity of the ANSF to conduct independent operations and defend Afghanistan against all threats, preserve and safeguard the achievements of our joint campaign, ensure an irreversible Transition, facilitate the drawdown of ISAF forces, and establish an ANSF sustainment capability which is efficient and enduring.

While the Security Transition and the development of the ANSF are moving forward according to plans, I would like to share some of my concerns and reservations. While planning for Transition, we together with ISAF jointly agreed on certain principles to ensure the success of the process. We agreed that the Transition will be a process and not an event. It must be conditions based, meaningful, and irreversible. It must not become victim to emotions stemming out of desire for early results, nor be held hostage to domestic political agendas or seen as a synonym for withdrawal and waning commitment in the long term.

Together with ISAF, we also developed three conditions to designate areas for

Transition:

- *First, a positive trend in the security environment.*
- *Second, the presence of sufficient and capable ANSF.*
- *Third, improving rule of law, governance, economic development, and proper infrastructure.*

History will judge whether we have adhered to our mutually agreed principles or not.

I have reservations about any future ANSF reductions without a sustained improvement in security. I am also concerned that any significant cuts to the ANSF on the heels of an ISAF drawdown and the completion of Transition, will present significant challenges.

No one can predict exactly what the level of violence will be once the ISAF drawdown is complete. We can all be sure of the preservation of our joint accomplishments earned after such an enormous cost in blood and resources if:

- *The level of violence is low and manageable.*
- *Terrorist sanctuaries are no longer active.*
- *Peace and reintegration efforts have been successful.*

Our current force structure is far less than that recommended by the 21<sup>st</sup> century COIN Manual or the U.S. Army Center for Analysis. Furthermore, it may be too small and without the necessary capabilities to fill the vacuum created by ISAF's drawdown and the downsizing of the ANSF. To determine now the future size of the ANSF would be premature and dangerous. The inability to adjust to different scenarios and eventualities may cost us dearly. The 21<sup>st</sup> of February 2013 NATO Defense Ministerial decision to delay the downsizing of the ANSF until 2018, if implemented, is a welcoming relief that will provide some flexibility.

## CONCLUSION

As we look beyond 2014, it is in our collective strategic interest to not view and define Afghanistan through a narrow prism of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, but rather in the much wider global and regional security context. The International Community's continued support through the Transformation Decade will be the only guarantor of the inevitability of the realization of our campaign objectives.

Even when Afghanistan is capable of taking over physical security, it will still be vital in this volatile region to maintain enduring strategic partnerships. For this reason, Afghanistan is seeking long-term partnerships and agreements. These partnerships help Afghanistan to look beyond 2014 to secure the nation, to provide stability for both Afghanistan and the region, and to prevent the recurrence of the catastrophic disaster of the 1990s. Signing of security agreements with the U.S.

and other key allied nations can be a strong reassurance for the Afghan public and the region that the past will not be repeated.

We fully acknowledge and honour the sacrifices and generosity of NATO and its partners; however, from 2002, we Afghans have been emphatic of the view that the only sustainable and enduring way to secure and defend Afghanistan is to enable the Afghans themselves. This approach would be much more cost-effective, politically less complex, and would have saved the lives of our friends and allies.

Recalling the experiences of the 1990s, the drawdown of the ISAF forces and the negative statements in the media cause mistrust, uncertainty, and anxiety among Afghans and in the region, which greatly encourages the Taliban and their supporters. To counter these feelings of mistrust, it is critical that the International Community continues its support well beyond 2014 and relays its message of support repeatedly and emphatically.

Afghanistan is located in the most volatile region of the world and lies within an extremely dangerous neighbourhood. On many occasions, Afghanistan has been exploited as a proxy battleground for competing interests. A weak fragmented and failed Afghanistan quickly invites external interference and the country's strategic position continues to attract unwelcome and disruptive attention. To ensure that the sacrifices of thousands of brave souls were not in vain, we must adhere to our enduring commitment that the International Community will never allow Afghanistan to become a safe haven or an ungoverned area again, where terrorists can hide, train and threaten the rest of the world.

The menace of terrorism continues to threaten human civilization, recognizes no geographic boundaries and cannot be overcome by a single nation, however powerful. It needs a strategic global response and concerted and coordinated effort by the community of nations to successfully defend the collective freedom of the International Community. Otherwise, no one can be safe, wherever they are on this planet. This vivid reality has been and continues to be the cornerstone of the campaign in Afghanistan.

We are all confident that the campaign in Afghanistan is eminently winnable, but only if the Afghans are enabled to defend their homeland as they have done throughout history.



# 6.

## THE TRANSITION IS THE FOUNDATION OF A NEW COURSE

DANIELE RIGGIO

To tackle the Afghan transition and the way beyond 2014 it is necessary to focus on three main aspects. First of all, I would like to give the historical context in which the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, one of the transition factors, has evolved. Secondly I would like to give the state of play about transition itself. Finally, I will try to give a sense/idea of what the way ahead is by looking at the remaining time until the end of 2014 and beyond.

It is important to put things into a proper context and to maintain a long term perspective. The year 2009 was a true watershed in the evolving operational profile of NATO in Afghanistan. Then, in fact, the so called counter-insurgency construct was absolutely new. NATO has never been involved before in counter-insurgency operations. However, currently, counter-insurgency is representing the spirit of the cooperation between ISAF and Afghanistan. It is therefore necessary to focus on what counter-insurgency actually means and understand its assumptions.

The fundamental assumption of counter-insurgency has been, and still is, the relentless and steady pressure, applied with the aim to progressively degrade the capabilities of the insurgents. In other words, counter-insurgency is about not killing insurgents, but to neutralise them as a threat to the Afghan nation.

The second assumption, clearly pointed out in the Lisbon Summit, is that, once the end-date of transition has been reached, the job is not finished. The idea that transition has to be considered the foundation for a new course, has always underpinned NATO policies in Afghanistan. In concrete terms it means, first of all, to put the afghan population centre-stage, trying to keep the insurgents separated from populated centers. Secondly, it has created a campaign centered on the training of the Afghan Armed Forces in order to give them the possibility to take the lead in exerting their constitutional prerogatives. Finally, it involves the necessity to align military operations with other stabilization efforts, namely governance and development. They still not proceed at the same speed.

This approach, and its concrete application, resulted, essentially, not in the kill-

ing of the insurgents, but in preventing them to achieve their military objective. To be extremely clear, the insurgents have continued to push back but the Afghan National Security Forces have progressively proven their response capabilities. It does not follow that by the end of 2014, the Afghan Security Forces will become 100% self-sustainable by retaining full security control and responsibility. Consequently, at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the transition process has been clearly specified and outlined.

First, in Lisbon, transition was designed to be a process aimed at transferring full security responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces, by the end of 2014, with support of NATO and the international community, coherently with the decision undertaken by the sovereign government of Afghanistan. Second, it has been clarified that even if security remains the central driver of the transition process, the importance of governance and development cannot be dismissed, and that both need a long term perspective. That is the reason why a commitment beyond 2014 exists. Third, and consequently, it has been affirmed that the process of transition was going to be complemented by an enduring partnership between NATO and Afghanistan, lasting throughout the period of transition and well beyond the end of 2014.

Now we are in the mid of the transition process, officially started in 2011, on track to respect the 2014 deadline. In occasion of the Chicago Summit, in May 2012, the timeline was further refined. It was agreed that by mid-2014, the Afghan National Security Forces will undertake the lead for security operations across the whole country. Moreover it has been re-affirmed that the process of transition of full security responsibility was going to be finished by the end of 2014.

An important aspect to point out is the increasing Afghan ownership over the mechanics of the very process of transition. In other words, on the one hand, the Afghan National Security Forces are progressively undertaking security responsibilities. On the other, the Afghan civil authorities are playing an extremely important role in coordinating Afghan stakeholders and in interacting with the international community. The daily engagement of a variety of stakeholders, in Kabul, reflects a process whose mechanics is driven by the Afghan people.

Looking at the timeframe until the end of 2014 the following priorities clearly stand out. First of all, it is necessary to continue to support the increasing capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces. Even if statistics are controversial, the trend is clearly positive. All of them, from the Afghan special forces, through the Afghan local police to the special units of the Ministry of Interior, have been progressively tested and have proven to do their job effectively.

The second important priority throughout the transition period will be to bring to full consolidation the already started process of what is called security force assistance model. Essentially the shift by the ISAF forces from combat to supporting, training and assistance forces.

A third priority is the very Afghan affaire to get the political transition right. On



this regard, the Afghan National Security Forces have guaranteed the security of the elections with the support, only if needed, of ISAF. However, of most importance is the commitment undertaken by the Afghan authorities to ensure that the process will be credible, transparent and inclusive so that the outcome will be accepted by the Afghan population.

The fourth important priority concerns the provincial reconstruction teams (PRT). They have a big stake in the transition process and an important role to play in order to ensure that governance and development strategies are going to be progressively taken over by the Afghan authorities. In fact, efforts have been, and are still focused on building capabilities, enabling local authorities to take gradually on board more civilian responsibilities.

The challenges are many but a number of building blocks allow to tackle all of them. The first building block is the performance of the Afghan National Security Forces, not perfect but clearly increasingly capable to do their job, and actually to communicate their job, to the Afghan population. The second building block is the NATO commitment for 2014 to train, advice and assist the Afghan National Security Forces. It is to stress that eight partners, already contributing to ISAF, have also committed to the post 2014 mission, even if a critical input will be provided by NATO. The third building block is the commitment to provide financial assistance to the Afghan National Security Forces. Once again, it is the international community as a whole to emphasize the importance of a steady financial support.

Finally other political and cooperation frameworks, beyond the enduring partnership, with respect to which NATO does not have a direct role, are of critical importance. In fact NATO stated that there is no agenda in the region but a sheer sense of responsibility to get the job done. The Afghan-Pakistan track, for example, even if extremely dynamic, is improving in quality, if confronted with a few years ago. But also the Asian framework is making the relations between Afghanistan and the regional actors much more predictable, transparent and accountable. Finally, a joint commitment has been undertaken in Tokyo for both sides of the equation to play their part.

To sum up, challenges are many, but the international community as a whole has made a commitment for Afghanistan, and this commitment is thought for the long term.



# 7.

## HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN POST-2014: THEIR VIABILITY IN A CHANGING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SETTING

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### **Background and Introduction<sup>2</sup>**

As the ISAF operations in Afghanistan begin to draw to a close with the anticipated removal of combat forces from the region in 2014, it is useful to make a preliminary assessment of the likely prospects for human rights in the short to medium term. For the past thirty years, the human rights situation in Afghanistan has been extremely dire, as the country has lurched from revolution, to occupation,

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to conflict, to nascent processes of democratization and nation-building. The fragile national state, mountainous terrain, competing ethnic factions, drug trade, poverty, marginalisation and inequality, and regional insecurity owing to sharing a border with Pakistan has meant prolonged periods of armed conflict and thousands of people killed; combatants and non-combatants alike. Since the 2001 invasion, international media reports have been replete with stories of human rights atrocities committed by a wide range of perpetrators that also includes members of the armed forces under the auspices of ISAF.<sup>3</sup>

Against this backdrop, what can the world expect of Afghanistan with respect to the promotion and protection of human rights post-2014? Using a variety of popular measures of human rights and findings from the existing empirical literature in political science and international relations, this paper argues that the prospects for human rights are very bleak indeed. This argument is advanced across four main sections of this short paper.

The first section examines the time-series trends in a range of human rights, including (1) Afghanistan's record to date of ratification of the main international human rights treaties; (2) measures of 'state terror' and physical integrity rights; (3) rights to assembly, association and movement; (4) women's economic, political, and social rights; (5) civilian casualty figures and internally displaced people; (6) and measures of human development.

The second section examines the main positive and negative factors that global comparative statistical analysis has identified as crucial in explaining the variation in human rights protection across the world, including a the 'consensus model' from political science and international relations and the 'more murder in the middle' thesis with respect to democracy and human rights (see Fein 1995; Davenport 2007). The third section discusses additional 'requirements' for the protection of human rights that lie outside direct measurement and assessment, but are nonetheless highly relevant for the case of Afghanistan. These include questions of the plurality of identities and nationhood, individualistic conceptions of the self, Weberian 'legal-rational' sources of authority, and key questions relating to the capacities and resources required for good governance, including inclusion, participation, accountability, transparency, integrity, and responsiveness.

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<sup>3</sup> As this paper will show, there are large scale statistics that attribute human rights abuse, extra-judicial killing and civilian casualties to state and non-state actors in Afghanistan (see .e.g. UNAMA 2013). In addition, there are a number of problematic human rights cases associated with the 2001 intervention ranging from the more internationally known cases of the detention of enemy combatants and treatment of detainees at both the Bagram Air Base and facility at Guantanamo Bay to the problem of 'rogue' soldiers to whom a wide range of human rights abuses have been attributed. See various reports from Amnesty International ([www.amnesty.org](http://www.amnesty.org)) and Human Rights Watch ([www.hrw.org](http://www.hrw.org)). The purpose of the paper, however, is not to dwell on rights abuses that have been committed, but to the prospect for the protection of human rights in the short to medium term after the planned 2014 withdrawal of ISAF troops.

The final section provides a summary and discusses implications with respect to the themes of this “Afghanistan after 2014: Ask and Task” event.

### Human Rights Trends in Afghanistan 1981 to 2011

The last thirty years in Afghanistan have seen the documentation of widespread human rights abuse by leading inter-governmental organisations (e.g. the United Nations), international non-governmental organisations (e.g. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch) and governmental agencies (e.g. the US State Department). These different organisations largely paint the same descriptive picture of the human rights situation. There have been and there continue to be persistent problems with widespread violence, extrajudicial killings, torture, violence against women and girls, discrimination against women and girls, and very low levels of socio-economic development and well-being for large parts of society.<sup>4</sup> Formally, Afghanistan has ratified six of the nine major international human rights treaties as well as the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (see Table 1). The legal obligations and reporting requirements under the human rights instruments sustain the world’s attention on human rights developments in Afghanistan and provide different levers and mechanisms for long term progress in the promotion and protection of human rights (see Landman 2005; Smith-Cannoy 2012).

**Table 1. Status of ratification of international human rights instruments, Afghanistan**

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)	<b>Ratified 1983</b>
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966)	<b>Ratified 1983</b>
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination	<b>Ratified 1983</b>
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (1979)	<b>Ratified 2003</b>
Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984)	<b>Ratified 1987</b>
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989)	<b>Ratified 1994</b>
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990)	x
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2006)	x
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances (2006)	x
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998)	<b>Ratified 2003</b>

<sup>4</sup> See the Country Reports published by the US State Department (<http://www.humanrights.gov/reports/>) and the Annual Report published by Amnesty International (<http://www.amnesty.org/en/annual-report/2012>).

Despite the formal legal commitments that Afghanistan has undertaken to protect human rights, the widespread human rights problems are likely to persist in the short to medium term even after the withdrawal of ISAF forces. To begin any such assessment, it is useful to take a more systematic look at the patterns in human rights abuse that have taken place throughout the last thirty years. The history of Afghanistan since 1979 can be divided roughly into four major periods:<sup>5</sup>

1. Soviet occupation between 1979 and 1989;
2. Conflict after the withdrawal of Soviet forces between 1990 and 1995;
3. Taliban rule between 1996 and 2000;
4. Defeat of the Taliban and ISAF intervention from 2001 until 2012.

While these periods are slightly 'stylized', they are nevertheless useful for comparing existing sets of data on a wide range of human rights 'in practice' (see Foweraker and Landman 1997; Landman 2004) in Afghanistan. The data presented here are different 'standards-based' scales of human rights protection (see Jabine and Claude 1992; Landman and Carvalho 2009) that variously code country performance across different categories of human rights using source material primarily collected by the US State Department and Amnesty International. The two main collections of these data are the 'political terror scale'<sup>6</sup> and the Cingranelli and Richards human rights data project.<sup>7</sup> These data have been collated alongside additional sets of data on country performance, legal commitments and other variables as part of the Human Rights Atlas,<sup>8</sup> which is also used in this paper.

The political terror scale codes country performance on a five-point scale (1 to 5), where low scores are for good human rights protection and high scores are for more systematic abuse of human rights. The human rights under consideration in this scale include problems with arbitrary detention, extra-judicial killings, exile, torture and disappearances (see Poe and Tate 1994; Landman and Carvalho 2009). In contrast, the Cingranelli and Richards human rights data project codes country performance across a larger number of human rights categories than in the 'political terror scale' on scales ranging from 0 to 2, where higher scores denote better human rights protection. In both cases, source material is coded using multiple

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5 For a good breakdown of the chronology of the periods under consideration here, please see special resource compiled by the New York Times: <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/afghanistan/index.html>

6 This data set is now hosted at the University of North Carolina Asheville (see [www.politicalterror-scale.org](http://www.politicalterror-scale.org)).


7 This data set has been developed by David Cingranelli at the State University of New York (SUNY) Binghamton and David Richards at the University of Connecticut. The data set is hosted at SUNY Binghamton ([www.humanrightsdata.com](http://www.humanrightsdata.com)).

8 The Human Rights Atlas is a joint project carried out by the Human Rights Centre and the Institute for Democracy and Conflict Resolution at the University of Essex along with The Mackman Group in an effort to provide a comprehensive collection of data relevant to human rights that can be accessed and visualised using a web-based resource and interface (see [www.humanrightsatlas.org](http://www.humanrightsatlas.org)).

teams whose coding results are subjected to inter-coder reliability tests. As the annual time-series variation in these measures for Afghanistan was not particularly large (i.e. uniformly bad performance for most of the periods), the descriptive analysis presented here compares the mean scores for different categories of rights across the four main periods outlined above.

Figure 1 shows the two different version of the political terror scale (one coded using US State Department reports and one coded using Amnesty International Annual Reports) for the four main periods outlined above.<sup>9</sup> The figure shows the mean score (with standard error bars) for each scale, where it is clear that over the last thirty years, human rights abuse has been very high. Indeed, the score for the US State Department coded scale is at a maximum of 5 for the Soviet and Taliban periods and drops to just below 5 during the periods of conflict and ISAF operations. The scores for the scale using Amnesty reports show a slightly better picture, but neither score drops below 4.2, suggesting widespread and systematic abuse of rights to personal integrity over the entire period.

**Figure 1. Political terror scale (Amnesty and US State Department), Afghanistan 1981-2012**




Source: [www.politicalterror scale.org](http://www.politicalterror scale.org)

Figure 2 reveals a similarly bleak picture using the disaggregated scores for physical integrity rights from Cingranelli and Richards, where some rights improvements are evident during the ISAF period. The mean scores during the first three periods hover around zero (0) with the exception of torture during the period of conflict between Soviet occupation and the Taliban.

<sup>9</sup> For reasons of data availability and comparability, the data cover the years 1981 to 2011.


**Figure 2. Physical integrity rights, Afghanistan 1981-2011**



Source: [www.humanrightsdata.com](http://www.humanrightsdata.com)

Figure 3 shows the scores for rights to assembly, association and foreign and domestic movement. Across the four periods, there are severe restrictions on all these categories of rights, with greater freedom of movement during the conflict period, and better overall levels during the ISAF period.

**Figure 3. Freedom of assembly, association and movement, Afghanistan 1981-2011**




Source: [www.humanrightsdata.com](http://www.humanrightsdata.com)



Figure 4 shows the scores for speech, elections, freedom of religion and worker rights, where the general improvement in speech and elections during the ISAF period has not been met with an increase in religious freedom or greater protection of worker rights.


**Figure 4. Freedom of speech, elections, religion and worker rights, Afghanistan 1981-2011**



Source: [www.humanrightsdata.com](http://www.humanrightsdata.com)

Figure 5 shows women's rights, which are consistent with the general level of reporting on violence and discrimination against women and girls. Clearly the Taliban period was the worst of the four periods, and marked improvement has been made during the ISAF period.


**Figure 5. Women's Rights, Afghanistan 1981-2011**



Source: [www.humanrightsdata.com](http://www.humanrightsdata.com)

Finally, figures 6 and 7 show estimated data on civilian casualties by perpetrator and internally displaced people (IDPs) for the latter part of the ISAF period. Both figures show increasing trends in casualties and IDPs, while the main perpetrator committing the reported civilian killings are anti-government forces.

**Figure 6. Estimated civilian casualties by perpetrator, Afghanistan 1981-2011**



Source: Brookings Institution (2012) Afghanistan Index, Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 15.

**Figure 7. Estimated number of internally displaced people (IDPs), Afghanistan 1981-2011**



Source: Brookings Institution (2012) Afghanistan Index, Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 16.

## EXPLANATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION

Since the first cross-national statistical analysis on human rights in late 1980s (Mitchell and McCormick 1988), there has been a proliferation of studies using increasingly large and complex data sets and an expanding list of independent variables (see Landman 2005a; Moore 2006).

These variables most notably include the level, pace, and quality of economic development (e.g. Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999); income and land inequality (Heinisch 1998; Landman and Larizza 2009); the level of ethnic fractionalisation (Landman and Larizza 2009; Landman, Kernohan and Gohdes 2012); the level, timing, and quality of democratization (e.g. Davenport 1999; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2005a; Zanger 2000b); involvement in internal and external conflict (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Davenport 2007); the size and growth of the population (Henderson 1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe Tate and Keith 1999); foreign direct investment and/or the presence of multinationals (Meyer 1996, 1998, 1999a, 1999b; Smith, Bolyard, and Ippolito 1999); the level of global interdependence (Landman 2005b); and the growth and effectiveness of international human rights law (Hafner-Burton and Tsuitsui 2005; Hathaway 2002; Keith 1999; Landman 2005b; Neumayer 2005; Simmons 2009; Smith-Cannoy 2012).

Across these studies, there is an emerging consensus about the 'core model' that accounts for a large proportion of the cross-national variation in the protection of civil and political rights, while similar such empirical explanations for the variation in the protection of economic and social rights remain elusive (see Landman 2005a).

This core model is summarised in Figure 8, which shows that the positive factors include high levels of democracy and economic development, more equal distributions of land and income, the ratification of treaties, and the proximity of large rights-protective countries as neighbours. The negative factors include authoritarianism, intra-state conflict, the presence of a few well-organised ethnic groups, and a large population.

While these are empirical generalisations based on large global samples of countries over thirty years, there are telling lessons for the case of Afghanistan. Afghanistan is struggling to consolidate democracy as President Karzai is perceived by many as an illegitimate president by many (Hadley and Podesta 2012), while the succession process for 2014 is an additional challenge to security as ISAF withdrawals (Joyner 2013).


Economic growth has come to the country (growth rates have fluctuated between 5% and 22%<sup>10</sup>), but its benefits will take time to accrue and it is not clear exactly

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10 The World Bank notes that growth rates are indeed high, but volatile and unbalanced across different economic sectors (see <http://go.worldbank.org/JN66MR9750>).

who will benefit and whether growth will be sustained in the absence of donor assistance.<sup>11</sup> Many of the international treaties have been ratified, but more work will need to be done across the board to begin to implement state obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights. Afghanistan shares a historically porous and insecure border with Pakistan whose continued contestation and violent conflict,<sup>12</sup> as well as its cross-border Pashtun community means that conflict resolution remains a significant challenge for any rights improvements. Its other neighbours include Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. Relative levels of democracy and human rights across this ring of states are also very low, suggesting that the probability of improvements in rights protection in Afghanistan remains very low as well.

**Figure 8. Explanations for human rights protection**



Sources: Landman (2005); Landman and Larizza (2009); Landman, Kernohan and Gohdes (2012)

Moreover, the ethnic composition of Afghanistan is precisely the kind that can fuel conflict and continued rights abuses as traditional leaders contest power and woo support from the general population. Existing research shows that the overall relationship between ethnic fragmentation and human rights abuse is curvilinear, where a small number reasonably large groups is related to higher levels of abuse (see Landman and Larizza 2009). For Afghanistan, the main competing groups that can cause a problem in the future include the Pashtun (42%), Tajik (27%), Hazara (9%), Uzbek (9%), Aimak (4%), Turkmen 3%, Baloch (2%), others (4%),

11 The World Bank argues that donor dependency makes the current economic model in Afghanistan unsustainable.

12 It is estimated that approximately 3.2 million people were displaced during the Soviet invasion and fled to Pakistan. Border incidents continue to plague the region with violence and radicalisation, as the border itself is contested as part of the Durand Line agreement of 1893, where the Afghan and Pakistan governments contest territory along the border. See Ahmad (2012).

who are geographically concentrated in different areas of the country (e.g. the Pashtuns inhabit a large southern ring of the country, and in certain cases (e.g. the Tajiks) inhabit isolated pockets in different parts of the country). The largest groups are the Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara and Uzbek, where contestation and competition for power in the post-Karzai period may well lead to renewed violence, which can be coupled with a resurgence of the Taliban. Indeed, former Head of Intelligence for Afghanistan Umrullah Salah has argued that it is highly likely that with the withdrawal of ISAF forces, Afghanistan will witness an increase in the number of ‘spectacular’ attacks from the Taliban (Gardner 2013). Such attacks are likely to involve large scale civilian casualties.


Figure 8. Ethnic composition of Afghanistan



Given these generalisations and insights from the existing literature on human rights, is Afghanistan a typical case? Does it share certain features with other poor countries in conflict? A scatter plot between levels of human development

(as measured by the UNDP's human development index<sup>13</sup>) and human rights shows that Afghanistan has low levels of human development and high levels of human rights abuse (see Figure 8). It shares this position in the figure with states such as Congo, Yemen, Pakistan, Burma, Chad and the Central African Republic. Moreover, even the benefits of democratization need to be qualified, as analysis has shown that states that are somewhere between autocracy and democracy are more prone to high levels of human rights abuse. Known as the 'more murder in the middle thesis,' (see Fein 1995; Davenport 2007), highly authoritarian states are so institutionalised that they rarely rely overt violations of human rights, while highly democratic states uphold rights commitments and have institutions for accountability and constraint, which make their violation less likely. States that are emerging from authoritarianism or that have experienced a breakdown of democracy have a greater tendency to violate human rights (see Figure 10).


Figure 9. Human development and human rights, 2010



Source: www.humanrightsatlas.org

13 The human development index (HDI) is a combined score for per capita GDP, means years of schooling, expected years of schooling, and life expectancy scaled to range from 0 (low levels of human development) to 1 (high levels of development). See <http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/>.

Figure 10. 'More murder in the middle'



Source: Fein 1995; Davenport 2007.

## PROSPECTS FOR AFGHANISTAN

This paper has combined a brief examination of human rights trends and key factors that are well known to explain the variation in human rights protection. There are many factors working against Afghanistan that lead to the conclusion that the prospect for human rights is very bleak. In addition to the broader factors identified in the last section, there is a deeper problem that the human rights and policy community must address for any meaningful developments in the protection of human rights. Despite the quest for and assumption of *universality* behind the idea of human rights, their defence is nonetheless grounded in particular assumptions about states and individuals. The history of the struggle for rights shows that the state is both the main *guarantor* and *violin* of human rights (see Marshall 1964; Barbalet 1988; Foweraker and Landman 1997). But in this history, the state is typically conceived as a set of modern institutions that have grown out of the recognition that feudal states in conflict were not the best way to organise society in order to oversee economic expansion; a trade off between prosperity and violence (see Mann 1993; Bates 2001).

The social contract that lies at the heart of the organisation of the modern state is one that trades individual liberty for the protections afforded by the state, which in turn has grown out of the amalgamation of smaller units that typically had been in perpetual conflict over scarce resources. The modern state, in turn, is meant to be 'a benevolent leviathan' (Cohen 1982) based on Max Weber's (1993) idea of 'legal rational' sources of authority (as opposed to charismatic and traditional sources) and that has the monopoly over the use of coercion in any given territory. The social contract also assumes that the state must guarantee particular sets of rights protections, while the history of the struggle for rights is one in which so-

cial movements increasingly *demand* rights from the state and states increasingly *extend* rights to citizens (see Foweraker and Landman 1997). This organic growth of the modern state across many countries has also included the democratisation of state institutions.

These rights protections, in turn, are based on a certain assumption of the 'rights-holder' who is in many ways a 'liberal individual' whose primary identification is with him or herself and with the nation-state. It seems to me that in both instances, the idea of the modern state and the rights-holding individual can be brought into question in the case of Afghanistan. It currently remains a conglomeration of ancient ethnic civilisations whose primary identification may not be with a unified national Afghanistan, but rather with more localised tribal affiliations and traditional sources of authority. Moreover, Afghanistan has not yet developed a modern state against which there are no overt challenges.

In their 1996 analysis of the problems of democratic transitions and consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Eastern Europe, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan argue that 'stateness' is key variable that needs to be in place for successful consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996). Some of their cases include the post-totalitarian states of the former Soviet Union, which share many features found in Afghanistan. The attempt to construct a modern democracy through the ISAF operations has had many challenges associated with 'stateness' that have not been overcome after more than ten years of presence in Afghanistan.

At the individual level in Afghanistan, it is not clear whether there is an immediate identification with the notion of being a 'rights-holder' with the associated responsibilities or with the notion of the state as primary 'duty bearer'. Much has been written about the primary unit of identification being with family and lineage. It is not clear whether the idea of human rights has the same resonance as in other societies. If human rights do not have such resonance, are there what anthropologists call 'homeomorphic equivalents' for human rights within Afghanistan? These are local practices and understandings of the individual and his or her role in society, responsibilities and relationship with the state that might approximate the idea of human rights understood in other countries and the larger international community. If there are such homeomorphic equivalents, is there a way to encourage them alongside the larger challenges associated with state-building, democratic consolidation and fortification of the institutions required for good governance? At present, there is a clash between traditional values, local understandings of justice, and cultural practices on the one hand and the philosophical and pragmatic underpinnings of human rights on the other.

## SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS

The international community is eager for positive news and progressive developments in Afghanistan that include an end to violence, peaceful resolution



of underlying and long-held conflicts, strengthening of democratic institutions and the development of rights-protective regime where the Afghan state is able to respect, protect and fulfil its human rights obligations.

The indicators that have been considered here show over thirty years of violence, widespread gross human rights violations, large number of civilian casualties, torture and abuse of detainees, and violence and discrimination against women. While standard indicators of economic development show robust growth rates, there are significant issues surrounding donor dependency and persistent patterns of inequality and marginalization. The ethnic fragmentation of the country and its contested border with Pakistan are two major obstacles to finding a stable peace as well as long term improvement in the protection of human rights. The withdrawal of ISAF forces will leave a power vacuum and a security problem as domestic security forces step in for a larger role in keeping security, law and order. If the withdrawal of troops is coupled with reduced foreign financial assistance, then the human rights situation is unlikely to improve in any significant way, and may well deteriorate to the kinds of abuses observed during the years of the Taliban.

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# 8.

## EGYPT AS A CASE STUDY

AMBASSADOR DR. MAHMOUD KAREM

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

*Although the topic of the conference deals with Afghanistan and the aftermath of December 2014, Ambassador Karem was asked to present a paper on Egypt: explaining the lessons learned; the possible spill over of events in Cairo; detailing how countries in the Middle East perceive the situation in Afghanistan and its impact on their own national security. Karem explains the unfolding challenges vis-à-vis the Arab Spring countries, the negative effects of small arms and light weapons' smuggling on the security of North African countries and Egypt. He identifies problems in Sinai and possible solutions. Speaks on the rise of political Islam, it's regional sweeping effects, and asserts measures that need assistance and facilitation from the West to help the process of democratic transition in the Arab world countries. The recurring theme he underlines is focussed on the possible role of Al Qaida in attempting to profit from this volatile situation in Arab Spring nations, and the differences between the true Islam of compassion and moderation from rigid and militant religious interpretations. The solution is assistance for a quick and smooth transition, lessening economic malaise problems and shortening the transitional period while reducing the costs in order to interdict what militant groups are trying to do by prolonging anarchy and instability in these young, democratic societies.*

Mr. Chairman,

thank you for giving me the floor. I wish to thank Ambassador Minuto Rizzo (President of the NATO Defense College Foundation) for inviting me and the IAI and NDC for the partnership in the conference. I shall speak to the point. Why am I here? Since I am no expert on Afghanistan, and I am in the presence of genuine experts on this topic, I humbly argue that perhaps the purpose is to put the question on the relationship between the Arab Spring and what is unfolding in Afghanistan. To draw parallels, study possible spill overs, highlight lessons learned,

identify common problems. Finally to explain how we in our Middle East region perceive this problem and its impact on our own national security.

Historically, the security of Egypt has always been closely tied to that of Europe and especially to the Mediterranean basin. Egypt has always been a model for good or bad: if it fails now, it will impact on the entire region. More so Egypt with its unique geographic location and the Suez Canal, is vital for free trade, as well as energy security, from West to East, North to South. The exemplary role of Egypt in signing peace with Israel in 1979 changed the shape of the region. Therefore everything must be done to ensure a smooth and effective democratic transition in Egypt despite the challenges and the bumps. However it should be mentioned that the Arab world and the Middle East in particular benefited from Afghanistan literature and artistic models. We should not also forget the enlightenment and scholarly excellence brought to our region by Jamal (Gamal) ed-Din al-Afghani, and his impact on our disciplines.

Now and dealing with the title of our conference, a few abrasive conclusions and judgments in full transparency. Yes, Truth hurts.

We must assert that the mission in Afghanistan did not fully succeed. The threat from opium plantation, cultivation, drug trafficking, in connection with trade in small arms and light weapons did not wane. NATO could not stop this triad, or axis of evil, namely weapons, drugs and terrorism. **What we most feared happened. Fundamentalism and terrorist ideology spread out of Afghanistan. In other words the cancer spread.**

From one standpoint NATO's mission achieved many objectives in Afghanistan and a formidable effort, synergy and coordination were achieved while upholding that the solution in Afghanistan should not only be military. Take education, for example, when all efforts were geared towards increasing the numbers of schools for boys and especially girls, encouraging preliminary and secondary education for both sexes, Taliban and others on a daily basis were thwarting this objective. That is why some posited that the West could not cope with the tribal and rigid customary edifice of the Afghan society, whereas the Taliban and others could exploit these national attributes to their advantage. The socio-cultural war in Afghanistan was being lost and the country was estranged from Westernisation.

Additionally, an erroneous conclusion was drawn: namely that the war had been won with the killing of Bin Laden, when in reality the ideology itself remained alive and well and hatred for the West increased. Additionally the lack of a political solution to the Palestinian problem remained a formidable force attracting people to jihad to "free Jerusalem", gaining momentum not only in Afghanistan but spilling over to different parts of the globe. As these calls came more and more from Afghanistan, this attracted more people to enlist, train and return to fight a "sacred war".

The jihadist operations in Mali and the attacks in Algeria, Yemen, Morocco, and possibly Ankara came to attest to these facts I have just outlined. **Al-Qaida**

is spreading outside of Afghanistan. When we had a chance to arrest the problem at the core, we failed.

Now Egypt. The 25<sup>th</sup> of January 2011 revolution made history as a peaceful one. However, today there are serious impediments especially related to the upholding of security and the current economic malaise, and I shall not dwell here on the mistakes by all political forces at present in Egypt, since this is not the subject. Yet the rise of political Islam in our region is a natural outcome of years of oppression by previous autocratic regimes throughout the entire Arab world. Political life and participation were stymied in favour of an oligarchic ruling party. Political parties were banned and elections rigged. This meant that political Islamists remained the only organised force in the societies capitalising on the mistakes of the ruling regimes, scoring public acceptance by identifying with social and charity work, increasing their popularity and opposition while remaining underground.

Considering this development the other way round, **some argue that the rise of political Islam should not become a back door for the spread of militant, religious fundamentalism.** The role of the moderate Al Azhar Institution, itself at stake, should be reinforced. Some analysts assert that the political-religious map in the area is complex mainly because the process is new, with forces still rising from underground to the surface, after years of hiding from oppression. Take the case of Egypt for instance, behind the Muslim Brotherhood now ruling Egypt after free elections, are the Salafis, and behind the Salafis there are the Jihadists. In this whole new complicated scene Al Qaeda is lurking exploiting every opportunity to gain political and operational control.

Muddying the scene, Libya has fallen and the illegal smuggling and transfer of weapons (among which also missiles). through the borders is causing alarm and instability. The 17<sup>th</sup> November 2011, here in Rome in this same room during another NDCF conference, I asked Admiral Locklear (Commander of the Allied Joint Force Command in Naples), why the planning of operation "Unified Protector" did not anticipate this grave threat, i.e. the impact of the implications of the ransacking of Libyan army barracks and weapon stockpiles on the security of neighbouring Egypt, North Africa, and other African states?

I even added the question of **how long should we wait till a civilian aircraft would be brought down by a missile or a MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defence System) smuggled from Libya?**

Moving on to Sinai, this area similar to the mountainous zone of Tora Bora and it is affected by jihadists who are spreading their ideology in the name of religion, heaven, and martyrdom among the simple Bedouins. Our army is conducting a wide operation code named "Eagle", facing many challenges [by March 2013 the operation was concluded, Editor]. One is the Peace Treaty with Israel which confines the presence of heavy equipment and armaments to certain zones. In some cases the army faced terrorists blowing up gas pipelines to Israel and Jordan, enjoying superior fire power. Some analysts argue that Iran itself could

be a challenge to Sunni Egypt with its vested Shiite interests against the largest regional civilisation, historically competing with Persia. Without the formidable effort by the Egyptian army, the drug cultivation and trade would have spread and we would have ended up with a nexus between arms, terrorism, thereby duplicating the same syndrome in Afghanistan.

Additional problems for Egypt include the huge mass of borders to protect against arms transfer. 995 Km of borders spreading over the Mediterranean, 1941 Km red sea, eastern borders of 218 Km, 1115 Km with Libya, and 1280 with the Sudan. Immense, difficult and impossible to control completely. Even the largest and most modern security apparatus failed in controlling borders with Mexico, imagine Egypt vis-à-vis this vast stretches! To this one must add the problem of tunnels along the Gaza border. The Egyptian army, itself in very difficult operational conditions, closed more than 60% of them. But as long as the Israeli blockade against Gaza remains, so will new tunnels be dug; and the victim, Egypt!

In the last CHODS meeting in Brussels, only weeks ago, the three questions asked to the Egyptian delegation were on weapon infiltration, tunnels and jihadists in Sinai. Just questions, but no talk about equipment or material assistance!<sup>14</sup>

From another standpoint there are reports out of Germany cautioning against the return of German Salafis after training in Egypt.<sup>15</sup> Recently a cell was discovered in the Nasr City quarter of Cairo involving some terrorists responsible for the infamous murder of the US Ambassador in Ben Ghazi. Investigations by the Attorney General's office, revealed an association with al Qaida to revert Egypt into "an Islamic Caliphate, by attacking the Suez Canal, foreign embassies and Coptic churches". When this matter was put to Mr. Muhammad Rabee al-Zawahiri, head of the jihadists in Egypt, his answer published in Al Ahram newspaper (1<sup>st</sup> of February 2013) was that his movement and followers only believe in the rule by sharia, and that democracy is anti-religious.

A few years back these ideas were confined to Afghanistan and when we heard them we were thankful for and content with the secular nature of Egypt. **Today these ideas are in our backyard, correction in our living rooms!**

Before I conclude on this point, I wish to distinguish between Salafism which is a widely, acknowledged movement in Egypt, anchored on religious beliefs, from some radical, militant, violence oriented, Gamma't Islamiyya jihadists, who advo-

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14 Assistance from NATO in land mine clearance equipments is anticipated.

15 See the report of the Spiegel, anticipated by the Frankfurter Allgemeine, referring to the exploitation of the new space of freedom in Egypt with the rise of political Islam by German Salafists. This development encourages these extremist to travel to Egypt and from Egypt to Afghanistan, North Africa, and Syria (<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-islamists-travel-to-egypt-a-849802.html>). French Interior Minister Manuel Valls on the 4<sup>th</sup> of February in a public statement also warned against militant Salafism threatening Europe especially coming from countries including Egypt ([http://www.letemps.ch/Page/Uuid/46a44cb6-6f6e-11e2-aa81-4d947e2dd2f0/Manuel\\_Valls\\_d%C3%A9nonce\\_le\\_salafisme\\_d%C3%A9voy%C3%A9\\_et\\_acc%C3%A9le%C3%A9s\\_enqu%C3%A9es#.UWFwR8qQPXw](http://www.letemps.ch/Page/Uuid/46a44cb6-6f6e-11e2-aa81-4d947e2dd2f0/Manuel_Valls_d%C3%A9nonce_le_salafisme_d%C3%A9voy%C3%A9_et_acc%C3%A9le%C3%A9s_enqu%C3%A9es#.UWFwR8qQPXw)).



cate Taqfir and Hijra, (proclaiming that certain persons are not Muslim and thus deserve death and advocating emigration and withdrawal from the society). Other members of the Gamma't Islamiyya, however, have chosen to resurface, practice politics, and established a "Building and Development" political party.

Many Egyptians therefore believe that we should guard our notion of equal citizenship, secularism, moderate interpretation of Islam from militant practices and avoid repeating the same mistake of Afghanistan. As we must also be in guard that the peaceful nature of Egyptians will not quickly degenerate in a very sharp and violent political struggle. As you will see these problems do not threaten Egypt alone but the region in its entirety. The Arab Spring countries shall suffer.

In conclusion what we need is a concerted multilateral effort to stand against international terrorism. The mission objective, strategies, and tools of enforcement should be revisited. The mistakes carried over from Afghanistan should not spill over.

Supporting Egypt should be a cardinal and a priority mission. Certain regional actors may use these challenges faced by Egypt to acquire additional weapons or to argue that its security is at stake. **I argue please do not allow Israel such practices of narrow national interests to threaten cooperation with Egypt in all fields.**

What Egypt and possibly other Arab countries emerging from a revolutionary stage need is:

- immediate economic assistance,
- help with consensus building,
- facilitating reconciliation,
- best practices on how to build political coalitions and broaden active political participation,
- power sharing,
- international election monitoring,
- convincing the parties to play on the table of national dialogue instead of inciting violence in the streets,
- to explain that compromise is not weakness, and that revising certain decisions, such as accepting to redraft parts of the Constitution, a new election law, and a new NGO law, is not weakness but strength,
- while also explaining that calls for ending a presidential term before its mandate through street violence is not the course of democracy and that election results must be upheld, given that democracy is not a onetime election process as stated by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

The murder of a noted Tunisian opposition leader only a few days ago is reminiscent of tactics used in Afghanistan for political liquidation. Anyone pushing our young democracies on this track should be brought to justice. Additionally, militant religious fatwa's on satellite religious channels, should be banned especially if they incite hatred or encourage illegal practices in the name of religion.

Finally, a few words of credit where credit is due, to the Egyptian army, an institution that has remained strong, intact, vigilant, while facing formidable challenges and smearing campaigns of defamation. The military repeatedly seeks to be released from playing politics and return to protecting a nation in transition to remain as always, a guarantor of peace and security in the Middle East.

*Thank You*

# 9.

## AFGHANISTAN – A VIEW FROM IRAN

AMIR MADANI

*In search of a diplomatic settlement*

After more than ten years of war, high human costs and over a trillion dollars spent, negotiations are again beginning with the Taliban, or at least parts of them. More than ten years after the Bonn Conference, what has changed if the war against the Taliban is turning into a deal with the Taliban? This means that the war in Afghanistan did not solve the problems it was intended to solve, despite the universally acknowledged need to combat extremist fundamentalism.

Indeed, the war has made a complicated situation even more complicated. First and foremost, it did not achieve the security sought by the international community. Quite to the contrary: Stability and security have deteriorated. There is a general consensus among experts that there is no military solution to the problems in Afghanistan. For this reason, the withdrawal plan announced by President Obama is a necessary step in the restoration of political processes that will permit the Afghans to decide their own future, while at the same time letting them know they are not being abandoned. The most important aspect of the plan is the decision to assess a strategy. Despite all the limitations and shortcomings of the withdrawal plan, Obama can succeed in putting an end to the concept of a borderless, timeless and permanent war. Mikhail Gorbachev, who planned the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, has simply argued: "Victory is impossible in Afghanistan. Obama is right to pull the troops out. No matter how difficult it will be."<sup>16</sup> It is absurd to continue to destroy lives and resources. Political negotiation is the better path to a diplomatic settlement to secure the future stability of the country. The negotiations should definitely involve all the players, including part of the Taliban.

It is well known that each of the myriad ethnic, sectarian and political groups in Afghanistan is supported by some regional or global power on which it relies, and

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16 Mikhail Gorbachev: Victory in Afghanistan is Impossible The Telegraph 27 Oct 2010  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8089476/Mikhail-Gorbachev-victory-in-Afghanistan-is-impossible.html>

that these powers pursue their own interests in Afghanistan through their proxies, or “allies.” The intervention in Afghanistan began with “Security” as its goal; but security is deeply linked to economics – you cannot have real security without a secure economy. So the international community should work for a more open, a more democratic economy, an economy that is more just, and, to put it more precisely: a **justice** that is more **distributive**, and less **punitive**.

In this context, there have emerged important geopolitical implications. In this sensitive area near Russia and both the Indian giant and the emerging powerhouse that is China, amidst the virgin resources of Central Asia and bordering both Iran and all the unrest that is Pakistan, problems could not – and do not – remain neatly contained within Afghanistan’s borders, nor restricted to its internal players.

For a lasting solution, we must consider Afghanistan by taking into account a number of regional problems. It is also necessary to take seriously the ideals of democratic legality with Afghani standards: Humanitarian aid will be needed for a long time, and some so-called “allies” will need convincing that playing with ideological extremism will endanger all parties, and in long run will yield no positive return. In this regard, the entire international community should put one hand on its heart and courageously pledge to believe – and achieve – security; it should plunge its other hand deep into its pocket, and pull out aid and investment; and it should, at the same time, try to hold its nose and resist the natural urge to recoil from some governments (and their security structures) that are giving succor and support to the Taliban. In a nutshell: On a global level, we must learn to consider the conflict with the Taliban not as a Clash *between* Civilizations, but rather as a struggle *within* human civilization. This is the only way to thwart tribal and sectarian religious war.

## THE TALIBAN

The Taliban, or “Seekers (of religious knowledge),” are an ultraconservative political and religious faction of the mujahedeen veterans after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979)<sup>17</sup> Many were the theological students of the religious schools (Dini Madarasas). The Soviets withdrew in 1989, and the Taliban emerged in mid-1990. As is well known, the Afghan Mujahedeen, under the *de facto* leadership of Ahmed Shah Massoud, took over in 1992, formed an alliance of various Mujahedeen groups and established an Afghan government with Burhanuddin Rabbani as interim president. But the Mujahedeen factions ended up fighting one another; the Taliban, with logistic support from the Pakistani Army, took power in late 1994. In September 1996<sup>18</sup> they gained control of Kabul, bringing with them

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17 UN News Centre Afghanistan and United Nations 22 January 2013 on line <http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/un-afghan-history.shtml>

18 Pakistani support for the Taliban is based on strong religious and ethnic bonds between the Taliban and Pakistan, especially with the tribal areas on the North-West borders of Pakistan. Most of

their own brand of Wahhabist ideology, promulgated in the Deobandi<sup>19</sup> schools of the Indian subcontinent. The regime was formally recognized by only a few countries – Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – which remain to this day the Taliban’s strongest allies and supporters.

### The Taliban and Al Qaeda

Following his public condemnation of the Saudi monarchy for allowing U.S. troops to enter and operate in Saudi Arabia, Osama Bin Laden moved to Sudan and eventually, in 1996, to Afghanistan, where he had fought against the Soviet troops and where he was warmly welcomed by the Taliban and its top leader, Mullah **Mohammed Omar**.

Ever since, the Afghan Taliban have provided al Qaeda a sanctuary to train, plan, and launch some of their most gruesome terrorist attacks.

The United Nations Security Council passed two resolutions – UNSCR 1267 in 1999 and UNSCR 1333 in 2000 – demanding that the Taliban stop its support for terrorism and hand over Bin Laden. The Taliban reacted by taking no action to end Bin Laden’s recruitment and training of militants, and otherwise responded in vague language to the Security Council.

The Taliban’s refusal to extradite bin Laden to the United States following the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the September 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon prompted a military confrontation with the United States and allied powers. The Taliban were subsequently driven from power in December 9, 2001 by a coalition of international parties guided by the Afghan group known as the **Northern Alliance**.<sup>20</sup>

Public opinion worldwide has largely disapproved of the social/cultural policies of the Taliban, especially the near-total exclusion of women from public life (including employment and education), harsh criminal punishments such as public execution of pregnant women, and for the systematic destruction of non-Islamic artistic and historical relics such as the world-renowned Bamiyan Buddhas). The cruel and destructive policies of the Taliban have, in the few short years of their rule, passed the limits of any rational imagination. The two novels of Khaled Hosseini “The Kite Runner” and “A Thousand Splendid Suns,” along with the Franco-

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the Taliban leaders were educated in refugee camps in Pakistan, where they had escaped the Soviet invasion. Taliban militants are Sunni Muslim Pashtuns, and Pashtuns constitute thirteen percent of the total population of Pakistan. Pashtuns dominate the Pakistani military and are concentrated in the North-West Frontier province, which was the command center for the Mujahedeen groups fighting the Soviet troops and a major destination for the Afghan refugees.

19 Global Security.org on line <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/islam-deobandi.htm>  
See also: Sher Ali Tareen “The Deoband Madrassa” Oxford Bibliographies online <http://www.oxford-bibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195390155/obo-9780195390155-0019.xml;jsession-id=B55EF0F8DA6CBBDB6CB462C626031DB2>

20 Germano Dottori, Amir Madani Afghanistan, crisi regionale, problema globale pp. 56-68 Clueb 2011 Bologna Italia. See also: Encyclopedia Britannica on line Taliban consulted at 18 January 2013

Afghan film "The Patience Stone," and the pictures taken by Steve McCurry are perhaps only partial images of what went on under Taliban rule.

#### CURRENT RE-EMERGENCE OF THE TALIBAN

In the years since their ouster, the Taliban have conducted an unexpectedly relentless insurgency against the international coalition forces, facilitated by endemic corruption and fuelled by the income from drug trafficking, which reached record levels within several years after the fall of the Taliban. While it may be that the Taliban's re-emergence was due to a series of strategic errors<sup>21</sup> of planning and geopolitical alliances, nevertheless few would question the appropriateness of the international community's engagement. The disarmament and the demobilization of those who had fought against the Taliban alongside the coalition forces should be considered a fatal strategic error. The end result was a power vacuum that left the central government with limited resources, incapable of withstanding the nascent but determined and foreign-supported insurgency.<sup>22</sup>

The geopolitical error was, after ousting the Taliban from power, seeking to deal with their ideological and logistical supporters. It is well known that some circles in the Pakistani Army and in Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) consider the Taliban as their geopolitical tool.<sup>23</sup> This, while Iran – the supporter of international action against the Taliban – was during the presidency of the reformist leader Mohammad Khatami included as part of the infamous "Axis of Evil." The Taliban resurgence is a direct result of the policies that took the Pakistani ISI to be the sun in the sky.<sup>24</sup>

I cannot stress this point enough: After cooperating with the Northern Alliance to oust the Taliban, the international community then sought to become close friends with Pakistan, which is to a great extent a supporter of the Taliban, while demonizing Iran, the Taliban's main opposition in the region, and where spontaneous candlelight vigils were held in Tehran after the attacks of September 11, 2001. The Taliban still claim to represent Afghanistan and see themselves as the legitimate government in exile that is fighting the foreign occupiers. Albeit expelled from Kandahar by coalition forces, Taliban leader, Mullah Mohammad Omar, in a kind of accord and understanding with the security structures of his host country,

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21 The esteemed European think tank The Senlis Council (ICOS) already in February of 2008 had warned of the errors and offered some recommendations about U.S Policy in Afghanistan. [http://www.icosgroup.net/static/reports/us\\_policy\\_recommendations.pdf](http://www.icosgroup.net/static/reports/us_policy_recommendations.pdf)

22 Abdullah Abdullah Saving Afghanistan Foreign Policy on line 8 January 2013

23 Amin Saikal The Taliban, Pakistan's Geopolitical Instrument, America's Problem <http://www.satp.org/satporgrp/publication/books/global/aminsaikal.htm>

24 Matt Waldman: THE SUN IN THE SKY: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PAKISTAN'S ISI AND AFGHAN INSURGENTS. Discussion Paper 18, Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. <http://www2.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/crisisStates/download/dp/18%20incl%20Dari.pdf>

is continuing to direct the insurgency from an unknown location in Pakistan. Although both the Taliban and the Pakistanis deny this, Mullah Omar is easily able to find refuge both among the Pakistani Pashtun population or in the tribal areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. This is where the informal army of jihadi Salafists find a warm welcome; an informal army drawn from a worldwide basin, linked to extremist ideologies (which instrumentalize the religion) and linked logistically to certain military circles in Pakistan. This is a volunteer army, and is being used as a geopolitical tool. And the volunteers come not only from all over the Arab-Islamic world (Chechens, Yigurs, Uzbeks, Arabs...) but from European and American cities, too.

### **The Taliban presence**

The Taliban presence is strongest in the south among the Afghani Pashtuns, who make up nearly 40 percent of the Afghan population. Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmens, Aymaks, Balochs, and related groups constitute most of the other 60 percent.<sup>25</sup> However, contrary to common belief, the vast majority of proud Pashtuns actually do not feel that they are represented by the Taliban. Among the Pashtuns, one may find many small anti-Taliban groups. In short, the Taliban do not represent the majority of the Afghan population. The anti-Taliban area is larger than many imagine, and most Pashtuns, who wish to defend their personal dignity and the rights of free human beings, want to commit to the fight against Taliban dominance. Indeed, they can defeat the Taliban, but only with support from the international community; not lip-service, but true democratic support, with a sincere desire to invest in real democracy (while always respecting Afghani culture, of course) and in a real economy built from the bottom up.

In reality, the Taliban are a cluster of minority groups formed and founded on fanaticism, whose power is based on control of the corrupt underground economy: Arms smuggling and illicit traffic of any sort, most especially drug trafficking. They thrive only in a context of backwardness and poverty. They exploit the conditions of backwardness and profit from the illicit economy. They terrorize the vast majority of the population.

Ideologically speaking, the Taliban may be considered as falling within Gilles Kepel's definition of Jihadism, specifically as a movement within "jihadist Salafism."<sup>26</sup> But since the Taliban and al-Qaeda claim a universal ideological

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<sup>25</sup> The sources provide different percentages for different ethnic groups. For example the WORLD FACTBOOK of CIA (updated on January 10,2013) without citing any census gives the following percentages: Pashtun 42%, Tajik 27%, Hazara 9%, Uzbek 9%, Aimak 4%, Turkmen 3%, Baloch 2%, other 4%

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>

This while other sources furnish different numbers that see higher percentage for other ethnicities.

<sup>26</sup> Gilles Kepel *Jihad Ascensu e Declino Tra. R.Landucci & S.Liberti Carocci Editore Roma 2001 pp259*  
The title of the book in French: *Jihad. Expansion et déclin de l'islamisme* Gallimard 2000

message, and since the sphere of their political action stretches far beyond national boundaries, the Taliban problem is of concern to the entire international community. The Taliban themselves are a combination of various, even competing groups. While a small faction within the Taliban are devoutly religious, which should actually lead them sooner or later to the understanding that religion is a moral choice, the majority are political activists. It is not difficult to see that the devoutly religious Afghani Taliban are being used as a geopolitical instrument by external interests, while being surrounded by smugglers, drug traffickers and criminals both within and outside of their borders. Despite the presence of some truly religious figures among the Taliban, absolute hegemony belongs to the extremist factions linked to or aligned with al-Qaeda. Among these groups, one stands out far and above the rest: The Quetta Shura Taliban (QST),<sup>27</sup> with the Haqqani Network<sup>28</sup> in second place. These two groups should be considered the local allies of al-Qaeda. Today as yesterday, they provide al-Qaeda safe haven, with sanctuaries to train, plan and launch their tragic terrorist attacks worldwide.

#### **After Withdrawal: Possible Steps Towards Stability**

Everyone involved in negotiating peace among the political fractions in Afghanistan has realized the extreme difficulty of achieving it. The situation is very complex and does not permit any simple solution.

The ethnic sectarian divisions result in harsh political divisions. Centuries of competition among various groups and internal competition within each group, the interference of regional and global states, the apathy of traditional society, the weak economy and endemic corruption are just a few of the elements rendering Afghanistan's civil war one of the most intractable. Fortunately, there is still room for diplomacy to seek possible routes toward an agreement. To achieve a concrete result against the Taliban, it is necessary to first define the problem in a way that confines it within the borders of Afghanistan and conduct free elections within a federal context, thereby Afghanizing, Southernizing and Pashtunizing the anti-Taliban movements:

1 **Afghanization.** Accurately defining the Durand Line as the official border with Pakistan would render it more accepted, and begin to set the regional-global disputes within a national frame, thus Afghanizing the conflict. It is an open secret that thousands of Taliban insurgents travel to Pakistan when they need a break from the fighting in Afghanistan. The reason for this is simple: The Pakistani

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27 Jeffrey Dressler & Carl Forsberg The Quetta Shura Taliban in Southern Afghanistan: Organization, Operations, and Shadow Governance December 21, 2009 ISW

[http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/QuettaShuraTaliban\\_1.pdf](http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/QuettaShuraTaliban_1.pdf)

28 Stanford University Mapping Militant Organizations Haqqani Network

<http://www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/363>

See also: Key Finding The Haqqani Network ISW Institute for the Study of War

<http://www.understandingwar.org/report/haqqani-network>



foot soldiers as well as the Army elite are friendly to the Taliban, and the border is hardly controlled at all.

- 2 **Southernization.** Viewing Afghanistan as a Federation; conducting free elections within a federal context would perhaps lead to a Taliban victory in the south, making it necessary to accept Taliban control in an autonomous southern region<sup>29</sup> (Southernizing, and thus localizing and limiting, the Taliban's sphere of influence).
- 3 **Pashtunization.** The flag of patriotism must be lifted from the hands of the Taliban and Pashtunized, thus empowering the noble and proud Pashtun people to decide for themselves whether they want to live with the brutal policies of the Taliban, or try the democratic alternative. This could go a long way towards circumventing further armed conflict.

## REGIONAL DISPUTES

While the international community has to limit any definition of the Afghan problem in order to solve it, a lasting solution is possible only by taking into account certain regional issues.

**Pakistani-Saudi Complications.** It is known that some circles in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are providing the Taliban with logistical and ideological support, fueled by petro-Islam. Pakistani security officials have even expressed frustration at their exclusion from Afghan President Hamid Karzai's overtures to the Taliban, warning that a sustainable peace agreement will be impossible without their support.<sup>30</sup> Some parts of the Pakistani Army tend to support the Quetta Shura & the Haqqani Network, and continue to consider Afghanistan as within its geopolitical sphere. To understand the level of this comprehension among some Pakistani Army circles, two cases are emblematic: (a) The location of the final refuge of Bin Laden in Abbot Abad, in close proximity to the Pakistani military headquarters; and (b) The fate of Syed Saleem Shahzad, the Pakistani investigative journalist, killed for exposing al-Qaeda's link to Pakistan's Armed Forces.<sup>31</sup>

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29 Federalization such as described by Latif Pedram (in an interview with Davood Gharizadeh, BBC Persian, 15 August 2009). See Amir Madani "How to Bring Jihadist Fundamentalism to Its End" Huffington Post

[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amir-madani/how-to-bring-jihadist-fun\\_1\\_b\\_867869.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amir-madani/how-to-bring-jihadist-fun_1_b_867869.html)

See also: "Dancing with the Devil in the Dark: The Dilemma of Afghanistan".

[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amir-madani/the-dilemma-of-afghanista\\_b\\_780450.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amir-madani/the-dilemma-of-afghanista_b_780450.html)

and "The Dilemma of Afghanistan: In search of a Solution"

[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amir-madani/post\\_1092\\_b\\_768646.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/amir-madani/post_1092_b_768646.html)

30 David Nakamura Pakistani security officials seek larger role in negotiations with Taliban Washington Post on line Foreign Service Sunday, October 24, 2010;

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/10/24/AR2010102401676.html>

31 Dexter Filkins The Journalist and the Spies The murder of a reporter who exposed Pakistan's secrets, New Yorker on line September 19, 2011

**Kashmir.** Certain Army officers also believe they can leverage the Afghanistan War and Jihadist fighters against India in the dispute over Kashmir. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf admitted that Pakistan had trained underground militant groups to fight against India in Kashmir.<sup>32</sup> Jihadi linked to al-Qaeda may indeed have put some pressure on India, but this has also damaged both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan on many levels. The Taliban commander in Kunar, like others interviewed, said he remained opposed to the presence of foreign troops in Afghanistan and had no plans to stop fighting them. But, speaking of Pakistan's spy agency, "the ISI wants us to kill everyone – policemen, soldiers, engineers, teachers, civilians – just to intimidate people,"<sup>33</sup> the commander said.

Two things are needed, here: Firstly, the Pakistani establishment should begin to understand that the country is losing its best traditions, namely tolerance and the coexistence of various religions, as the Jihadi are transforming the whole country into an arena of sectarian wars. Secondly, the indiscriminate drone attacks must stop, and civil society in Pakistan must be strengthened, with particular attention to youth and women, and those social areas represented by courageous figures such as Malala Yousafzay.<sup>34</sup>

**Saudi Arabia.** Although Saudi Arabia is the birthplace of al-Qaeda, it is at the same time being damaged by al-Qaeda. It does not appear to be a matter of fact that all the Saudis wish to continue living solely according to past traditions. Many Saudis aspire to political and social rights and freedoms that can be guaranteed only by a modern state and not a sectarian one. A modern state can only be achieved by isolating radical ideologies. To that end, two efforts at the regional level could contribute seriously to stability in Afghanistan:

*A. Support civilian rule in Pakistan and reforms in Saudi Arabia.*

Ensure transparency in Saudi aid to Deobandi religious schools on the Indian subcontinent, and transparency generally in aid from the Arab-Islamic basin worldwide. In this context, the Pakistani-Saudi axis must also agree to withdraw their support of the Taliban. This would mean the end of the Taliban as a political movement.

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[http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/09/19/110919fa\\_fact\\_filkins](http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/09/19/110919fa_fact_filkins)

32 Pervez Musharraf Pakistan seen always as rogue Spiegel on line October 04, 2010

<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview-with-pervez-musharraf-pakistan-is-always-seen-as-the-rogue-a-721110.html>

33 Julian E.Barens, M,Rosenberg, H.Totakhil Pakistan Urges on Taliban Wall Street Journal on line October 5,2010 <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704689804575536241251361592.html>

34 Rob Grilly & Ashfaq Yusufzai Pakistan Taliban claim responsibility for shooting of 14-year-old girl Telegraph on line 09 Oct 2012

<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/9596487/Pakistan-Taliban-claim-responsibility-for-shooting-of-14-year-old-girl.html>

India is moving ahead with soft power in Afghanistan and is apparently working toward stability. India is a democracy based on ethnic and sectarian balance. It is under pressure from Jihadi armies like Lashkar Taiba<sup>35</sup> and others, which are linked to irredentism in Kashmir. Moreover, Jihadis also live among 160 million Indian Muslims. Yet India does not always work hard enough toward creating a Kashmir solution and bears some of the responsibility for raising tensions. Finding a stable solution for Kashmir should mean isolating Jihadism. Eliminating Jihadism means less Hindu nationalism and better conditions for democracy in India. So a further point needed to ensure stability in Afghanistan is:

*B. Work toward closing the Kashmir wound.*

### **China, Russia, and the Central Asian States**

China, as a member of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (the “SCO”), perhaps does not yet feel Jihadism as enough of a real threat. This is due not only to the fact that the Muslim minority (like the Uyghurs) in China does not even reach 2% of the population. China, which sees itself as competing with India, has sympathized with the Pakistani Army’s “logic,” which is neither the logic of Pakistan’s civil government, nor of its people. The *China Daily* suggests accepting the Taliban as “key players” in the process of reconciliation. Meanwhile, Pakistan has handed over to China *de facto* control of the strategic Gilgigit-Baltistan region in the northwest corner of Kashmir. Since Bin Laden had appointed his own emissary to China, there are also many Chinese Uyghurs among the Jihadis in the tribal areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan. China is starting to show an interest in Afghani security, out of fear the Taliban might begin helping Uyghur separatists.<sup>36</sup> There are several indications that Chinese Jihadists, after being trained militarily in the tribal areas of Pakistan, pass into Syria and, after participating in various incursions, finally repatriate to their homeland.<sup>37</sup> China is gradually coming to the realization that radicalism is an epidemic that can be easily passed from one sect to another, and increasingly to understand that its investments in Afghanistan and in the region generally are not safe with the Jihadists at work.<sup>38</sup>

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35 Ashley.J.Tellis The Menace That Is lashkar-e Taiba Carnegie Endowment for International peace on line, March 2012; [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/LeT\\_menace.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/LeT_menace.pdf)

36 Jane Perlez China Shows Interest in Afghan Security, Fearing Taliban Would Help Separatists New York Times on line June 8,2012

[http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/world/asia/china-signals-interest-in-afghanistan-after-na-to-leaves.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/world/asia/china-signals-interest-in-afghanistan-after-na-to-leaves.html?_r=0)

37 China: Terrorism poses hazard to international community 2012-10-30 SINA English <http://english.sina.com/china/2012/1029/521234.html>

Also: Hindustan Times Chinese Uighurs join Jihadis in Syria AP Beijing October 30,2012

<http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/China/Chinese-Uighurs-join-Jihadis-in-Syria/Article1-951959.aspx>

38 Shlomo Ben- Ami China’s Afghan Game Plan Project Syndicate on line Jul,4, 2012

Russia, another strong player in the region, became well acquainted with Jihadism in the years of the Soviet Afghan occupation, and is becoming even better acquainted today through the insurgency in Chechnya. Jihadi Salafism has reared its head within Russian Islam for some time now; Muslim minorities make up about one seventh of Russia's population. Some analysts suggest that high Muslim birth rates could make Islam Russia's dominant religion by 2050.<sup>39</sup> If radical Islam were to become widespread in Russia, Jihadism could put Russia under terrorist pressure and trample the fragile regimes of Central Asia. Russia and the SCO would therefore appear to have a common interest in stemming sectarian radicalism.<sup>40</sup> India backs a greater SCO role in Afghanistan.<sup>41</sup>

If the SCO, especially India, were to expand its role in Afghanistan,<sup>42</sup> finding common ground in the fight against Salafi terrorism<sup>43</sup> uttering a collective "no" and collaborating instead of competing, it would be a big step forward.

This brings us to a third project that could help assure security in Afghanistan:

### *C. Involving the SCO and India in a security project.*

#### **IRAN and the issue of Shiites in Afghanistan**

Perhaps the most influential player in Afghanistan for historical cultural, ethnic and geographical reasons is Iran. Most ethnic and cultural groups in Afghanistan are indissolubly related to Iran. Sir Olaf Caroe, the colonial governor of the North West Frontier of Pakistan and author of *The Pathans*, states: "Asia from the Tigris to the Indus is one country. The spirit of Persia breathes over it."<sup>44</sup>

Iran has long been a supporter of those forces that formed the **Northern Alliance**, which proved so instrumental to the victory over the Taliban after 9/11. Iran would not tolerate a Taliban return to power also for doctrinal reasons. The Iranian position on Afghanistan is independent of any regime, stemming rather from

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<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-s-afghan-game-plan>

39 Russia's Muslim leader wants less coverage of terrorism Moscow July 19 (Ria Novosti)

<http://en.ria.ru/russia/20110719/165285700.html>

40 Jorge Benitez Shanghai Cooperation Organization seeks role in Afghanistan after NATO Forces leave in 2014 Atlantic Council June 06, 2012

<http://www.acus.org/natosource/shanghai-cooperation-organization-seeks-role-afghanistan-after-nato-forces-leave-2014>

41 Ananth Krishnan India backs greater SCO role in Afghanistan THE HINDU on line June 7, 2012 <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/india-backs-greater-sco-role-in-afghanistan/article3500209.ece>

42 Zhan Haizhou SCO can play bigger role in Afghanistan China Daily on line 2011-12-06 [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-12/06/content\\_14217254.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2011-12/06/content_14217254.htm)

43 James Brooke Fighting Islamic Terrorism Seen as Common on Ground for US, Russia VOA on line May 02, 2011

<http://www.voanews.com/content/fighting-islamic-terrorism-is-common-ground-for-us-russia-121190754/170627.html>

44 Sir Olaf Caroe *The Pathans* The Pathans, 550 B.C.-A.D. 1957 Oxford University Press, 1983, pp 65,91

the deeper soul of Iranian society. Nonetheless, actual power in Tehran currently resides in the Shiite clergy; thus, the regime is more sensitive to the demands of Afghani Shiites. Shiites are thought to constitute almost 20% of the Afghan population. The majority of Afghan Shiites are Twelvers, while a minority is Ismaili, or Seveners. The Twelvers are primarily of the Hazara ethnicity. The Twelver community includes the Farsiwan of the western Herat and Farah provinces, the Bayat and Qizilbash Turkic populations of Iranian origin, as well as some of the Sayeds.

Despite all the tensions of the last thirty years in both domestic and international policy, Iran has never ignored Afghanistan. Its first response to the Soviet intervention was to open its Afghani border, by order of the Ayatollah Khomeini, in the name of Islamic solidarity against *godless* Soviet Communism. The Islamic Republic followed an 'open door' policy toward refugees throughout the period. Iran has granted to Afghani refugees the status of mohajerin, or involuntary migrant. Afghani immigrants in Iran were entitled to a number of advantages and privileges, but also suffered some discrimination. They were not confined to refugee camps, but were allowed to settle on the outskirts of towns and cities.<sup>45</sup> Iran, like Pakistan, received refugees by the millions. Inside the country, Tehran paid great attention to the politics and military capabilities of the Shia groups in the central region of Hazarajat. Iranian clergymen and advisers travelled along with military equipment throughout the dominant Shia areas. The Hazara Shias, considered by the majority Sunni sect of Afghanistan and particularly by Sunni Pashtuns as "desired victims" have a strong sense of persecution and the perception of this persecution is very strong among the Iranians. *Hizb-i-Wahdat* (United Party), composed of eight parties of Afghan Shiites, under Iranian auspices, is the resistance party that represents the Hazara in Afghanistan.. Karim Khalili is its political leader, and Mohammed Mohaqiq its militia leader. It must also be noted that A.A. Mazari, one of the most important Shia leaders, was killed by the Taliban.<sup>46</sup> While the *Hizb-i-Wahdat* (United Party) was based in Iran, the

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45 Aryaman Bhatnagar Iran: Understanding the Policy toward Afghan Refugees Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies 25 July 2012

<http://www.ipcs.org/article/Afg-Iran/iran-understanding-the-policy-towards-afghan-refugees-3683.html>

46 The Hazara are a people of distinctions - set apart from fellow Afghans by religion, mixed ethnicity and an independent nature, and they have suffered for that. Persecution has shaped and defined the Hazara, particularly over the last 200 years. Most face discrimination as Shi'ite Muslims, a minority among Afghanistan's dominant Sunni Muslims, as well as for ethnic bias. The Hazara are concentrated in the Hazarajat, a mountainous area in central Afghanistan centered around Bamiyan province and including the areas of Ghowr, Uruzgan, Wardak, and Ghazni province. Significant populations of Hazara are also in Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif and Samangan province. While the majority of Hazara are Shia Muslims, a small number are Sunni. The Hazaras are culturally and religiously linked to Iran, which is almost all Shia Muslim. The Hazara have experienced discrimination at the hands of the Pashtun-dominated government throughout the history of modern Afghanistan. Pashtun leaders, with occasional support from Uzbek and Tajik leaders, have denounced Hazaras as not real Muslims because of their Shia faith, and as agents of Persian imperialism in Afghanistan. The Taliban government has been accused of conducting massacres against the Hazara. The giant

Harekat Enghelab-e Eslami, guided by Ayatollah Mohseni, remained in Pakistan without joining the Shia alliance under the flag of *Hizb-i-Wahdat*.<sup>47</sup>

After the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran (where, as in Iraq, Azerbaijan and Bahrain the Shiites are in the majority) protection and empowerment of the Shia, who are a minority sect in almost every Muslim country, has been one of the central objectives of Iran's foreign policy. Therefore, Tehran has devoted much of its energy to their welfare, training, equipping and organizing them.<sup>48</sup> In the past, Mujahedeen groups regularly consulted Iran and the Shia factions over the issue of a negotiated settlement for a Soviet withdrawal, the Geneva Accords, and the formation of an interim government. The quantum of representation for the Shias in any future government caused differences among the Sunni and the Shia factions, and to date remains unresolved. Iran, supporting Shia factions, has demanded 25 to 30% Shia representation in all branches and departments of the Afghan government. Iran's strategic aim most likely is essentially based on ensuring the unity of the Persian speaking populations of Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Its immediate goal is to avoid the prevailing Wahabbi extremism in Kabul. Iran works to strengthen the anti Taliban groups by giving them material and political support. This policy fits well into its strategic aim of holding together the disparate groups of Farsi speakers. Tajiks and most Shia minorities are Pashtuns, yet are speakers of Farsi and have traditionally controlled the regions where Iran would like to preserve its traditional links. Iran also facilitated the re-entry of Russia and India into Afghanistan by extending diplomatic support and helping them to establish contacts with the northern minorities.

By the end of 1994, Iran's policy objectives began to diverge from Pakistan's. Iran wanted Rabbani to continue although his arbitrarily extended term that was to have ended on December 28, 1994. This was despite the fact there had been several battles around Kabul between Rabbani's forces and those of the *Hizb-i-Wahdat* (United Party). Iran quickly moved to resolve the differences between the two parties in the face of the Taliban threat, which had not at first been taken seriously. But around this time, after running down the defences of Hikmatyar in Charahsiab, the Taliban had moved dangerously closer to Kabul. Still, despite the Taliban's anti-Iranian policies, up to 1996 there was essentially harmony in the policy of Iran and Pakistan with respect to nuclear matters.

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Buddha statues destroyed by the Taliban were in Bamiyan province, in the heart of Hazara territory. Although the Hazaras are Shia Muslims, not Buddhists, they identified with the Buddhas as a cultural symbol. The Taliban's destruction of the Buddhas may have been partly directed against the Hazara. The Hezb-e Wahdat is the resistance party that represents the Hazara in Afghanistan.

<http://www.joshuaproject.net/people-profile.php?rog3=AF&peo3=12076>

<http://info.publicintelligence.net/MCIA-AfghanCultures/Hazara.pdf>

47 Amrallah Saleh "Iran va Chalesh hay-e Amniyati-ye Afghanistan" BBC Persian 26/01/2013

<http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/persian/viewpoints/2013/01/post-452.html>

48 Rasul Bakhsh Rais Conflict in Afghanistan: Ethnicity, Religion and neighbours

[http://ices.lk/publications/esr/articles\\_jan99/Afghanistan-%20Rais,ESR,Jan%201999.pdf](http://ices.lk/publications/esr/articles_jan99/Afghanistan-%20Rais,ESR,Jan%201999.pdf)

Since the ouster of the Rabbani government from Kabul in September 1996, Iran has increased its assistance to what is now known as the Northern Alliance, which includes Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks and related groups. Iran has supplied massive amounts of weapons and money to keep this alliance going. But the alliance received a major military setback in 1998 when their stronghold of Mazar-i-Sahrif fell to the Taliban and eleven Iranian diplomats were killed by Taliban fury. Early this year, they also ran down Bamayan province, where the Shia had established their strongest administrative and military base. After losing the main supply line from Mazar-i-Sharif in the north, Iran has turned to the Central Asian States for supply routes to the few northern provinces that still remain under the control of Ahmad Shah Masud. Iran has important links with several Afghan groups and resources to finance the anti-Taliban forces, whose rule Iran refuses to accept. There is a great deal of bad blood between the Taliban and Iran for ideological reasons. In recent years, Iran's relations with Pakistan have become strained over the situation in Afghanistan.

While Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have supported the Taliban regime, Iran has supported international intervention under the aegis of the United Nations to oust the Taliban. In 2001, the "U.S. diplomats found common ground with their Iranian counterparts during the campaign to oust the Taliban from Kabul and support a more representative government there. Iranian officials were actively engaged in the campaign to remove the Taliban from power, and supported the US approach. Iran, like Russia, was actually focused on mobilizing the northern forces in Afghanistan to oust the Taliban long before it became U.S. policy after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Today the challenge is indisputably more difficult. That brief opening in U.S.-Iran relations suffered when Iran was included in the "axis of evil" formulation in President Bush's 2002 State of the Union address, and diplomats were not able to truly integrate Iran into the early state-building activities of that early post-Taliban period."<sup>49</sup>

In the opinion of some Western analysts, Iranian politics seems to possess contradictory aspects; but Iran, for historical and other contingent reasons, recognizes the sovereignty and integrity of Afghanistan and favors stability in Afghanistan.<sup>50</sup> Today, the Iranian positions on Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and the entire region are subject to U.S.-Iranian relations, which have been characterized by mutual mistrust for more than three decades. Nonetheless, Iran is on the same side as the U.S. in supporting the Northern Alliance against the Taliban regime. Today, together with the international coalition, Iran supports the Karzai government. Despite ongoing concerns over Iran's nuclear program and

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49 Ellen Laipson Engaging Iran on Afghanistan March 2012

[http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Engaging\\_Iran\\_on\\_Afghanistan.pdf](http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/Engaging_Iran_on_Afghanistan.pdf)

See James Dobbins, *After the Taliban: Nation-Building in Afghanistan* (Potomac Books, 2008) for the authoritative account of US engagement with Iran in 2001-2003.

50 See Amrallah Saleh the cited source.

allegations that Iran is arming militants in the region, Gen. David H. Petraeus, ex-commander of U.S. forces in the region, has said Washington and Iran could coalesce around stabilizing Afghanistan. Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has echoed the sentiment. NATO partners, too, have sought to include Iran in Afghan strategy decisions.<sup>51</sup> Hopefully, president Obama, in appointing the new Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel<sup>52</sup> and the new Secretary of State John Kerry, will find a way to overcome this lack of confidence and be able to play a *win-win game* with Iran.

Since in the case of a military attack against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the country could bet on every horse in the race in Afghanistan, the last crucial effort to be made for stability in Afghanistan would be:

*D. To hold Iran within its historical vocation while waiting for its internal evolution.*

This is possible through intensive diplomacy, based on an agreement recognizing Iran's legal rights to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

An unbalanced policy<sup>53</sup> toward Iran could push the country, together with energy resources of the Iranian plateau and adjacent areas, into the arms of the global competitors and definitely change the global balance of power. "For our presence in Afghanistan, for our residue in Iraq, for our need in Syria, there is no solution to anything in that region without Iran."<sup>54</sup> In two crucial moments of recent history – the ousting of the Taliban in Afghanistan and of Saddam in Iraq – Iran has chosen to align itself with the international community. This is not a coincidence, but is a product of the historical vocation of Iran. The international community should keep in mind this central point.

## CONCLUSION

All the players – global and regional – must bear in mind that after the American withdrawal, a *de facto* international withdrawal and accompanying creation of a power vacuum and ungoverned space must be avoided.

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51 Greg Bruno & Lionel Beehner Iran and the Future of Afghanistan Council on Foreigner Relations on line March 30, 2009

<http://www.cfr.org/iran/iran-future-afghanistan/p13578>

52 S.Kinzer Chuck Hagel big problem: being a realist about American power and Iran guardian.co.uk, Monday 31 December 2012

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/dec/31/chuck-hagel-big-problem-realist-iran>

53 Jon B. Alterman, Foreword: Zbigniew Brzezinski. (Contributor: Jon B. Alterman, Richard Dalton, Nathan Freier, Geoffrey Kemp, Haim Malka, Michael O'Hanlon, and Barbara Slavin) Reflections on the Iranian Chalange CSIS Center for Strategic & International Studies May 21, 2012 <http://csis.org/publication/gulf-kaleidoscop>

54 Jon Snow West Must Rethink Iran Chatham House on line

<http://www.chathamhouse.org/research/middle-east/current-projects/iran>



The clearest lesson of the 9/11 attacks was that global security cannot be disentangled from security in the world's ungoverned spaces, ranging from Afghanistan to Somalia. The lack of international interest in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 allowed the Taliban to rise, and created space for Al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan. International players must learn this bottom line lesson. Al Qaeda and other international terrorist groups cannot be allowed a safe haven in Afghanistan, regardless of their political terrain.<sup>55</sup>

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55 Afghanistan Report Afghanistan The Relation Gap The International Council on Security and Development ( ICOS) on line July 2010  
[http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/4651~v~Afghanistan\\_\\_\\_The\\_Relationship\\_Gap.pdf](http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/4651~v~Afghanistan___The_Relationship_Gap.pdf)



# 10.

## FUNDING, SELLING OR TRANSFORMING?

IVAN SAFRANCHUK

I will analyse the situation in Afghanistan from the point of view of a Russian expert, without referring to any official position of the Russian government. Three main aspects will be investigated in detail. First I will outline all the threats, originated from the security perspective. Secondly, I will move to the political scenario and finally I will look deeper into the economic criticalities.

First of all, from the security perspective Afghanistan is halfway along the path. The way things are going, the expected target will not be met. On the contrary, the situation may probably go worse. It does not follow that the transition process and the consequent shift of responsibilities to the Afghan National Security Forces, leads to catastrophic consequences, at least not at the moment. However, it is known that the Afghan National Security Forces have some fundamental shortcomings. And, probably, they cannot be fixed in the near future. First, the Afghan National Security Forces are functionally limited in their capability. In other words, they are able to manage only a part of their duties. In particular, they lack functional capabilities to face the warlords which control some part of the country. The second criticality concerns the very structure of the Afghan forces. Despite all the efforts, made by both the western advisers and the Afghan government, the Afghan National Security Forces are a coalition of troops of warlords. That involves double loyalty, in which one can argue that primary loyalty is to the warlord. The consequence being the risk of a collapse overnight in case of a call-up by the lords. It does not follow that the risk is going to materialize. However, in order to keep some political stability in Kabul, a compromise, ignoring the aforementioned risk, is connecting warlords to politicians.

Moreover, a turbulent political arrangement increases the risk of collapse of the Afghan National Security Forces. This is the second important element of the Afghan transition picture. 2014 is going to be a difficult year, during which two political process, both extremely important, will take place. Namely, reconciliation negotiations and presidential elections. Political stability will be difficult to keep

during the electoral period. Operations are coordinated by bargaining between the Karzai administration and the United States. However, even in the best scenario, the elections will not be fully inclusive. Some elements of the Afghan society will be excluded from the political process, even if there is some progress in the reconciliation process. Further, after elections, one has to choose whether to include the excluded into some political arrangement or to intervene militarily against them. The answer to this question is now not clear. In short, there are, and there will be in the next years, many political risks, in Afghanistan.

In addition, political instability is exacerbated by the Afghan economic situation. This third aspect could be described in very positive but also in very negative terms. To draw a positive scenario it is sufficient to refer to the size of GDP or to the growth rate of GDP. However, at least three further indicators, suggesting a very critical situation, can be identified. Namely, budget deficit, trade deficit and the outflow of capital. First, budget deficit is 1/3 of the total GDP, this is a very high figure, with no prospective to be reduced. Second, Afghanistan is buying nine times what it is selling. Out of total Afghan trade, 90% is import. It follows that Afghanistan is absolutely not sustainable in its consumption and foreign trade. And even if the deficit is expected to decrease, as the dependence on foreign military troops downsizes, the figure will probably remain huge. Trade deficit is currently funded by foreign aid and no other way is possible. From a cynical point of view, some suggest to substitute foreign aid with drug money. However, most of the drug money does not even enter Afghanistan and therefore no substitution is possible. The situation is gloomy and no way out is promised. The third indicator is the outflow of capital. Since it is very hard to measure, my estimation is quite broad. A figure between 3 and 6 billion US dollars, varying from year to year, leaves Afghanistan annually. Indian statistics tell that Afghan citizens spend slightly over one billion US dollars in India pro year. Even more is spent in Pakistan, even if not registered.

This money is taken away from Afghanistan by wealthy Afghans, pretending to be loyal to their government, speaking in favour of it and voting for it. That indicates a very gloomy scenario in which there is a class of Afghans profiting from the current situation. Those are the wealthy Afghans, who have access to money and power. They are convinced to live in a golden age but do not believe in their country. But ordinary people see the golden age of Afghanistan in the future. They have very high expectations and are convinced that Afghanistan is a very rich country now exploited by foreigners. Of course this point of view does not meet western perspectives, according to which their presence in Afghanistan is for Afghanistan and not to exploit it.

The question, underpinning most of the discussion about the future of Afghanistan is whether the situation is going better or worse. I would say that the situation is definitely going better. But it does not matter. As soon as foreign aid will stop, everything will collapse. However, there are still three different scenarios for the

future. A first opportunity is to continue funding. The situation will look more or less stable even if improvements will constantly decrease. But funding can not last forever, probably it is possible to continue for something like 4 or 5 years. In this case you are only delaying the inevitable.

The second option is “selling” Afghanistan as it is to the region, transferring to regional players all responsibility. However, the region is not interested in Afghanistan as it is now. On the contrary, they are profiting from the current situation. In the last five years trade between Afghanistan and Russia increased ten times, and even more it has increased with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Of course, this is only possible as long as somebody is funding. It is therefore impossible to sell Afghanistan out to regional responsibility.

A third prospect could be to succeed with transformation. However, it is unclear whether commitments for foreign aid will be respected, whether in the next years the same will be going to hold tight and if there is enough time. The crucial question is whether Afghanistan does have a future and the answer is yes. But only if it is going to become a part of the region, from both the economic and political point of view. Unfortunately, plans of the last decade, and future plans, are going to create an isolated island. Again, it is necessary to emphasize that Afghanistan can live stable and in peace only if plugged into the regional arrangement. But many of the transformation plans are simply not compatible with the regional players. Transformation is building a competitor against its neighbours, excluding any kind of possible cooperation to be supported by them.

A dramatic reshape of the transformation plans for Afghanistan is inevitable. On the one hand, Afghanistan can only live as an economic and political part of the region. On the other, neighbour countries will accept Afghanistan only if it fits into the regional framework, without competing with it.



# 11.

## THE ANKARA PERSPECTIVE

GÜLDENER SONOMUT

We need time and we need to give time. Perception of time is different. It depends on whether you are talking to politicians, or to citizens, on whether you are talking about nature or a football match. Afghanistan needs time.

The Turkish perception about Afghanistan is that it is an unstable country, made of drugs smuggling, terrorism, internal fight for power and corruption. But there is an important weapon that has been used by the alliance, and will be used more and more in the future, in order to give peace and stability back to Afghanistan. It is the weapon of mass instruction. This is the only weapon able to fight extremism and terrorism. A lot of people have been educated in Afghanistan: military forces, police, but also judges, doctors and nurses. Afghan people have had the chance to go to Turkish, French, Italian universities, tasting freedom, while dreaming of their country. That is why it is important to believe in the hundreds of thousands of military but it is even more important to believe in the civil society. Democracy and freedom is the opium of people. As soon as tasted there is no way back into the cage. Afghan people are interacting to each other and with foreigners. Through Twitter and Facebook they have had their first taste of freedom and I do not believe they would like to go back to the old Afghan age.

Now, for what concerns the Afghan-Turkish relations. The Ottoman Empire built a long tradition of relations with Afghanistan. After 9/11, Turkey has come back to Afghanistan, first with ISAF, but also through a system of bilateral cooperation based on common and mutual roots. Turkey is willing to affirm itself as a regional power, able to provide an added value for all its neighbours. To guarantee peace and stability in the region, it is setting up concentric rings around Afghanistan.

The first initiative has been the so called trilateral commission, bringing together Turkey itself, which is also hosting the relations, Afghanistan and Pakistan. These three countries are trying to find a dialogue and to build basic consensus around security measures and border control.

The second one is OIC , for Turkish perspective. OIC is also very important for the cultural proximity. There are of course others like UN but within the limit of Turkey of course or NATO within the limit of what Turkey can do through NATO in Afghanistan.

Last, there is the so called Istanbul initiative for Afghanistan, started in November 2011. Turkey has invested, and will continue to invest a lot in this process. Countries and institutions are one inside the others: 15 member states and 15 supporters. The fact that they are supporters, and not observers or associated, is of basic importance. It means that support is necessary to stay in.

To sum, the international community does believe in the future of Afghanistan and in the future of the whole region. Afghanistan is the heart of Asia. It follows that if Afghanistan has a problem, the whole region will suffer from it. It also means that a common and inclusive solution has to be built. One cannot just rely on the United States, the whole region must be involved. So, for example, Iran should be included. And it is still unclear whether Iran is ready to cooperate with and show to the international community that it is ready to contribute to peace and stability in the region. On the one hand there is the need of commitment, by the neighbour countries and the international community. But on the other hand, there is the critical internal fight for power. A big risk which can only be managed if the international community continues to take into account Afghanistan and the Afghan population, remaining committed to the promised financing for next year (16 billion US dollars). But who is going to guarantee that the international community will remain committed financially and administratively in Afghanistan? There are countries which, for internal political reasons, have already shortened their commitments. The European Union has not been equal to its diplomatic power task. The same is true for NATO. As a matter of fact, only the United States passed the test, despite the financial crisis of 2008, and even increased the number of troops sent to Afghanistan.

It is important to focus on the progress made. The situation today is promising but the most important thing is the commitments of the West towards Afghanistan to be maintained. With the international community leaving Afghanistan, it is peace and security in continental Europe and in the United States which is on risk. On that side, Turkey has an important role to play and it will play it. Turkey is the most western country of the east and the most eastern country of the west. It is able to listen to the Afghan voice while keeping in mind the concerns raised by the international community. Of course one cannot expect Afghanistan to have the same political maturity of a State whose people did their revolution 300 years ago and has hundreds of years of experience in building consensus through dialogue. But time goes by and there is, without any doubt, a positive starting point on which confidence can be built. Also Turkey is learning, continuously adapting its policy, to manage its role as deal broker in the region. It is not easy to build consensus. It took over one and a half year, of which 6 months of condensed di-



scussion, to get an agreement on the European budget. Once again, we need time and we need to give time.

The main point is that the future of Afghanistan is in the hand of the Afghan people. At the same time, the international community should remain committed and use the weapon of mass instruction, through which reinforcing the role of women and of the civil society in general. In this context it is important that the Afghans stop fighting each other for power and start to build their future, not for themselves, but for future generations.



# 12.

## A NATION ON ITS OWN FEET

SHUKRIA BARKAZAI

I would like to talk about the real Afghanistan, beyond optimism and pessimism. I have suffered a lot in my country. I lost my kid during the civil war. Today, I am negotiating with the people who killed my child. It is not easy for a mother, but I do it. Because I have five more kids to grow up. This is Afghanistan, this is the Afghan struggle to come together and build the country, the nation, proud and privileged as it was before. I would like to take you on a journey, four decades back in time. Afghanistan was not a country relying on international aid and foreign military assistance. No neighbour country was able to interfere into domestic issue of Afghanistan. We know what we were as we know what we are doing right now. Politics, our political leaders, have created much trouble over time. This is why, after 2001, a new chapter was opened in Afghanistan. It has been the new beginning, with a lot of hope and mystics.

The constitution of Afghanistan, a modern democrat Islamic constitution, protecting fundamental civil rights, is the biggest achievement of the Afghan nation. You cannot see constitution like this in Afghan neighbour countries. Democracy has been, and still is, of incredible importance for the people of Afghanistan. And if you believe the flag of democracy to be raised by the international community, you are wrong. The Afghan people have fought, and are still fighting, with their lives and with their votes, for democracy, freedom of expression and security.

2014 is a worrying year, but not for everybody. Only for politicians, leaders and the private sector, searching for stability for its investments. It will be a shaky year. But the very large majority is not worried, nor is it thinking about leaving Afghanistan. To this regard, the commitment of the international community, embedded in the strategic partnership built with the legitimate government of the Afghan people, is of basic importance. It is assuring that Afghanistan will not be any more a marginalized country, a forgotten nation or fertile land for extremism and radicalism. Then it will be the political transition, through a very transparent electoral process, to give a new, better Afghan leadership to the country.

Moving on to the relation of Afghanistan with its neighbours, they are very shaky. Afghanistan is considered a piece of meat, tempting for the foxes around it, all ready to gobble it up. But that will never happen, because Afghanistan will not fall back into civil war again. Afghanistan will not go back to the age of Taliban. There is, now, no single province controlled or lead by a Taliban leader. And that is because the people of Afghanistan will never support any extremist ideology. Taliban once controlled Afghanistan, promising peace and security during the civil war time. Now they have lost the support of the nation. They have not been delivering justice and peace but they have killed, and are killing, people in Afghanistan.

To negotiate with them is one of the Afghan current strategies, widely and strongly supported. However, I would like to see my government showing its muscles. Shared power built on a bargaining process with the Taliban is not what the Afghan people need. The cold war legacy left Afghanistan with more than two million lost lives and a very tough reality to face. No one of the Afghan's neighbours is happy to see Afghanistan back on its own feet and all are looking with suspect to our good relations with the West and the United States of America.

Afghanistan used to be a peaceful country, to be proud of. Many presume the Afghan National Security Forces to be corrupted. Those men, no matter all accusation, are saving Afghanistan. They have never been divided in the name of ethnics or any other kind of factionalism, which, indeed, characterizes Afghan politics. The Afghan National Security Forces is the hope, the starting point on which Afghan people can come together and rebuild the nation.

Moving on to the economic situation, I would like to stress that, despite all investments, nobody set out a development program for the re-building of Afghanistan. Economy needs infrastructure. A lot of promises were made and now you are telling us you will leave Afghanistan. The message back, by the Afghan people, is that we will stay, no matter you are leaving, no matter you are ignoring, no matter you are destroying. We do appreciate all the international support we enjoyed and we will remember all the lost lives in order to bring democracy to Afghanistan. In truth, to bring back the very democracy you borrowed, once upon a time, during the cold war. What is important to the Afghans is to have Afghanistan back. A country beside all the other in the international community and in the region.

One last point should be cleared up. In the region between Afghanistan and Pakistan there is more than a half million of radical trouble makers. From time to time they are receiving support from Europe, they are taking money from Arabs and Chinese, supported in their initiatives by Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. This is not an Afghan business. Afghanistan will not be any more a save land for those people. No extremism will be allowed on the Afghan land, whatever the costs will be. We are paying with our lives since four decades and we are ready to pay more to have a nation to be proud of.

I hope and I believe that after 2014 Afghanistan will be a nation on its own feet, guaranteeing democracy and human and women rights. As a woman I know how much we are struggling. As a mother, I know the dreams of my kids and they mean for me the future. And the future will be bride, because I believe in it.



# 13.

## AFGHANISTAN: VIABILITY AND CAPITAL FLOWS

CHARLES A. GOOHS

How can Afghanistan become viable within the international community? This paper attempts to provide a framework for looking at this question for the period of 2014 and beyond from the point of view of the international financial markets.

As an introduction it is imperative to understand that currently Afghanistan is a donor-dependent state. In fact, if one includes security assistance in the computation, donor aid accounts for around 40% of GDP. This figure places the country in a fairly unique position with few parallels, such as, for example, Liberia or the West Bank and Gaza. Clearly, this situation is neither healthy, nor sustainable. Moreover, as the World Bank has properly pointed out, there are important limits to the country's capacity to efficiently absorb such large amounts of aid, without unintended consequences such as waste, or even corruption, as aid becomes a source of patronage.

The expected sharp reduction in aid which is widely expected to occur during the transition period and beyond will shock the system, roll back the economy, and will put the fragile nature of the progress made at risk. However, as the World Bank has also pointed out, the impact of the expected cutback in Afghan aid on the Afghan economy might be significantly less than might be expected. The reason for this is that much of the aid spent *on* Afghanistan is not spent *in* Afghanistan. The World Bank estimates that approximately 88% of aid to the country is implemented through the "External" Budget, not the government budget. Consequently, much of this aid does not accrue to the country or result in payments for local goods and services but ends up outside the country as payments for imports, contractors and consultancies, and repatriated profits. However, even if actual figures may overstate the impact of future reductions in donor assistance, they will still have a dramatic impact and highlight the urgent priority to replace these cutbacks with other forms of sustainable financing in order for Afghanistan to remain viable.

One obvious source of financing to support the Afghan economy from the cutback in aid is international investment and capital flows which are currently relatively

insignificant. According to UNCTAD estimates, foreign direct investment flows in 2010 were only around US\$79 billion – about 2% to 3% of GDP. Perhaps these estimates are underestimates as financial statistics and estimates on Afghanistan are often unreliable. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that very large increases in international capital flows would be necessary to offset expected reductions in aid. To attract foreign capital of the necessary magnitude certain basic requirements would need to be met.

First, sizeable economic opportunities that promise a commercial rate of return need to be identified. Such opportunities should also address important macro-economic goals, such as improving the balance of trade and generating foreign exchange, increasing tax revenues, creating job and providing training to local workers. Ideally, they would also produce externalities that support the development of other sectors.

Second, donor aid must continue in the area of basic infrastructure, which is absolutely essential to attracting foreign direct investment. Considerable progress has already been achieved in many areas of basic physical infrastructure including the transportation sector (e.g., completion of the Ring Road), the power sector (e.g., refurbishment of large hydroelectric plants), and telecommunications (e.g., the increased penetration of mobile phone service outside of Kabul). Other areas of basic infrastructure, however, have not witnessed the same consistent progress. In particular, the legal system remains inadequate, the banking system is still recovering from the 2000 Kabul Bank scandal, and Afghanistan continues to rank near the bottom of international indicators in such important areas as governance, corruption and the rule of law.

All of these deficiencies contribute to a high level of perceived political and economic risk. Currently, none of the major credit rating agency provides ratings for Afghanistan. The major export credit agencies are officially or effectively “off cover” due to the perceived high level of risk, although some deals do get done. Investors may look for some comfort to bilateral trade and investment agreements or may be able to obtain political risks coverage from institutions as MIGA or OPIC, but these are not substitutes for real progress which requires the support of continued international aid.

Third, in order to become viable in an era of transition, there needs to be large economic opportunities with the potentially to significantly add to Afghanistan’s real economic growth over the coming years and decades. The World Bank has identified two such sectors: agriculture and mining.

Given Afghanistan’s climate, soil and tradition, agriculture (even excluding illicit crops) is the largest contributor to GDP. Despite its importance, the sector is still largely informal, small-scale and lacks adequate investment. For example, Afghanistan used to be a leading exporter of dried fruit and nuts but today Afghan exports of these agricultural products only garner perhaps a 3% share of the world market. Foreign investment to help modernize food processing, packaging



and transportation, to name a few areas, has the potential to transform this sector while supporting economic, employment and fiscal goals.

Similarly, the mining sector is small scale and lacks adequate investment, but has attracted considerable interest and international attention due to the magnitude of the opportunities involved. Prefeasibility studies, covering just 10% of the national territory, have identified mineral deposits, reportedly worth in excess of \$1 trillion. . [Note these figures do not constitute proven reserves but they do show real commercial potential.] Accordingly, the mining sector is the basis of the *Resource Corridor Approach*, which is championed by the World Bank and has been labelled a “National Priority Program” by the Afghan Government. This *Approach* seeks to develop large deposits of copper, iron ore, coal, gold and other precious mineral through attracting sizeable foreign direct investment. The plan is to develop these deposits through strategic sequencing and prioritization of actions that will unlock supply chain benefits and leverage beneficial externalities.

One of the greatest challenges to developing these large mineral deposits is risk of inadequate governance. The Afghan government is currently addressing this risk through implementation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Several EITI milestones have already been met and the first reconciliation report is expected in the near future. Utilizing custom bid tendering methodology developed by the World Bank, two world class deposits have already been successfully tendered yielding commitments of US\$8 billion. Other smaller assets, including small oil wells, have been tendered as well. If successful, the Resource Corridor Approach might not only fill some of the gap created by expected cutbacks in donor aid, but it is hoped that it can address important macroeconomic issues as well, such as the fiscal gap – by some estimates development of gold deposits alone could generate future tax revenues in excess of US\$250 million annually.

In conclusion, the viability of the Afghanistan state and the Afghan economy will require international capital flows to replace much of the expected cutback in international aid. The mining and agricultural sectors provide large-scale investment opportunities that have the potential to address this problem. However, while financial commitments have been made, scepticism remains, as significant disbursements have yet to be made. Further progress on improving basic infrastructure, political stability and governance remain prerequisites for attracting the international capital flows necessary to see Afghanistan through this transition period from a donor-dependent state to one where it is viable in the international community. Donor aid will be most effective if it is targeted at these areas.



# 14.

## SUPPORTING SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT TOGETHER

VIOREL ISTICIOAIA BUDURA

The relationship between the International community and Afghanistan has been defined by conflict. The European Union, the member states and Afghanistan are working together since a while. After eleven years, dominated by counter-insurgency, it is time for social, political and economic development, for transition and transformation. To this regard the coming months will be of crucial importance. Facts need to meet the many expectations on both the political transition, including the presidential elections in 2014, and the transition of security responsibility. The complexity of the process requires a balanced and comprehensive approach and the European Union is moving in this direction.

There are a few issues, of basic importance, on which the European agenda and attention are focused on. They are: the establishing of a sustainable model of governance and security management, human rights protection, the safeguard of a pluralist society, credible elections, the reconciliation and peace process. The key point is security, which should progress hand in hand with development. Since stability is the prerequisite for anything to be achieved. Without, it would be very difficult, if possible, to help Afghan state and the Afghan people to become responsive and accountable.

The implementation of the Bonn, the Chicago and the Tokyo commitments is a priority. The Union and all the member states are major supporters of the Tokyo mutual accountability framework. Indeed, the key word is "mutual". The Afghan government, in order to continue benefiting from international support, must also be committed, i.e. reforms in the area of rule of law, human rights, anti-corruption and in the judiciary have to be concretely implemented. We know that the commitments exist, now we need to see real progress in implementation. The European Union will press in this direction.

The commitment of the European institutions and the member states for a viable Afghanistan is a long term commitment, which covers at least the next ten years. One of the first results is the Cooperation Agreement for Partnership and

Development, being negotiated by the Union and the Afghan government. It will provide the legal basis for cooperation and assistance in all civil fields and will also consist in a platform for bilateral dialogue. Even if the exact amount of the European commitment will need to wait for the finalization of the European overall budget (for the period 2014/2020), assistance for 200 million euro per annum are guaranteed. Individual voluntary contributions by the member states are estimated to reach 1 billion euro per annum. The covered sectors involve mainly health and agriculture but assistance is also provided to improve political and economic governance.

Another key point for security is the expertise necessary to train the Afghan police. Professionals, in particular highly trained civil police are of critical importance, indispensable to ensure stability. Therefore, our efforts focus on institutional reforms to increase the capacity of the police forces, for example in specialized activities. The EU is also sustaining three different confidence building activities: disaster management, counter narcotics and commercial opportunities.

It is necessary to always remember that efforts towards a viable Afghanistan need to focus on the regional dimension. Peace and stability in Afghanistan is crucial for a stable region and a secure and prosperous Afghanistan can only emerge out of a stable region. Therefore the European Union welcomed the initiative promoted by Turkey in Istanbul, the only one to include all Afghanistan's neighbours.

Looking ahead, once again a viable Afghanistan starts at home. Laying the right groundwork for the coming presidential elections is critical. Mistakes of 2009/10 should be avoided, the international community should organize a coordinate support and elections should be prepared coherently. The peace and reconciliation process is central to this question. And the recent killings, the many influential tribal figures, tell the importance of dialogue. However participants must renounce to any form of violence and terrorism and must respect the Afghan constitution.

Concluding, I have to confess that many aspects of our future work in Afghanistan are yet not well known. However, not strategies but firm commitment organized around just three pivotal points: security, political will at all levels and coordination, are needed.

# SPEAKERS' BIOGRAPHIES

## SHUKRIA BARAKZAI

Member of Wolesi Jirga, Kabul Member of Parliament, **Shukria Barakzai** was elected to the Wolesi Jirga in 2005. Since September 2006, she has been president of the Third Line Political Group, 12 parliamentarians working to promote democracy, reform, and human rights in Afghanistan's political institutions. In February 2003, Ms. Barakzai was appointed as a member of the Constitutional Reviewing Commission by President Hamid Karzai. As a commissioner, she traveled to seven provinces and consulted with tens of thousands of Afghans on the constitution. Ms. Barakzai is chief editor of *Aina-e-Zan* (Women's Mirror), a weekly magazine she started after the fall of the Taliban in order to launch a women's rights campaign. She also directs Asia Women Organization, an organization she founded in 1999 that maintained secret educational rooms for women and girls under the Taliban. (Asia Women Organization has since expanded its area of focus to include health and relief.) In 2007, the city of Florence, Italy presented Ms. Barakzai with the Giglio d'Oro award for her contributions to democracy and human rights. She was also internationally recognized for her work in 2005, receiving the Medal of Courage from the parliament of France and being named International Editor of the Year by [www.worldpress.org](http://www.worldpress.org). In 2004, President Karzai presented her with the Medal of National Honour. She studied at Kabul State University.

## VIOREL ISTICIOAIA BUDURA

Managing Director for Asia and Pacific, EEAS, Brussels **Viorel Isticioaia Budura** is managing director and head of the Asia-Pacific Department at the European External Action Service. He is also a guest professor at Beijing University of Foreign Studies and a member of the Council of the Association of

the Beijing University Alumni. Between 2002 and 2010, he was the ambassador of Romania to the People's Republic of China and Mongolia. Previously he was Romania's ambassador to the Republic of Korea. Other former positions include minister counsellor at the Embassy of Romania, London and deputy director at the UN Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, as well as minister counsellor at the Embassy of Romania, Tokyo. Ambassador Isticioaia Budura holds a B.A. in philosophy and history from the University of Bucharest as well as a bachelor degree in Chinese language and literature from Nankai University, Tianjin, China.

ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN

Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington **Anthony H. Cordesman** holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS. He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal. During his time at CSIS, he has completed a wide variety of studies on energy, U.S. strategy and defense plans, the lessons of modern war, defense programming and budgeting, NATO modernization, Chinese military power, the lessons of modern warfare, proliferation, counterterrorism, armed nation building, the security of the Middle East, and the Afghan and Iraq conflicts. (Many of these studies can be downloaded from the Burke Chair section of the CSIS Web site at <http://www.csis.org/program/burke-chair-strategy>.) Cordesman has directed numerous CSIS study efforts on terrorism, energy, defense planning, modern conflicts, and the Middle East. He has traveled frequently to Afghanistan and Iraq to consult for MNF-I, ISAF, U.S. commands, and U.S. embassies on the wars in those countries, and he was a member of the Strategic Assessment Group that assisted General Stanley McChrystal in developing a new strategy for Afghanistan in 2009. He frequently acts as a consultant to the U.S. State Department, Defense Department, and intelligence community and has worked with U.S. officials on counterterrorism and security areas in a number of Middle East countries. Before joining CSIS, Cordesman served as director of intelligence assessment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and as civilian assistant to the deputy secretary of defense. He directed the analysis of the lessons of the October War for the secretary of defense in 1974, coordinating the U.S. military, intelligence, and civilian analysis of the conflict. He also served in numerous other government positions, including in the State Department and on NATO International Staff. In addition, he served as director of policy and planning for resource applications in the Energy Department and as national security assistant to Senator John McCain. He had numerous foreign assignments, including posts in the United Kingdom, Lebanon, Egypt, and Iran, as well as with NATO in Brussels and Paris. He has worked extensively in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

ARNE B. DALHAUG

Commandant at the NATO Defense College, Rome **Arne B. Dalhaug** graduated from the Officer Candidate School in 1975 and from the Military Academy in 1979. Dalhaug completed the Command and General Staff Course at the Norwegian Army Staff College in 1990 and was a student at US Army Command and General Staff College from 1992 to 1993. He is also a graduate from the US Army War College in 2000. Dalhaug served as Rifle Company Commander until 1985 and as an instructor at the Military Academy until 1987. He was promoted to major in 1987. From 1987 he was assigned to staff duty, also including being an instructor at the Norwegian Army Staff College, until 1995 when he became battalion commander. He was promoted Lieutenant Colonel in 1993 and Colonel in 1997 when he was assigned Brigade Commander, Brigade North. Dalhaug was promoted Brigadier in 2000 and became ACOS Operations and Resources Management, Joint Staff, CHOD Norway. In 2002 he was promoted Major General and headed the Strategic Management Integration Process in the MOD where the military strategic staff was integrated with the MOD. In 2003 he was assigned Head of the Department of Defence Policy and Long Term Planning in the MOD. In 2005, Arne Bård Dalhaug was promoted Lieutenant General and assigned Chief of Defence Staff/Deputy CHOD, Norway. In November 2008 he was appointed the Norwegian Military Representative to NATO, a post he held until July 2011. On 22 July 2011 he assumed the post as Commandant of NATO Defense College in Rome, Italy.

GIAMPAOLO DI PAOLA

Italian Minister of Defence Born in 1944, Admiral **Giampaolo Di Paola** joined the Italian Navy in 1963 and graduated from the Naval Academy in 1966. Soon after the graduation in 1967 he attended the Submarine School and underwent fleet training onboard submarines. In 1981 he attended the NATO Defense College in Rome. From 1981 to 1984 Giampaolo Di Paola served as Anti Submarine Warfare and Undersea Warfare Program Officer, Long Term Planning Branch, in the Supreme Allied Command Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia (USA). In 1984 he assumed command of the frigate "Grecale". Thereafter, in 1986, he was appointed to the Navy Staff in Rome as Plans and Programs Branch Chief in the Directorate of Financial Planning. From 1989 to 1990, as a Captain, he commanded the aircraft carrier "Garibaldi". In 1990 he returned to the Navy Staff and was appointed as Executive Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff (1990-91), then as Chief of Naval Plans and Policy Branch (1991-92), and finally as Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations (1993-94). During this period the Italian Navy was involved in supporting NATO arms embargo operations (Operation Sharp Guard) to contain the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, and in the U.N. ope-

ration Restore Hope in Somalia. With the rank of Rear Admiral (lower half) in 1994 he was assigned to the Defence Staff in the Ministry of Defence where he became Chief of the Directorate of Defence Policy (1994-98). In this position he took active part as far as the planning of the Italian contribution to the NATO effort for the stabilization of the Balkans and for the Italian-led Operation in support of Albania in 1997. As Polmil Advisor to the Minister of Defence and to the Italian Chod he was actively engaged in NATO PfP initiative and in the Mediterranean Dialogue. He was also the Italian representative to the HLG on nuclear and proliferation issues. From 1998 to 2001, with the rank of Rear Admiral, he assumed the position of Chief of the Cabinet Office of the Ministry of Defence. On the 1st of January 1999 he was promoted Vice Admiral. In this position he took active part in supporting the political decision making for the Italian contribution to the NATO initiative in Kosovo, the NATO enlargement process and outreach policy and in the development of the ESDP and NATO-EU relationship. In March 2001 he was appointed Secretary General of Defence / National Armaments Director. In this capacity he held national responsibility for major NATO programmes such as AGS, ALTBMD, NATO Airlift Capability, NATO SATCOM Post 2000 and MEADS. He was promoted Admiral on 10 March 2004 on becoming Chief of Defence. In this capacity he had the overall responsibility for the policy and planning of the Italian Armed Forces and - as CINCFOR - he did hold policy and command responsibility for Italian Forces participation in NATO, EU and Coalition operations conducted in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans, the Mediterranean, Pakistan and in the United Nations Operation in Lebanon. From 27 June 2008 to 17 November 2011, he assumed the position of Chairman of the NATO Military Committee. On 18 November 2011, Admiral Di Paola was appointed Minister of Defence

EMANUELE GIORDANA

Journalist, Speaker Afgana Network **Emanuele Giordana** is editor-in-chief of the "Terra" monthly magazine, president of the Association "Lettera22" and one of the hosts of Radio3Mondo (Rai third channel). He is also the porte-parole of the "Afgana" Network. Consultant for the UN (Unops, Who, Undp), Ficross, Italian cooperation, Italian and international Ngo's, was also Deputy Chairman of the Association of Oriental Studies "Asia Maior" (until 2010) and Professor of Indonesian culture at the Ismeo, Milan, (until 1990). He is now holding courses on the relations between emergencies and information in many Italian Universities. His last publications: "Afghanistan" (Editori riuniti 2007) and "Diario da Kabul" (ObarraO 2010) Afgana ([www.afgana.org](http://www.afgana.org)) is an informal Network of the Italian Civil Society (Ngo's, Associations, academics, researchers and citizens). Afgana was born in March 2007 thanks to an initiative promoted by 3 Italian Association (Archi, Lunaria and Lettera22). The initiative



was a response to the appeal “A journey to peace and justice in Afghanistan: reflections and proposals of the civil society”. The appeal put forward suggestions and solutions for a country, Italy, where “a lot has been said about Afghanistan, but only few on Afghan population, its needs, and on how Western presence is perceived”. Afgana organized the first Afghan civil society Conference in Kabul and in Rome in 2011, who is mentioned in the Partnership Agreement between Italy and Afghanistan signed by the Italian and Afghan Parliament. Afgana is recognized by Italian Parliament and Mofl and was received with an Afghan civil society delegation by president Napolitano. In December 2011, Afgana launched the “30% Initiative”. Afgana in Italy is asking the Parliament to reallocate to civil reconstruction and cooperation projects, 30 cents out of every euro saved from the downsizing of the Italian military force in Afghanistan. The same issue was presented by Afgana during Tokyo Conference in July 2012

CHARLES A. GOOHS

Senior Strategic Initiatives Officer, Eximbank, Washington DC **Charles Goohs** is a Senior Officer in Ex-Im Bank’s Renewable Energy Division. With over 20 years of trade finance experience, Mr. Goohs has worked in a number of areas of Ex-Im Bank, including Renewable Energy, Strategic Initiatives, Business Initiatives, Short-Term Trade Finance, Business Credit, Insurance and Policy Analysis. He has taken a lead role in a number of new products and initiatives such as Renewable Energy Express – expedited project finance for loans of \$10 million or less, Transportation Security Export Program (a programmatic response to the events of 9-11), The Film Production Guarantee Program, the Finance Lease Guarantee Program, programmatic responses to regional and global debt crises such as large country-specific lending facilities and various facilities designed to stimulate additional exports by small business. Mr. Goohs’ private sector experience includes roles as Project Manager for contracts with the Commodity Credit Corporation, including claims and reschedulings related to Russian and Iraqi loan guarantees and setting up a World Bank-backed guarantee program in Moldova. Mr. Goohs is a Chartered Financial Analyst. He holds an MBA from the Wharton School of Business (U of PA) with highest honors (Palmer Scholar), an MPP from the Kennedy School of Government (Harvard University) and a B.A. in Economics from San Diego State University. He has also served on adjunct faculty of Georgetown University and University of Maryland.

ISTVÁN GYARMATI

Director, International Centre for Democratic Transition, Budapest Dr. **István Gyarmati** is also professor at Zrinyi Miklós National Defense Univer-

sity, ELTE University, Budapest, Budapest University of Economics as well as lecturer at such international education institutions like NATO Defense College (Rome), SHAPE School (Oberammergau), George C. Marshall Centre (Garmisch Partenkirchen). His other responsibilities are: Member of the Academic Advisory Board, NATO Defense College (Rome) Member of the Advisory Board, International Institute for Strategic Studies (London) and Senior Political Advisor to the Director of the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). In his career Dr. Gyarmati has assumed the positions of Head of the Defense Minister's Task Force to draft the National Military Strategy of the Republic of Hungary (2008 – 2009), Member of the Advisory board of the Prime Minister of Hungary (2004-2006), Head of the OSCE/ODIHR Election Monitoring Mission in Moldova (2004), Under-secretary of Policy, Ministry of Defense of Hungary (1998-1999). Beside that he is also board member of the following institutions: Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy, Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, European Security Forum, International Institute of Strategic Studies, European Advisory Group, etc. Dr. Gyarmati has master degrees in political science and journalism, a Ph.D. in military science (strategy studies), and a habilitation at Zrinyi Miklós National Defense University in Hungary. He speaks English, German, Russian and French.

RICHARD D. HOOKER

Dean of the NATO Defense College, Rome Dr. **Richard D. Hooker, Jr.** became Deputy Commandant and Dean of the NATO Defense College in October 2010. He is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the International Institute of Strategic Studies, and the Foreign Policy Research Council and is a Fellow of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. A former White House Fellow, Dr. Hooker previously taught at the United States Military Academy at West Point and held the Army Chair at the National War College in Washington, D.C. He also served with the Office of National Service, The White House under President George H.W. Bush, with the Arms Control and Defense Directorate, National Security Council during the Clinton Administration, and with the NSC Office for Iraq and Afghanistan in the administration of George W. Bush. While at the NSC he was a contributing author to The National Security Strategy of the United States. Dr. Hooker graduated with a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy in 1981 and holds M.A. and Ph.D. degrees in International Relations from the University of Virginia. He is a Distinguished Graduate of the U.S. National War College, where he earned an M.S. in National Security Studies and also served as a Post-Doctoral Research Fellow. His publications have

been used widely in staff and defense college curricula in the US, UK, Canada and Australia and include more than thirty-five articles and three books on security and defense-related topics. Dr. Hooker has lectured extensively at leading academic and military institutions in the United States and abroad. Prior to his retirement from active duty, Dr. Hooker served for 30 years in the United States Army as a parachute infantry officer in the United States and Europe. While on active duty he participated in military operations in Grenada, Somalia, Rwanda, the Sinai, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan, including command of a parachute brigade in Baghdad from January 2005 to January 2006. His military service also included tours in the offices of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army.

#### MAURITS JOCHEMS

Senior Civil Representative NATO, Brussels Ambassador **Maurits R. Jochems** was appointed as NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan in August 2012 and took up his post in October 2012. He previously served as Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to Estonia from September 2010 to September 2012. From 2005 to 2010, Maurits Jochems was on secondment to NATO by the Dutch Foreign Ministry with the personal title of Ambassador, and held the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Plans in the Operations Division of NATO's International Secretariat. In his position at NATO Maurits Jochems dealt with civil emergency planning, exercise and crisis management policy and conceptual issues with regard to operations. He was also NATO's Senior Civilian Representative in Pakistan during NATO's disaster relief operation in support of the Pakistani government's earthquake relief efforts in 2005-2006. He was NATO's Senior Civilian Representative for contacts with the African Union and from January-July 2008, he was NATO's Resident Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan. From 2001-2005 he was for four years the Director International Security Policy at the Dutch Foreign Ministry, dealing with participation in international peacekeeping operations and policies with regard to NATO, EU/ESDP, OSCE, conventional and UN related arms control and disarmament, as well as arms export policy issues. Before 2001, Ambassador Jochems held positions at Dutch embassies abroad in Kingston (Jamaica), Bonn, Beirut, Brussels and Rome as well as at the Ministry in The Hague. Ambassador Jochems started his career at the Royal Military Academy in Breda where he graduated in 1972. In 1977, after having obtained a Masters Degree in International law at the University of Utrecht, he joined the Dutch Foreign Service and retired as a career military officer.

MAHMOUD KAREM

Former Secretary General, the Egyptian National Council for Human Rights (NCHR) **Mahmoud Karem** PhD. 1984 from the United States with Highest Distinction Former Ambassador to Japan (2004), Ambassador Extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the EU, NATO, Belgium and Luxembourg (2009), Chosen Best Ambassador to the EU 2007, Special Advisor to the Foreign Minister of Egypt on Non Proliferation, Special Diplomatic Advisor to the Egyptian Parliament on European Affairs, Member of the Advisory Board of NATO Defense College in Rome (NRCC) till 2011 Board Member (elected), the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs ECFA till 2016 Board Member Nato Defense College Foundation Rome till present

JÁN KUBIŠ

Head of UNAMA, Kabul United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed **Ján Kubiš** of Slovakia as his new Special Representative for Afghanistan and head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) on 23 November 2011. Prior to taking up his current position in Kabul on 17 January 2012, Mr. Kubiš served as the Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). Mr. Kubiš has more than three decades of experience in diplomacy, foreign security policy and international economic relations. Mr. Kubiš served as his country's foreign minister from 2006 to 2009, and has also held the posts of chairman of the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers and as the Secretary-General of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Mr. Kubiš previously served with the United Nations in the late 1990s as the Secretary-General's Special Representative for Tajikistan and head of the UN mission of observers in that Central Asian country. A graduate of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Mr. Kubiš worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the former Czechoslovakia from 1976 to 1992, and then in 1993 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovakia.

TODD LANDMAN

Director of the Institute for Democracy and Conflict Resolution, Colchester, UK **Todd Landman** is Professor of Government and Director of the Institute for Democracy and Conflict Resolution at the University of Essex. He has been at Essex since 1993 in the Department of Government and before being appointed Director of the Institute, he served as the Deputy Director (1999-2003) and Co-Director (2003-2005) of the Human Rights Centre and Director (2007- 2010) of the Centre for Democratic Governance. He is author of *Protecting Human*

Rights (Georgetown 2005), *Studying Human Rights* (Routledge 2006), and *Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics* (Routledge 2000, 2003, 2008); co-author of *Measuring Human Rights* (Routledge 2009), *Assessing the Quality of Democracy* (International IDEA 2008); *Governing Latin America* (2003), and *Citizenship Rights and Social Movements* (Oxford 1997, 2000); editor of *Human Rights Volumes I-IV* (Sage 2009), and co-editor of the *Sage Handbook of Comparative Politics* (Sage 2009) and *Real Social Science* (Cambridge 2012). He was the President of the Human Rights Section of the American Political Science Association and has numerous articles published in *International Studies Quarterly*, *The British Journal of Political Science*, *Human Rights Quarterly*, *Democratization*, *Political Studies*, *The Journal of Human Rights*, *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, *Electoral Studies*, *Human Rights and Human Welfare*, *Public Law and The California Western International Law Journal*. He has carried out numerous projects on the analysis and synthesis of data and complex governmental information, preparation of reports, and the development of assessment and measurement frameworks for significant inter-governmental organisations, governments, and non-governmental organisations. These include the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), the UK Department for International Development (DFID), The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), The Danish Foreign Ministry, The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), The European Commission, The Inter-Parliamentary Union, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, International Capacity Building (InWent), Minority Rights Group International, The International Council for Human Rights Policy, Amnesty International, and the World Organisation Against Torture.

AMIR MADANI

Author at Mardomsalari, Tehran **Amir Madani** is a Senior Research Fellow at Institute of Political Studies "S. Pio V" Rome. He has studied architecture in the University of Palermo and continued his studies at the Faculty of Oriental Studies in University "La Sapienza" of Rome. His areas of interest are Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Arab-Islamic world, and the Middle East in general. He is the co-author of *Atomica degli Ayatollah* (Nutrimenti 2006), the author of the "*Le Letture Persiane*" (Associate 2007) and *Afghanistan* (Clueb 2011). Amir collaborates with Nomisma think-tank and Istituto di Studi Politici S,Pio V. as a senior researcher. He also collaborates as an analyst, columnist and political commentator with various European and North American media, including: "*HuffingtonPost*" (United States), "*Mardomsalari*" (reformist newspaper in Tehran), "*Limes*", "*Kukci*" International (Afghanistan). He is the author of numerous articles and essays.

ALESSANDRO MINUTO-RIZZO

President of the Nato Defense College Foundation, Rome **Alessandro Minuto-Rizzo** is a career diplomat who has served in a number of high-level European and international posts. He was born in Italy and holds a degree in law, which he obtained in 1965. Minuto-Rizzo began his political career at the Institute for International Policy in Milan, Italy. After a brief tenure there, he moved to the Directorate of Cultural Affairs at the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He has held several various Diplomatic Counselorships in Italy, fulfilling this position for the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Budget and Economic Planning and the Minister for Coordination of European Policies. From 2000 - 2001, he was the Italian Ambassador to the Western European Union and the European Union's Committee for Policy and Security. He served as the Deputy Secretary General of NATO from 2001 - 2007 and is regarded as one of the principal architects of its transformation and expansion. He currently teaches at the Libera Università Internazionale Degli Studi Sociali (LUISS). His areas of professional interest are security, the Mediterranean and Gulf countries and transport policy. Outside of international politics and diplomacy, Minuto-Rizzo has been involved in a number of important transport related projects. He has served as a member of the Italian Space Agency's Management Board, Personal Representative of the Italian Prime Minister for Trans-European Networks, and Head of the Delegation to the European Committee for Financing Transport Projects in the European Union. He was also elected as the Chairman of the Administrative and Financial Committee of the European Space Agency, a position he held for two years.

ALESSANDRO POLITI

Director, NATO Defense College Foundation, Rome **Alessandro Politi** is a global political and strategic analyst. He is senior researcher for the Italian MoD (CeMiSS) regarding the strategic monitoring of Latin America. He teaches geopolitics and intelligence at the SIOI. He teaches conflict management, crisis, peace-making and analysis at different governmental centres. He is facilitator at the WEF Global Shaper of Rome. He has been acting director of the School of Analysis at the Link Campus University in Rome. Political activist in the European Common Goods movement. Forthcoming a book on the Iran-Israel war and the PG13 strategic perspectives volume for the Italian MoD.

DANIELE RIGGIO

Regional Information Officer for Afghanistan and Central Asia, Public Diplomacy Division, NATO HQ, Brussels Mr. **Daniele Riggio** studied law in Bolo-

gna, Italy and Salamanca, Spain, before completing his masters in international relations at Tufts University in the United States. In the 1990s, he worked throughout the Balkans, Ukraine and Yemen in the field of electoral monitoring. Since 2000, having worked as Civil Affairs Officer on the UN special mission to Afghanistan, his area of specialisation has been Afghanistan. Mr Riggio has worked in Afghanistan for a total of three years as a Political Advisor, first to COMISAF, and then to NATO. He also spent two months in Islamabad, Pakistan as the Political Advisor to the NATO Civilian Representative of the NATO Disaster Relief Mission following the earthquake in Kashmir. Since 2009, Mr Riggio has been the Regional Information Officer for Afghanistan and Central Asia, in the Public Diplomacy Division of the NATO Headquarters in Brussels.

IVAN SAFRANCHUK

Deputy Director, Institute of Contemporary International Studies, Diplomatic Academy, Moscow Dr. **Ivan Safranchuk** graduated in 1998 from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO). Dr. Safranchuk received the degree of candidate of sciences (Russian equivalent of Ph.D) from Academy of Military Sciences for the thesis on post-cold war nuclear strategy. From 1997 to 2001 he worked at the PIR Center for Policy Studies. In 2001 he joined Washingtonbased think-tank Center for Defense Information to open a branch office in Russia. In 2006 CDI was renamed into World Security Institute (WSI). In 2006 Dr. Safranchuk left WSI, but served advisor to WSI in the next two years. From 2003 Dr. Safranchuk lectures at MGIMO. From 2007 he publishes analytical magazine "Great Game: politics, business, security in Central Asia" and heads consulting firm LaTUK, specializing on energy, politics and security in Central Asia and neighboring regions. Through 2010 Dr. Safranchuk led the project, sponsored by Russian MFA, to research regional perspectives on the Afghani situation. Within this project bilateral workshops of Russian and local experts to discuss Afghani issues were organized in Kabul, Mazari-Sharif, Delhi, Beijing, Islamabad. In 2011-2013 Dr. Safranchuk coordinates the project "Strengthening economic ties between Afghanistan and neighboring countries", implemented through ESCAP on the Russian donation.

GIUSEPPE SCOGNAMIGLIO

Executive Vice-President for Public Affairs, Unicredit Spa, Rome Min. Plen. **Giuseppe Scognamiglio**, 49 years, Executive Vice President for Public Affairs of Unicredit Group. Before joining the banking group (2003), he served in the diplomatic service as chief of staff of the Minister for Foreign Affairs (2001) and Counselor for Foreign Policy of the Minister for Industry and Foreign Trade (1999-2001). He started his diplomatic career in 1989, in the desk United

Nations at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, then abroad as Consul in Izmir (Turkey) and Political and Press Counselor at the Italian Embassy in Buenos Aires. Member of the Board of Save the Children Italy. Since January 2013 he is Chairman of Editorial Company "EuropEye", which publishes the Review of International Policy and Economy "East".

STEFANO SILVESTRI

President, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome **Stefano Silvestri** has been President of the International Affairs Institute since 2001. He has been a lead writer for *Il Sole 24 Ore* since 1985. Between January 1995 and May 1996 he served as Under Secretary of State for Defence, having been an advisor to the Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, for European matters, in 1975, and a consultant to the Prime Minister's Office under various Governments. He continues to act as a consultant to both for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministries of Defence and Industry. As a professional journalist, he has been a special correspondent and columnist for *Globo* (1982), member of the Policy Committee of *Europeo* (1979), and has contributed articles on foreign and defence policy to numerous national daily papers. He was Professor for Mediterranean Security Issues at the Bologna Centre of Johns Hopkins University (1972-76), and has worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London (1971-1972). He is currently a member of administrative council of the Italian Industries Federation for Aerospace, Defence and Security (AIAD), and of the Trilateral Commission.

GÜLDENER SONUMUT

Bureau Chief NTV Turkey, Brussels Born on the 5th of September 1973 in Paris, Mr. **Güldener Sonumut** graduated from High School in Lycée Charles de Gaulle in Ankara in 1991. He then studied Mathematic in Université Louis Pasteur in Strasbourg France where he was graduated with a B.Sc. in Mathematics. He continued his education with a M.A in Polemology at the University of René Descartes in Strasbourg and finished his education with a M.A in Geopolitics at the University of Paris 8. He started his professional career as a journalist in 1994 in order to finance his studies. At that time, he worked as a free-lance in Strasbourg for a Turkish economic daily newspaper called *Dunya* and then became the permanent correspondent for that newspaper in 1996 in Paris. He moved to Brussels in 1998 as the correspondent of Turkey's first news network at that time NTV Turkey. NTV is a private owned news network with 27 correspondents abroad broadcasting 24/7 news in Turkish language. NTV's sister channel is CNBC-e which is CNBC-Europe broadcasting in Turkish language for Turkey and Turkish speaking community abroad. In 2000, Mr. So-



numut became the Bureau Chief of NTV in Brussels and in 2006 NTV's Chief European Correspondent network based in Brussels. He mainly covers Foreign Policy, Defense policy and humanitarian aid. Within that context Mr. Sonumut has an extensive experience in covering issues on war (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq) and Humanitarian aid (Earthquake in Turkey 1999, ACEH, Iran, Armenia, floodings, etc). In that regard, as a member of the French Geopolitics Quarterly magazine, Mr Sonumut has written a number of articles on Afghanistan, EU's defense policy, Turkey's new identity as regional power as well as articles regarding the future of the intelligence community. (*Revue Outre-Terre*)

#### MARIA SULTAN

Director-General, SASSI, Islamabad **Maria Sultan**, Director General of the South Asian Strategic Stability Insititue (SASSI) was formerly the deputy director of South Asian Strategic Stability Unit at the Bradford Disarmament Research Centre. She was formerly a Research Fellow at the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISSI) in Islamabad. ISSI is an independent think tank working as the research and development section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan. Ms. Sultan is a specialist in South Asian nuclear arms control issues, disarmament, and weapon systems development and has published widely in academic journals and the South Asian media. She has also worked as the Research Assistant in the Department of Peace Studies with Dr. Shaun Gregory on the nuclear command and control issues in South Asia. Before joining ISSI as a researcher Maria was a journalist working as an assistant editor in the influential English daily *The Muslim*. Her media work has also included time as an anchor person in both TV and radio current affairs programmes. She is also a contributor to different national and international dailies and research journals. Maria has already published extensively in academic journals. She is on the list of visiting faculty member/speaker at Pakistan's National Defense University, Pakistan Foreign Service Academy, Pakistan Naval War College and is a guest lecturer at the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Quaid-e-Azam University, Islamabad and the Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar and Command And Staff College Quetta. Maria is also registered with the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford for her PhD on 'Pakistan's nuclear arms control policy process'.

#### ABDUL RAHIM WARDAK

Political and Military Advisor to the President of Afghanistan His Excellency, General **Abdul Rahim Wardak** was appointed as the Senior Defense and Security Advisor to the President of Afghanistan in August 2012. He was the Minister of National Defense for Afghanistan from 24 Dec 2004 until August 2012.

He was responsible for the implementation of reform of the defense sector, including the creation and fielding of the Afghan National Army, reform of the Ministry of Defense and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of the former military and militia forces. He is a professional military Officer and former Chief of the General Staff for the Afghan Army. As a Commander of Mujahedeen forces in the war of national liberation against the Soviet Union, he conducted numerous highly successful Operations. Born in 1945, General Wardak is married, has 3 children and lives in Kabul.






The NDCF is a unique think-tank: international by design and based in Rome, due to its association with the NATO Defense College. Its added value lies in the objectives stated by its charter and in its international network.

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Objective of the conference was to explore the issues related to the Afghan engagement by the international community after the retreat of Allied combat units by December 2014. The conference was relevant for the work of major institutions present in theatre insofar it offered a rather precise picture of the possible end states, of the means necessary to achieve them and the major obstacles that can be found by the local government and its assisting countries on the path to full recovery of the country.

Regarding future scenarios the main hinge of the process will be the political transition from which the security and economic transition will depend. Without a political transition there is no transition at all and it must be built on the achievements of the last 11 years. The main responsibility rests with the Afghan leaders, despite the influence of some external actor.

After the final publication of the candidates' list in November 2013 there is still no certainty about the next leader, an essential figure to ensure a strong central government. Without it there will be the collapse of the army and security forces that actually are less coherent than desired. Without an adequate economic sustainability, the army risks to be vulnerable regarding its discipline, staying power and unbalanced ethnic distribution.

On the other hand it is essential to avoid in future a third marginalization of Afghanistan. Other important enabling factors are: the "weapon of mass instruction" (that will help in entrenching a democratic mentality and system); job creation; communication technology; exploitation of the natural resources; water management and the Afghan ownership of the transition.

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